State v. Sutherland
Citation | 329 Or. 359,987 P.2d 501 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Relator, v. Myron Robert SUTHERLAND, Jr., Defendant-Adverse Party. |
Decision Date | 07 October 1999 |
Court | Supreme Court of Oregon |
Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for plaintiff-relator. With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Peter J. Richard, of Aspell, Della-Rose & Richard, Klamath Falls, argued the cause and filed the brief for defendant-adverse party.
Emily Simon, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for amici curiae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association and State Public Defender. With her on the brief was David Groom, State Public Defender.
This is an original mandamus proceeding brought under ORS 34.250 and Article VII (Amended), section 2, of the Oregon Constitution. Petitioner, the State of Oregon (the state), asks this court to overturn an order of the circuit court entered before trial in the underlying criminal case, which presently is set for trial beginning on October 13, 1999, in the Klamath County Circuit Court. Defendant is charged with assault in the second degree, ORS 163.175. In its order, the trial court released defendant on conditions not relevant here, after refusing to impose a pretrial security release amount of not less than $50,000 under ORS 135.240(5), set out post.
The state sought an alternative writ of mandamus from this court directing the trial court to enter an order requiring that defendant be taken into custody pending his posting a security release deposit in an amount not less than $50,000 or to show cause why it had not done so. This court issued an alternative writ. The trial court declined to issue the order contemplated by the writ, the matter was briefed and argued, and the case now is before this court for decision. For the reasons that follow, a peremptory writ shall issue.
The right to pretrial release of persons who, like defendant, are accused of "Measure 11" offenses1 is addressed in two subsections of ORS 135.240.2 Subsection (4) of that statute provides, in part:
Subsection (5) of ORS 135.240 provides, in part:
Thus, ORS 135.240(4) requires a trial court to deny release to a defendant accused of committing a Measure 11 offense, unless the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant will not commit any new crime while on release. ORS 135.240(5) then sets out an alternative scheme to be applied if ORS 135.240(4) is found to be unconstitutional. Defendant, the trial court, and the state all agree that subsection (4) of ORS 135.240 is unconstitutional. As explained below, we conclude that that agreement is well founded.
Article I, section 14, of the Oregon Constitution, provides:
The question is whether ORS 135.240(4) is valid in light of that constitutional provision. To answer that question, we examine the text, case law, and history surrounding Article I, section 14. See Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or. 411, 415-16, 840 P.2d 65 (1992)
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840 P.2d 65 ( ). Accordingly, we conclude that ORS 135.240(4) is unconstitutional under Article I, section 14, of the Oregon Constitution. We turn to the issue that the parties have joined here, viz., the constitutionality of ORS 135.240(5).
At the pretrial hearing in this case, defendant asserted that ORS 135.240(5) is unconstitutional on various grounds. After a brief colloquy, the trial court adhered to its ruling in previous cases that the statute is facially unconstitutional under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution,3 as well as under various provisions of the United States Constitution.4 As noted, the court then ordered defendant's release under conditions not at issue here.
For a statute to be facially unconstitutional, it must be unconstitutional in all circumstances, i.e., there can be no reasonably likely circumstances in which application of the statute would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., State v. Chakerian, 325 Or. 370, 381, 938 P.2d 756 (1997)
( )(quoting State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 411 n. 8, 649 P.2d 569 (1982)); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ( ). Defendant and amici do not argue that the $50,000 amount itself makes the statute facially unconstitutional. Both acknowledge (and we agree) that there will be circumstances in which imposing a security release requirement in that amount would be reasonable.
Defendant and amici do advance three other arguments as to why ORS 135.240(5) is unconstitutional, however. First, they argue that the effect of the statute is to set bail for all Measure 11 defendants without a hearing, contrary to due process. Second, they argue that the statute sets a mandatory minimum security amount of $50,000 for all Measure 11 defendants, which violates due process and deprives defendants of the presumption of innocence. Third, they argue that a $50,000 security amount is excessive for indigent defendants and arbitrarily divides Measure 11 defendants into two classes, those who can pay the security amount and those who cannot.
The premise underlying defendant's and amici's arguments is that, under ORS 135.240(5), a Measure 11 defendant is not entitled to a hearing or individualized consideration of his or her circumstances before the trial court imposes and enforces the minimum $50,000 security release requirement. That premise itself raises at least two questions of statutory construction. The first is whether a right to a hearing exists under the statute. The second is whether, absent a provision granting such a right in the statute, the right nonetheless exists because of a separate source of law, either statutory or constitutional. We begin by examining the text and context of ORS 135.240(5). See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610-12, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993)
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As to the question whether there is a right to a hearing under ORS 135.240(5),...
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