State v. Suppah
| Decision Date | 06 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | A149412.,100016CT |
| Citation | 334 P.3d 463,264 Or.App. 510 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Roman Lance SUPPAH, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, and Laura E. Coffin, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before HASELTON, Chief Judge, and ARMSTRONG, WOLLHEIM, ORTEGA, SERCOMBE, DUNCAN, NAKAMOTO, HADLOCK, EGAN, DeVORE, TOOKEY, GARRETT, Judges, and SCHUMAN, Senior Judge.
In this criminal case, defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for giving false information to a police officer, ORS 807.620,1 assigning error to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during and after a traffic stop. He contends that the stop violated his rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution2 because it was not supported by probable cause, and he further contends that that violation tainted the evidence that he moved to suppress. The state does not dispute that the stop violated defendant's constitutional rights, but argues that the violation did not taint the evidence. Because we conclude that the violation tainted the evidence obtained during the stop and that admission of that evidence was prejudicial, we reverse and remand.
The relevant facts are undisputed. On July 14, 2010, defendant was driving a purple Cadillac on Interstate 84. Sherman County Deputy Sheriff Hulke pulled defendant over.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, Hulke testified that he stopped defendant for a traffic violation, but that he could not recall what the violation was. Hulke testified that it was the type of violation for which he would usually issue a warning to a driver; but Hulke did not issue a warning to defendant. Defendant's uncontradicted testimony was that Hulke did not inform him of the reason for the stop. Although, in his motion to suppress, defendant specifically asserted that there was no evidence that Hulke had a reason to stop him, the state did not respond by presenting any evidence—such as a dispatch record or police report—that Hulke had ever given notice of, or recorded, any reason for the stop.3
During the stop, Hulke asked defendant for his name and defendant gave the name “Harold Pennington,” which is the name of one of defendant's friends. Hulke ran Pennington's name through dispatch, learned that Pennington's driver's license was suspended, and issued defendant a traffic citation in Pennington's name for driving while suspended and—because defendant had been unable to provide proof of insurance—for driving uninsured.
Approximately one month later, defendant informed a staff member of the district attorney's office that he had given a false name during the traffic stop. Thereafter, Sherman County Deputy Sheriff Shull telephoned defendant and obtained an oral statement. Defendant told Shull that he had given a false name because he did not have a valid license at the time of the stop and he did not want the car, which belonged to his girlfriend, to be towed. Defendant also told Shull that he had given Pennington's name because he had thought that Pennington had a valid license, and that he wanted to make sure that Pennington “didn't get in trouble.” Shull asked defendant to go to his local police department and complete a written statement. Defendant did so, and the police department sent the statement to Shull. Thereafter, the state charged defendant with giving false information to a police officer based on his statements during the traffic stop.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during and after the traffic stop. In his written motion, defendant moved to suppress “the seizure and identification of Defendant, any statements or admissions made by Defendant, all observations of Defendant, all evidence including identification, seized from Defendant and/or the vehicle in which he was driving on July 14, 2010.” Defendant asserted that Hulke “pull[ed] [him] over without cause and ask[ed] for [his] identification” and that doing so “constitute[d] an unlawful seizure similar to the one struck down in State v. Toevs, 327 Or. 525, 964 P.2d 1007 (1998).” Defendant further asserted that, because the stop was unlawful, the evidence obtained as a result of the stop had to be suppressed under the “attenuation analysis delineated in [State v. Hall, 339 Or. 7, 115 P.3d 908 (2005) ].” Similarly, at the hearing on his motion, defendant argued that the evidence obtained during and after the traffic stop had to be suppressed under Hall. Defendant argued that the evidence was “directly tied to that stop” and that there was “no factual attenuation” between the stop and the discovery of the evidence.
The state did not dispute that Hulke had stopped defendant unlawfully. But, the state argued that the causal connection between the unlawful stop and the discovery of the evidence was attenuated. The state's theory regarding the statements that defendant made during the stop was that the statements were attenuated from the stop because defendant made them because “[h]e didn't want to get his girlfriend's car towed.” The state's theory regarding the statements that defendant made after the stop was that they were attenuated from the stop because defendant volunteered them a month after the stop and because he made them “so his friend wouldn't get in trouble.”
Accepting the state's arguments, the trial court stated:
After the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the court acquitted him of driving while suspended, but convicted him of giving false information to a police officer. Defendant appeals.
As mentioned, defendant assigns error to the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop. He renews his argument that, under the exclusionary rule of Article I, section 9, the evidence is inadmissible because it is the unattenuated product of the illegal stop. His argument focuses on the admissibility of his statements, both the oral statements that he made during the stop and the oral and written statements that he made one month after the stop.4 He asserts that all of the statements were erroneously admitted, but that, even if the later statements were properly admitted, the erroneous admission of the earlier statements was harmful because, without the earlier statements, the later statements would not have been corroborated and the state would not have been able to prove that he committed the crime of giving false information to a police officer. See ORS 136.425 ().5
In response, the state argues that all of defendant's statements were properly admitted because the causal connection between the stop and the statements is attenuated. The state acknowledges that the stop made it possible for Hulke to question defendant and that defendant's statements during the stop were in response to Hulke's questioning, but contends that the statements are admissible because defendant chose to give a false name. According to the state, “defendant's unilateral, voluntary decision to lie about his identity attenuated the ‘discovery’ of the evidence from the prior illegality.” The state also argues, for the first time on appeal, that defendant's statements are admissible because they are evidence of a “new independent crime-providing false information to a police officer.” As support for that argument, the state relies on an exception to the exclusionary rule that applies to evidence of “independent crimes directed at officers who illegally stop, frisk, arrest or search,” State v. Gaffney, 36 Or.App. 105, 108, 583 P.2d 582 (1978), rev. den., 285 Or. 195 (1979), but the state acknowledges that “this case does not present the same type of officer-safety concerns “as the cases in which we have applied the Gaffney exception.
Article I, section 9, protects individuals from unreasonable government searches and seizures. It prohibits government officers from interfering with individuals' rights to privacy and liberty.
Article I, section 9, applies to traffic stops. State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or. 610, 618, 227 P.3d 695 (2010). To be constitutional, a stop for the purpose of investigating a traffic violation must be based on probable cause that the person to be stopped has committed the violation. ORS 810.410(2), (3) ; State v. Matthews, 320 Or. 398, 402, 884 P.2d 1224 (1994). The probable cause requirement serves to protect the rights of all individuals to travel without unjustified interference by government officers; it helps to ensure that government officers exercise their authority only for proper purposes.
When a defendant moves to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless seizure on the ground that the seizure violated Article I, section 9, the state bears the burden of proving that the seizure was constitutional. State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227, 237, 666 P.2d 802 (1983). In this case, the state did not establish that Hulke had probable cause to stop defendant. Therefore, as the trial court held, the stop violated defendant's ...
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