State v. Suriner

Decision Date23 January 2013
Docket NumberNo. 39258.,39258.
Citation294 P.3d 1093,154 Idaho 81
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
Parties STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Todd James SURINER, Defendant–Appellant.

Diane M. Walker, Deputy State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, argued for appellant.

Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, argued for respondent.

SUBSTITUTE OPINION

THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION FILED ON NOVEMBER 15, 2012 IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Ada County contending that there was not sufficient evidence corroborating the defendant's confession to support his conviction for sexually abusing his two young daughters. We hold that the corroboration was sufficient and affirm the judgment of conviction. We also overrule our prior decisions adopting the corpus delicti rule.

I.Factual Background.

Todd Suriner (Defendant) is the father of twin girls who, in December 2008, were about three and one-half years of age. One of the daughters mentioned to her aunt that the Defendant had hurt her "business," which is the word she had been taught to use when referring to her vagina. Law enforcement was contacted, and on December 18, 2008, a detective telephoned the Defendant and asked to meet with him. He went to the detective's office, denied any wrongdoing, and agreed to submit to a polygraph.

After arriving at the sheriff's office for the polygraph, but before it was administered, the Defendant admitted that for the past year he had been sexually abusing his daughters by inserting his finger into their vaginas and then masturbating. He stated that he abused them on Sundays while his wife was at work. The Defendant confessed to sexually abusing them during two separate interviews with detectives that were held five days apart.

On December 30, 2008, the Defendant was charged with two counts of lewd conduct in violation of Idaho Code section 18–1508 (one count for each daughter). He pled not guilty and was tried before a jury. During the trial, the State offered into evidence the Defendant's videotaped confessions and audiotapes of remorseful telephone calls he had made from jail. The State also presented the testimony of a pediatrician who had conducted a physical examination of the girls. His examination did not reveal any trauma or injury that is associated with sexual abuse, but he testified that the lack of such physical evidence is not unusual and that from 66% to 95% of children who are seen for allegations of sexual abuse and penetration will have a normal exam. The State also called the Defendant's wife as a witness, and she testified that he was alone with the girls on Sundays while she was at work.

After the State rested, the Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal based upon the corpus delicti rule on the ground that the State had not produced evidence that a crime had occurred independently from the Defendant's confession. The district court denied the motion, and the Defendant declined to testify or offer any evidence. The jury returned a verdict finding the Defendant guilty of both counts of lewd conduct. The court later sentenced the Defendant on both counts to twenty-five years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with five years determinate and the remaining twenty years indeterminate, with the sentences to be concurrent. The court retained jurisdiction for 180 days, but later declined to place the Defendant on probation and remanded him into the custody of the Board of Correction to serve his sentence. The Defendant timely appealed.

The appeal was initially heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals, which reversed the conviction on the ground that there was no evidence corroborating the Defendant's confessions as required by the corpus delicti rule. The State filed a petition for review, which we granted. In cases that come before this Court on a petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision, we directly review the decision of the lower court as if the appeal came directly to this Court. Head v. State, 137 Idaho 1, 2, 43 P.3d 760, 761 (2002).

II.Did the District Court Err in Holding that There Was Sufficient Corroboration Under the Corpus Delicti Rule?

The corpus delicti rule is "the fact that a crime has been committed cannot be proved by the extrajudicial confessions or statements of the prisoner, and that there must be some evidence or corroborating circumstances tending to show that a crime has been committed, aside from such confessions or statements." State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 704, 70 P. 1051, 1052 (1902). There was no common-law corpus delicti rule in England. "There the courts have been hesitant to lay down a rule that an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession may not send an accused to prison or to death," Opper v. U.S., 348 U.S. 84, 89, 75 S.Ct. 158, 162, 99 L.Ed. 101, 106 (1954), although there were statutes that prohibited a conviction for specific crimes on the uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of a defendant, See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 357 (21st ed. 1844).

In adopting a corpus delicti rule, the courts in this country have not been uniform in applying the rule. Because the rule is court created, each jurisdiction has determined what can constitute the necessary corroboration. Some have required independent evidence of each element of the crime, while others have required much less corroboration. See Opper, 348 U.S. at 92–93, 75 S.Ct. at 164–65, 99 L.Ed. at 108–09, (wherein the Supreme Court reviewed the various ways in which federal courts had applied the corroboration requirement); 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 777 (2008) (discussing varying applications of the rule).

In denying the motion for a judgment of acquittal, the district court held that there was sufficient evidence corroborating the Defendant's confession under the corpus delicti rule adopted in Idaho. The court relied upon (a) the fact that the Defendant confessed twice, several days apart; (b) the confessions were videotaped, allowing the jury to assess whether there were any pressures that might cause a false confession; (c) the Defendant initiated telephone calls from the jail in which he made incriminating statements; and (d) the pediatrician's examination of the girls could not rule out sexual abuse. The issue is whether the district court's application of the rule is consistent with our prior opinions. We hold that it is.

In 1902, this Court adopted the corpus delicti rule in State v. Keller. The defendant had been convicted of violating a quarantine by bringing sheep through Box Elder County, Utah, into Idaho. 8 Idaho at 703, 70 P. at 1051. The evidence produced by the State in its case-in-chief consisted of the Governor's quarantine proclamation and the testimony of one witness. Id. at 703–04, 70 P. at 1052. On March 19, 1901, the Governor of Idaho had issued a proclamation pursuant to Idaho's quarantine laws prohibiting the bringing of any sheep into Idaho for a period of forty days from or through certain specified areas including Box Elder County. Id. at 703, 70 P. at 1052. The witness testified that on April 12, 1901, he went with the defendant to his sheep camp in Oneida County, Idaho, where there was a band of the defendant's sheep containing about 2,000 head and the defendant stated that two or three days earlier he had driven the sheep into Idaho through Box Elder County. Id. at 703–04, 70 P. at 1052. At the close of the State's case, the defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant on the ground that there was insufficient evidence corroborating his out-of-court statement, which the court refused to do. Id. at 704, 70 P. at 1052. This Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion. We held that only slight corroborating facts were required and that there was sufficient corroboration, which we described as follows:

We think the above evidence sufficiently corroborates the statement of the defendant that said sheep had been brought by him from Box Elder county, Utah, subsequent to the date of the governor's proclamation, and prior to the twelfth day of April, 1901. The witness saw the sheep in Oneida county. Defendant claimed to own them, and stated that he had wintered them on the desert, and had brought them through Box Elder county, Utah, into Idaho, two or three days prior to the 12th of that month.

Id.

The only evidence corroborating the defendant's out-of-court statement was the witness's testimony that on April 12, 1901, he was at the defendant's sheep camp in Oneida County, Idaho, where the defendant had about 2,000 head of sheep. Although the defendant having the sheep in Idaho was a fact that the State was required to prove, it was not a crime for the defendant to have had sheep in Idaho on that date. It was only a crime to have brought them through Box Elder County within forty days after the Governor's proclamation. The witness's observation of the sheep in Idaho would not in any way corroborate the truthfulness of the defendant's statement that he had brought those sheep through Box Elder County within the last two or three days. Thus, there was no corroboration of that portion of the defendant's statement that made having the sheep in Idaho criminal, which was bringing them into Idaho through Box Elder County after the Governor's proclamation. Nevertheless, this Court held that the corroboration was sufficient.

In State v. Urie, 92 Idaho 71, 437 P.2d 24 (1968), the defendant conspired with a man named Fraley to obtain money from an insurance company for serious injuries that Fraley had allegedly suffered, including alleged paralysis of his left leg, when he fell into an elevator pit on the premises of the defendant's employer. Id. at 72, 437 P.2d at 25. The defendant made statements to the insurance company supporting Fraley's claim, and the company ultimately settled the claim by paying Fraley $25,000. Id. When the defendant did not receive his promised share of the...

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