State v. Sweat
Decision Date | 06 December 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 3898.,3898. |
Citation | 362 S.C. 117,606 S.E.2d 508 |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Johnny Phillip SWEAT, Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Assistant Appellate Defender Aileen P. Clare, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Ralph E. Hoisington, of Charleston, for Respondent.
Johnny Phillip Sweat (Sweat) appeals his convictions of first-degree burglary, assault and battery with intent to kill, and three counts of assault of a high and aggravated nature. Sweat contends the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of a prior bad act of domestic abuse. We affirm.
Robin Sweat (Robin) and Sweat lived together for approximately nine years and had two children together. Although they had participated in a marriage ceremony, Robin discovered that Sweat was still married to a previous wife, and, therefore, Robin and Sweat were not legally married. She reported Sweat for criminal domestic violence in October of 2001 (the October incident). While he was in jail for that offense, she moved in with her brother, Chris Hasty, and became romantically involved with Bobby Blake (Blake). The incident giving rise to the convictions at issue on appeal took place on December 11, 2001 — eleven days after Sweat was released from jail for the October incident.
Sweat invaded a home occupied by Robin; Robin's brother, Chris Hasty; Robin's boyfriend, Blake; Hasty's roommate, John Greene; a friend, Deon Dent; and two children: Robin's oldest son, Robert; and Deon's nephew. Sweat, brandishing a knife, forced his way through the front door. Robin and Blake were in a bedroom and the others were in the living room. Sweat began yelling and continued waving the knife. Robin and Blake emerged from the bedroom to investigate the commotion. Sweat became more upset when he saw Robin and Blake. Robin, Blake, Hasty, and Greene retreated to a back bedroom, and Blake held the door shut as Sweat attempted to enter. Sweat eventually opened the door enough to insert his arm — with knife in hand — into the room. He continued to swipe with the knife and severely cut Blake on the hand.
Unable to breach the bedroom from the inside, Sweat exited the house and attempted to enter the bedroom through an outside window. He broke the window, but was unable to fully enter the room because the headboard of a waterbed was blocking the window. He returned inside the house, again trying to breach the back bedroom. Unsuccessful, Sweat finally left. He was apprehended the next day.
At trial, the State introduced Robin's testimony — first in camera, and then in the presence of the jury — of the incident of domestic violence that took place in October of 2001. Robin, Sweat, and Sweat's brother and sister-in-law were together when Sweat directed Robin to take off her shirt and show his brother her breasts. When Robin refused, Sweat began yelling and calling her a "fat bitch." He attempted to physically pull off her shirt, and in the ensuing struggle, Robin's arm was bruised.
A few days later, Robin reported the October incident to the authorities. She explained at trial that she desired to end the relationship and saw the incident as her opportunity to escape. Sweat was arrested for criminal domestic violence. He spent forty-five days in jail, but was released after Robin signed a statement that the October event did not actually happen. At trial, Robin averred that she copied the statement at the request of her sister-in-law and acquiesced in signing it because
Additionally, Robin gave a general account of the authoritarian and imperious personality of Sweat, which consisted of: (1) dictating when and what she could eat; (2) hanging up or breaking the telephone if she stayed on too long; (3) compelling her to drink alcoholic beverages; and (4) forcing her to have sex.
Defense counsel moved to exclude evidence of prior episodes of domestic violence on the grounds that it was impermissible character evidence. The State argued that the prior evidence was admissible to show motive and intent. Sweat objected that: (1) the evidence was irrelevant; (2) it could not be shown by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. After an in camera review, the trial judge ruled evidence of the October incident was admissible to show motive and intent and to provide a full picture of the events leading up to the night of the attack. However, the trial judge disallowed other instances of domestic violence because she found them irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. On appeal, Sweat argues admission of the October incident was error. We disagree and affirm.
Generally, South Carolina law precludes evidence of a defendant's prior crimes or other bad acts to prove the defendant's guilt for the crime charged. State v. Beck, 342 S.C. 129, 536 S.E.2d 679 (2000); State v. Gillian, 360 S.C. 433, 602 S.E.2d 62 (Ct.App.2004); State v. Mathis, 359 S.C. 450, 597 S.E.2d 872 (Ct.App.2004); State v. Weaverling, 337 S.C. 460, 523 S.E.2d 787 (Ct.App.1999). In State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923), our supreme court articulated the exceptions to this general rule excluding bad character evidence. Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other; and (5) the identity of the person charged with commission of the present crime. Lyle at 416, 118 S.E. at 807; State v. Bell, 302 S.C. 18, 393 S.E.2d 364 (1990); State v. Pagan, 357 S.C. 132, 591 S.E.2d 646 (Ct.App.2004); see also Anderson v. State, 354 S.C. 431, 581 S.E.2d 834 (2003) ( ).
" State v. Humphries, 346 S.C. 435, 448, 551 S.E.2d 286, 293 (Ct.App.2001) (Anderson, concurring)rev'd on other grounds,354 S.C. 87, 579 S.E.2d 613 (2003); see also State v. Tutton, 354 S.C. 319, 327, 580 S.E.2d 186, 190 (Ct.App.2003) ( ).
At the conclusion of Robin's in camera testimony, the trial judge ruled the October incident was admissible under both the motive and intent exceptions of Rule 404(b) and Lyle. In reaching her decision to admit evidence of the October incident, the trial judge stated:
We agree that both motive and intent can be inferred from the prior bad act. Following the October assault, Robin reported Sweat's conduct and Sweat spent forty-five days in jail. He was released eleven days before the December incident occurred. Robin became involved with Blake and refused to resume her relationship with Sweat. Within days, Sweat perpetrated the December 11 attack. Thus, the October incident and Sweat's time in jail relate to his actions on December 11, 2001.
The State had to prove malice as an element of assault and battery with intent to kill (ABIK). See State v. Wilds, 355 S.C. 269, 584 S.E.2d 138 (2003) (). "Generally, motive is not an element of a crime that the prosecution must prove to establish the crime charged, but frequently motive is circumstantial evidence ... of the intent to commit the crime when intent or state of mind is in issue." Danny R. Collins, South Carolina Evidence 319 (2d ed.2000). "State of mind is an issue any time malice or willfulness is an element of the crime." Id. Therefore, the October incident was properly admitted.
In State v. Thomas, 248 S.C. 573, 151 S.E.2d 855 (1966) overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) ( ), the defendant was convicted of rape. Our supreme court found evidence the defendant had previously stolen the victim's watch was properly admissible under the motive exception to Lyle. The victim had testified against the defendant for stealing the watch. The defendant allegedly said to the victim on the night of the rape, "" Thomas, 248 S.C. at 576, 151 S.E.2d at 857. In affirming the admission of the prior bad act, the court concluded:
We think that all of the evidence here, which only incidentally tended to prove the...
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