State v. Sweet

• Decision Date: 31 January 2000
• Citation: 2000 ME 14,745 A.2d 368
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Richard SWEET and Paul Poulin.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

745 A.2d 368

2000 ME 14

STATE of Maine v. Richard SWEET and Paul Poulin.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued November 1, 1999.

Decided January 31, 2000.

David W. Crook, District Attorney, Alan P. Kelley, Deputy Dist. Atty. (orally), Augusta, for State.

Jeffrey P. Towne (orally), Waterville, for defendant Richard Sweet. John O'Donnell (orally), Tilton & O'Donnell, Waterville, for defendant Paul Poulin.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, and CALKINS, JJ.

SAUFLEY, J.

[¶ 1] Richard Sweet and Paul Poulin appeal from sentences of 40 years and 65 years respectively entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Alexander, J.). They challenge the use of the enhanced statutory range of 20 to 40 years for Class A charges of gross sexual assault, the imposition of consecutive sentences, and the length of the sentences in their entirety. We affirm the sentences.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Richard Sweet is today approximately 47 years old. He was first convicted of gross sexual misconduct in 1984, as a result of charges related to five separate child victims. He was sentenced to ten years in prison and was released in 1991. Within months of his release, he was convicted of terrorizing (Class D) as a result of threats directed toward one of the victims of his previous gross sexual misconduct charges. He was sentenced to seven days in the county jail.

[¶ 3] Paul Poulin is today approximately 32 years old. Before the events at issue, he had been convicted of multiple burglaries, both Class C and Class B. According to his own journal entries, he was a member of N.A.M.B.L.A. (North American Man-Boy Love Association) and began sexually assaulting young boys in the early 1990s. He described himself as a "boy-lover," and spent much of his time and energy finding and grooming young boys, in the age range of 10 to 14, for sexual activities.

[¶ 4] Sweet and Poulin worked together and began a consensual sexual relationship in September 1994. Shortly thereafter, Poulin informed Sweet that he was a "boy-lover," and the two began discussing the possibility of introducing an adolescent boy into their relationship. Over the course of the next two years, Sweet and Poulin used alcohol, drugs, gifts, money, and pornography to lure and groom young adolescent boys into sexual relationships. The victims from which the charges stem were 13 and 14 years old. Allegations of sexual abuse surfaced after one of those boys contacted authorities. In October of 1997, both Sweet and Poulin were indicted and charged with multiple sexual assault crimes involving a total of four children.

[¶ 5] Sweet pled guilty to one count each of gross sexual assault (Class A) and sexual abuse of a minor (Class C) committed against a thirteen-year-old boy; one count of sexual abuse of a minor (Class C) perpetrated against a second victim; and one count of conspiracy to commit gross sexual assault (Class B). Poulin pled guilty to one count each of gross sexual assault (Class A), unlawful sexual contact (Class C), and sexual abuse of a minor (Class C) committed against one victim; gross sexual assault (Class A) and unlawful sexual contact (Class C) against a second victim; sexual abuse of a minor perpetrated against a third victim; and conspiracy to commit gross sexual assault (Class B).

[¶ 6] Applying State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151 (Me.1993), as codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C (Supp.1999), the sentencing court entered basic sentences of 15 years for each gross sexual assault count. The court also determined that the nature of the crimes and the prior criminal histories of each defendant warranted sentencing in the upper tier of 20 to 40 years on the gross sexual assault charges. On both of Poulin's gross sexual assault charges the court set the maximum sentence at 30 years and determined that the sentences should run consecutively. On Sweet's single conviction for gross sexual assault, the court set the maximum sentence at 35 years.

[¶ 7] In addition, the court sentenced both Sweet and Poulin to five years on each charge of unlawful sexual contact and sexual abuse of a minor. All charges related to the same victim ran concurrently and those related to different victims ran consecutively. Finally, the court sentenced each defendant to ten years on the charges of conspiracy to commit gross sexual assault to run concurrently with the gross sexual assault charge. After considering each of the defendants' prospects for rehabilitation, the court declined to suspend any of the sentences.

[¶ 8] The sentences as a whole resulted in a 65-year period of incarceration for Poulin: 30 years for gross sexual assault of one victim, followed by a consecutive 30 years for the second gross sexual assault of a second victim, followed by a consecutive five years for sexual abuse of a minor related to a third victim. Sweet was sentenced to a 40-year period of incarceration: 35 years for gross sexual assault of one victim, followed by a consecutive five years for sexual abuse of a minor related to a second victim.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 9] The defendants assert that the sentencing court erred by improperly establishing sentences for the gross sexual assault charges in the enhanced range of 20 to 40 years. They further claim that the sentencing court abused its discretion when it entered consecutive sentences and that the sentences are, taken in their entirety, excessive.

A. Sentencing Framework

[¶ 10] Criminal sentencing is one of the most difficult responsibilities of a judge. Within certain parameters, the judge is given the discretion to fashion an individual sentence. That discretion must be exercised in a way that meets often competing goals.¹ For example, the court must both individualize the sentence to the particular defendant, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1151(6) (1983), and must at the same time "eliminate inequalities in sentences that are not related to legitimate criminological goals," 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1151(5) (1983). In other words, while addressing the many goals of sentencing, the court must endeavor to create consistency among sentences for similar crimes and must, at the same time, tailor the sentence to the individual defendant.²

[¶ 11] In order to place all of the differing considerations into a manageable framework, the sentencing court must engage in the analysis first announced in Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1151, and now codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C. This analysis, commonly referred to as a Hewey Analysis, requires the court to undertake three steps. First, the court must determine a basic sentence based solely on the nature and seriousness of the offense.³ Next, the court must examine the crime and all relevant mitigating and aggravating factors in order to establish an individualized maximum sentence. Finally, the court must set a final sentence, determining how much of the sentence, if any, should be suspended and what circumstances and conditions of probation, if any, should be ordered. See State v. Bolduc, 638 A.2d 725, 727 (Me.1994)

.

[¶ 12] When, as here, the defendant has been convicted of one or more Class A crimes, "the court must engage in an additional preliminary step to determine whether the crime falls within the higher tier of Class A sentences." State v. MacDonald, 1998 ME 212, ¶ 15, 718 A.2d 195, 199; see also 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1251(2)(A) (1983). In this context, "[t]he court may consider a serious criminal history of the defendant and impose a maximum period of incarceration in excess of 20 years based on either the nature and seriousness of the crime alone or on the nature and seriousness of the crime coupled with the serious criminal history of the defendant." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(A) (Supp.1999). Accordingly, depending on the nature of the crime and the defendant's criminal history, the highest sentence available for a Class A crime may be either 20 years or 40 years.

B. Standards of Review

[¶ 13] Because of the complexity of the multiple steps comprising our sentencing process, the standards of review for each individual step must be understood before an examination of the sentence itself is appropriate.

[¶ 14] We review the "basic" sentence, set by the court pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(1), for misapplication of principle. See State v. King, 1998 ME 60, ¶ 14, 708 A.2d 1014, 1018

; State v. Carr, 1998 ME 237, ¶ 6, 719 A.2d 531, 533; State v. Pfeil, 1998 ME 245, ¶ 14, 720 A.2d 573, 577; State v. Wilson, 669 A.2d 766, 768 (Me.1996). Similarly, we review the sentencing court's determination that a Class A crime falls in the enhanced range of 20 to 40 years for misapplication of principle. See MacDonald, 1998 ME 212, ¶ 15,

718 A.2d at 199; State v. Shackelford, 634 A.2d 1292, 1295-96 (Me.1993).

[¶ 15] Because the sentencing court is in a better position to review aggravating and mitigating factors, we review its "maximum" sentence, entered pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(2), for abuse of discretion. See State v. Lewis, 1998 ME 83, ¶ 8, 711 A.2d 119, 123-24

; Pfeil, 1998 ME 245, ¶ 18,

720 A.2d at 578. We also review the sentencing court's decision to suspend any part of the maximum sentence for abuse of discretion. See Pfeil, 1998 ME 245, ¶ 19,

720 A.2d at 578; State v. Ardolino, 1997 ME 141, ¶ 26, 697 A.2d 73, 81. Finally, we review the sentencing court's decision to apply sentences consecutively for abuse of discretion, see State v. Shulikov, 1998 ME 111, ¶ 28, 712 A.2d 504, 511-12; State v. Prewara, 687 A.2d 951, 954 (Me.1996), or error of law, see State v. Fleming, 644 A.2d 1034, 1035-36 (Me.1994); State v. Brooks, 634 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Me.1993).

C. The Sentences Imposed on Sweet and Poulin

1. Enhancement of Class A Sentences to the Higher Tier

[¶ 16] Sweet and Poulin argue that the court erred in determining that the sentences for the Class A gross sexual assaults fall in the upper tier of sentences, allowing sentences of up to 40 years. They argue that the court misapplied the provisions of 17-A M.R.S.A. §...