State v. Swanigan

Decision Date18 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. 88,347.,88
PartiesSTATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. JAMI DEL SWANIGAN, Appellant.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Debra J. Wilson, capital appellate defender, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Bobby J. Hiebert, Jr., assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Ellen Mitchell, county attorney, and Phill Kline, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

NUSS, J.:

Jami Del Swanigan was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. State v. Swanigan, No. 88,347, unpublished opinion filed December 19, 2003. We granted Swanigan's petition for review pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(b).

Swanigan now raises two issues on appeal:

(1) Did the trial court err in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during police interrogations?
(2) Did the trial court err by failing to give a jury instruction regarding the voluntariness and truth of Swanigan's statements?

We reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial because of error on issue one, which makes the second issue moot.

FACTS

Shortly before 4 a.m. on October 26, 2000, the Kwik Shop on West Cloud Street in Salina was robbed. According to clerk Krystal Keefer, she saw a black man put his hand up to the glass of the front window and look inside. He then rushed in the front door with a gun. Several times the robber told her to hurry and at one point told her that he would shoot her or kill her if she did not go faster. She opened the cash drawer, grabbed the bills, and handed them to the robber. As she began to grab the change, the robber turned and ran out the front door to the east. The robber stole $100 to $102.

Beverly Rindt saw a small compact car that was white, gray, or silver in color pull up behind her van. After she was done bagging newspapers in her van, she turned to go to the Kwik Shop and saw a man leave the shop and run east toward the car. Eric Harper also saw a little white car and a Ford Ranger in the area at that time.

Surveillance cameras at the Kwik Shop captured video images of the robber. The man was wearing a blue bandana over his nose and mouth, blue denim shorts, a long-sleeved black or blue shirt, tennis shoes, and white socks. A photograph of the robber taken from the video was posted at the police station, and Lieutenant Christopher Trocheck believed the person shown to be Jami Swanigan.

Five days after the robbery, Shari Lanham, the lead investigator, accompanied another officer to Jessica Wegele's house, where Swanigan was staying. Lanham asked Swanigan if he would come to the police department to answer questions about this robbery and other recent convenience store robberies in Salina. He agreed and rode in a patrol car to the station. Upon his arrival, he was placed in a locked waiting room for 30 to 45 minutes before the interrogation began.

The interrogation lasted from 5:03 p.m. until 6:20 p.m., with all but the first few minutes recorded on audiotape. When it began, Lanham read Swanigan his Miranda rights, which Swanigan indicated he understood. Swanigan first denied knowing anything about the robberies, but eventually said he had heard Marcus Brown was involved. Lanham falsely told Swanigan that his fingerprints had been found at the scene. She also informed him that he had been caught on the surveillance camera. Swanigan had no explanation for either fact, except that he had possibly been at the store before.

After Swanigan took a bathroom break, Lieutenant Mike Sweeney, who was in charge of criminal investigations and who supervised Lanham, joined the interrogation. Swanigan gave Sweeney and Lanham several different stories, but each version contained facts that were contrary to what the officers knew from the eyewitnesses. When confronted with the discrepancies, Swanigan then denied any involvement in the robbery.

Investigator James Feldman then joined the interrogation. Right after Feldman's comments, Swanigan confessed to the robbery. When a discrepancy arose over the clothes the robber had worn, Feldman showed Swanigan a photo from the surveillance video. Swanigan immediately denied the photo was of him and denied that he had any involvement in the robbery. Based primarily upon his interrogation — since latent fingerprints taken from the store, including the front window, were found not to be his — he was arrested and charged with aggravated robbery. Swanigan also gave the police an oral statement the next day, November 1, in which he again not only confessed to the robbery, but also then began providing facts that the officers knew were untrue, so they ended the interrogation.

On January 5, 2001, Swanigan filed a motion to suppress his two statements. At the February 23, 2001, suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The State introduced information from the statements into evidence at the jury trial where Swanigan was convicted of aggravated robbery. Based upon Swanigan's criminal history classification, the court sentenced him to 88 months in prison.

ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in denying Swanigan's motion to suppress?
Voluntariness Determination

In Swanigan's motion to suppress, he alleged that his statements were not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. Specifically, Swanigan alleged that the police used coercive and deceptive tactics, including providing him false information that his fingerprints matched those found at the crime scene and promising that his cooperation in the investigation would help him.

At the hearing, Lieutenant Sweeney and investigators Lanham and Feldman testified, as did Dr. Robert Schulman, a clinical psychologist who had evaluated Swanigan for the defense. Admitted into evidence was a photograph of the robber taken from the surveillance video, Dr. Schulman's report, and an audiotape of the October 31 police interrogation to which the trial court later listened. In later denying the motion, the court stated:

"Well, here's what I have to decide. I have to decide, regarding the voluntariness of statements, whether the State has proved by a preponderance of the evidence, considering the totality of the circumstances, whether Mr. Swanigan's statements were freely and voluntarily made. There's no question he was advised of his Miranda warnings. That's not an issue. He was. The Court listened to the tape. There were some allegations that Mr. Swanigan was misled by some of the officers indicating that they'd found fingerprints when, in fact, they had not, or at least that his matched fingerprints found when they were not. There was also the suggestion that, Mr. Swanigan, that your physical and psychological state was such that your will was overcome by police tactics. There was also an allegation made that you were promised leniency.
"I've listened — I listened to the evidence on Friday. I listened to the tape. It is my thought that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that the State has proved by a preponderance of the evidence the statements should be admissible into evidence. Miranda warnings were given. Now, police interrogation is never pleasant. There's always, by the very nature of the police atmosphere, some coercive circumstances or atmosphere. That's the reason the Miranda warnings are given. They recognized that in Miranda that at least a subject should be told that they have a right to remain silent. Now, Mr. Swanigan could have exercised his right to remain silent any time. He could have asked for counsel. He did not.
"I listened to the officers on the tape, and I listened to them testify. There's no way in the world that anyone could conclude after listening to that tape that Officer Shari Lanham exercised undue coercion on Mr. Swanigan. At no time were voices raised. At no time were any threats uttered. On the whole, it seemed to be a pretty level interrogation. It lasted just a little over an hour. There were breaks taken. I can't see in these particular circumstances how anyone could look at that circumstance and say that Mr. Swanigan wasn't treated humanely. He was. I don't see any indication of out-of-bounds conduct by the police.
"Now, as far as the promises made, Mr. Swanigan was told several times that if he cooperated that that would be conveyed to anybody who might pursue the case. No specific promises of leniency were made. As a matter of fact, several times, the Court heard on the tape that Lieutenant Sweeney indicated that there couldn't be any promises made by those in authority. So, I think the conduct of the police is within bounds, and that's my decision on that.
. . . .
"I did — I failed to mention that at the hearing the defendant called an expert witness, Dr. Robert Schulman, Ph.D., licensed clinical psychologist. In his report, in his testimony, he indicated that the clinical examination of Mr. Swanigan was within normal limits. He also concluded there's no indication of any underlying associative thought disorder. . . . The overall cognitive functioning, while low, is generally intact.
"It would seem to me that — the Court considered that testimony. I found nothing there that would lead me to believe that Mr. Swanigan was of such a psychological state that it was improper for the police to interrogate and talk to him. And, by the way, there's no allegation the police induced to cause that psychological state. And, for all of these reasons, the Court believes simply that the State has proved by preponderance of the evidence that the statements of Mr. Swanigan on October 31st of the year 2000, and the next day, follow-up, should be admitted into evidence."

Our standard of review of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law is well-known:

"In reviewing a district court's decision regarding suppression, this court reviews the factual
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