State v. Sweat

• Decision Date: 18 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-1975-CR,95-1975-CR
• Citation: 561 N.W.2d 695,208 Wis.2d 409
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Robert W. SWEAT, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 695

561 N.W.2d 695

208 Wis.2d 409

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Robert W. SWEAT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-1975-CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Jan. 10, 1997.

Decided April 18, 1997.

For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause was argued by Maureen McGlynn Flanagan, Assistant Attorney General with whom on the briefs were Thomas J. Fallon, Assistant Attorney General, and James E. Doyle, Attorney General.

For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Leon S. Schmidt, Jr. and Schmidt, Grace & Duncan, Wisconsin Rapids, and oral argument by Leon S. Schmidt, Jr.

¶1 DONALD W. STEINMETZ, Justice

The issue presented in this case is whether in restitution proceedings, Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) ¹ allows a defendant to assert a civil rather than criminal statute of limitations, and its related civil tolling and discovery rules, to bar individual crime victims' claims for restitution. The Wood County Circuit Court, the Honorable John V. Finn, presiding, answered "no" and denied the defendant's claim that the civil statute of limitations and its related tolling principles applied to limit restitution. The court ordered the defendant, Robert W. Sweat, to pay a total of $364,597.23 in restitution to some 23 victims of his criminal racketeering scheme. Reversing the circuit court's order of restitution, the court of appeals found that the civil statute of limitations applies to restitution proceedings. State v. Sweat, 202 Wis.2d 366, 550 N.W.2d 709 (Ct.App.1996).

¶2 Based on our reading of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) in conjunction with the rest of § 973.20, and considering the purposes of the restitution statute, we hold that the same statute of limitations that applies in the underlying criminal proceedings, Wis. Stat. § 939.74, ² including its tolling provisions, also applies in the related restitution proceedings. We therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision.

¶3 The defendant, Sweat, was charged with one count of racketeering, Wis. Stat. § 946.83(3), based on four or more acts of securities fraud in violation of Wis. Stat. § 551.41(2) ³ which were charged as separate counts of the complaint. The defendant entered a negotiated no-contest plea to a single count information charging him with racketeering.

¶4 By his plea, the defendant admitted that, between August 6, 1986, and December 6, 1988, as president of Sweat Insurance, Inc., he intentionally and feloniously, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of securities, participated in the corporate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering by committing acts of securities fraud in violation of Wis. Stat. § 551.41(2) on at least three occasions. In each instance, the defendant failed to inform named investors of material facts that: (1) he had been convicted of theft by fraud in 1983 for conversion of insurance premiums; (2) his intermediary-agent's license had been suspended for 340 days as a result of that conviction; and (3) he had declared bankruptcy in 1983 and had all debts discharged.

¶5 The defendant urges this court to affirm the court of appeals' decision. He argues that Wis. Stat. § 973.20 is unambiguous on its face, and should therefore be interpreted based on the plain meaning of its terms. Sweat asserts that "any defense available in a civil action" means just that--any defense. Even when considering the statute in its entirety, Sweat argues that it is unambiguous because statutes of limitation are substantive defenses and therefore cannot be waived for purposes of restitution proceedings. Finally, Sweat argues that the court of appeals' interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) is not inconsistent with other provisions of § 973.20. We disagree with the defendant on all facets of his argument. ⁴

¶6 Resolution of the issue presented in this case requires the interpretation of at least two related statutes, Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3), providing the statute of limitations in criminal prosecutions, and Wis. Stat. § 973.20, ⁵ the restitution statute. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this court reviews independently, without deference to the lower courts. State v. Sher, 149 Wis.2d 1, 8, 437 N.W.2d 878 (1989). This court uses a two-step process for interpreting statutes:

The ultimate goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. The first step of this process is to look at the language of the statute. If the plain meaning of the statute is clear, a court need not look to rules of statutory construction or other extrinsic aids. Instead, a court should simply apply the clear meaning of the statute to the facts before it. If, however, the statute is ambiguous, this court must look beyond the statute's language and examine the scope, history, context, subject matter, and purpose of the statute.

UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis.2d 274, 281-82, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996). (citations omitted.)

¶7 According to this court in UFE Inc., the first step is to determine whether a statute is ambiguous. "[A] statutory provision is ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning." UFE Inc., 201 Wis.2d at 283, 548 N.W.2d 57, quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis.2d 650, 662, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995). Ambiguity can be found in the words of the statutory provision itself, or by the words of the provision as they interact with and relate to other provisions in the statute and to other statutes. In re Custody of D.M.M., 137 Wis.2d 375, 386, 404 N.W.2d 530 (1987).

¶8 When construing a statutory provision, the entire section and related sections of the statute should be considered. Id. See also, White Hen Pantry v. Buttke, 98 Wis.2d 119, 122, 295 N.W.2d 763 (Ct.App.1980), rev'd on other grounds, citing Omernik v. State, 64 Wis.2d 6, 12, 218 N.W.2d 734 (1974). In determining the meaning of a single word or a single phrase in a statute, it is necessary to view it in light of the entire statute. Buttke, 98 Wis.2d at 122, 295 N.W.2d 763 (citation omitted).

¶9 Seizing on one sentence, indeed one word, of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), in isolation, the court of appeals literally drew the successive conclusions that civil statutes of limitation apply in restitution proceedings and that civil tolling statutes and judge-made civil discovery rules must be applied to the disposition of restitution claims. The word is "any" in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), and the court of appeals claimed that it is an unambiguous term, so no further analysis need be done.

¶10 The court of appeals' error was in its characterization of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) as unambiguous. This characterization is possible only if one looks exclusively at the word "any," while ignoring the remainder of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) itself, Wis. Stat. § 973.20 as a whole, and related statutes, particularly Wis. Stat. § 939.74. Ambiguity in a statute can be created by the interaction of two separate statutes, as well as by the interaction of words and structure of a single statute. In re Custody of D.M.M., 137 Wis.2d 375, 386, 404 N.W.2d 530.

¶11 The statutory provision at issue in this case is Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), which provides in relevant part that "[t]he defendant may assert any defense that he or she could raise in a civil action for the loss sought to be compensated." When read alone, this provision appears to be clear and unambiguous. However, when read in conjunction with the remainder of the statute, the provision at issue becomes ambiguous. As the State explains in its brief, the word "any" on its own is unequivocal, but the term "any defense" as used in the statute is neither self-defining nor defined. The legislative history of the statute and the placement of the provision at issue indicate that "any defense" is applicable only toward the defense of the amount of the loss at issue, and therefore does not include "any defense" imaginable. Further, other language in § 973.20(14) authorizes the court to waive rules of "practice, procedure, pleading or evidence" in a restitution hearing. Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(d). Additionally, although the language in other provisions of § 973.20 makes it clear that restitution hearings are not to be conducted like a civil trial, the language in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b) purports to allow a defendant to rely on any defense available in a civil action. We conclude that the statutory provision at issue in this case, Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b), is ambiguous.

¶12 Because the language of the statute is ambiguous when construed in light of the statute as a whole, this court looks to the "scope, history, context, subject matter, and purpose of the statute." UFE Inc., 201 Wis.2d at 282, 548 N.W.2d 57. When we examine the scope, history, context, subject matter, and purpose of the statute, this court concludes that the entire subject matter of the restitution statute goes to establishing the amount of the loss sought to be compensated. Defenses to liability are not relevant once restitution is available to crime victims.

¶13 There is no explanation in the legislative drafting record of the phrase "any defense" in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b). However, the origins of this phrase and its placement within Wis. Stat. § 973.20 combine to show that the legislature intended "any defense" to mean only defenses as to the amount of restitution, and not defenses to liability for restitutionary payments or acts.

¶14 The requirement that convicted criminals pay restitution to their victims was first mandated by Wis. Stat. § 973.09 (1979-80). In 1987, Wis. Stat. § 973.20 was created to set restitution requirements, and Wis. Stat. § 973.09 was amended to require conformance with the new statute. Subsection (14)(b) of Wis. Stat. § 973.20 has not been changed since the statute was first enacted.

¶15 The judicial council notes for Wis. Stat. § 973.20 indicate that subsection (13)(a) was patterned on 18 USC 3664(a) and is similar to former Wis. Stat. §...