State v. Szulczewski
| Decision Date | 13 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1323-CR,96-1323-CR |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James E. SZULCZEWSKI, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Toni H. Laitsch and Laitsch & Zion, Madison and oral argument by Toni H. Laitsch.
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Warren D. Weinstein, Assistant Attorney General with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, Attorney General.
¶1
This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Szulczewski, 209 Wis.2d 1, 561 N.W.2d 781 (Ct.App.1997), modifying and, as modified, affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dane County, Mark A. Frankel, Judge.
¶2 The single, limited issue presented is whether a circuit court may stay execution of a prison sentence of a defendant who was found not guilty of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI) in a criminal case; was committed in that case to the Department of Health and Social Services (the DHSS) for custody, care and treatment under Wis. Stat. § 971.17; and was not discharged from the NGI commitment at the time of conviction and sentence for a subsequent crime. 1
¶3 We hold that under Wis. Stat. §§ 971.17, 973.15(1) and 973.15(8)(a), a circuit court has the discretion to decide whether to stay execution of a prison sentence imposed on an NGI acquittee who is convicted of and sentenced for a crime while under the NGI commitment. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court to determine whether the defendant's sentence should be stayed.
¶4 The facts are not in dispute for purposes of our review. In 1975 the defendant, James E. Szulczewski, was found NGI of murder and attempted murder. He was committed to the DHSS for custody and treatment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1), which governs the commitment, release and discharge of persons adjudicated NGI.
¶5 In 1995, while institutionalized in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 971.17, the defendant was convicted of assaulting another patient at the Mendota Mental Health Institute. 2 Although the defendant initially entered an NGI plea to the battery charge, he withdrew the plea prior to trial.
¶6 The circuit court sentenced the defendant to five years in prison on the battery charge and ordered him immediately transferred to the Department of Corrections (the DOC) for assessment and placement in the Wisconsin prison system.
¶7 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court and the order of the circuit court denying the defendant's motion for sentence modification. 3 The court of appeals concluded that immediate commencement of the defendant's prison sentence was required by Wis. Stat. § 973.15. 4
¶8 This case involves the interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 971.17 and 973.15. The issue of statutory interpretation presents a question of law. See Carlson & Erickson Builders v. Lampert Yards, 190 Wis.2d 650, 658, 529 N.W.2d 905 (1995). This court determines questions of law independently of the circuit court and court of appeals, benefiting from their analyses. See id.
¶9 Two statutory provisions are at issue in this case. The first is Wis. Stat. § 971.17, which governs the custody, care, treatment and discharge of an NGI acquittee committed to the DHSS. Section 971.17(1) reads in pertinent part as follows:
When a defendant is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, the court shall order him to be committed to the department [of health and social services] to be placed in an appropriate institution for custody, care and treatment until discharged as provided in this section.
¶10 Chapter 971 of the Wisconsin statutes details the procedure for the discharge of an NGI acquittee from the DHSS and from placement in a mental health institution. Section 971.17 makes no provision for an NGI acquittee in the event the NGI acquittee, like the defendant in this case, is convicted of a crime while under a chapter 971 commitment.
¶11 The second statute at issue in this case is Wis. Stat. § 973.15, two subsections of which come into play in this case. Subsection (1) of § 973.15 states that except as otherwise provided in § 973.15, all sentences commence at noon on the day of sentence. Section 973.15(1) reads as follows:
Except as provided in s. 973.032, all sentences to the Wisconsin state prisons shall be for one year or more. Except as otherwise provided in this section, all sentences commence at noon on the day of sentence, but time which elapses after sentence while the convicted offender is at large on bail shall not be computed as any part of the term of imprisonment(emphasis added).
¶12 The other subsection, Wis. Stat. § 973.15(8)(a), sets forth exceptions to the rule that all sentences commence at noon on the day of sentence and provides that a sentencing court may stay the execution of a sentence of imprisonment in three circumstances: (1) for legal cause, (2) to place the person on probation to the DOC under § 973.09(1)(a) or (3) for not more than 60 days. 5 Although § 973.15(8)(a) states that a circuit court may grant a stay under one of these circumstances, it does not require the court to do so.
¶13 In this case, the only exception in Wis. Stat. § 973.15(8)(a) to immediate commencement of a prison sentence which might arguably apply is the provision that a circuit court may stay execution of a sentence of imprisonment "[f]or legal cause." Wis. Stat. § 973.15(8)(a)1.
¶14 In summary, Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1) does not on its face authorize the discharge of an NGI acquittee for imprisonment upon sentence for a crime while § 973.15 requires immediate imprisonment of a convicted defendant, with no exception made expressly for NGI acquittees. A circuit court's imposition of an immediate sentence under § 973.15(1) would run counter to the requirement in § 971.17 that NGI acquittees be committed to the DHSS until discharged from the commitment under chapter 971. Section 973.15(8)(a) does, however, provide that a circuit court "may" stay execution of a sentence of imprisonment for legal cause, a concept we discuss later in part IV. 6 If commitment under § 971.17 constitutes legal cause under § 973.15(8)(a), the courts would have the option to impose a sentence of imprisonment immediately or to stay execution of the sentence for NGI acquittees.
¶15 In this case the defendant has not been discharged from the DHSS in accordance with chapter 971. At the same time he is required to serve a prison sentence in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 973.15(1) unless a circuit court, in the exercise of its discretion, authorizes a stay for legal cause under § 973.15(8)(a)1.
¶16 In this case three interpretations of the statutes are presented to the court: that of the court of appeals, that of the defendant and that of the State.
¶17 The court of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. § 973.15(1) clearly states that all sentences commence at noon on the day of sentence with no exception made for NGI acquittees. Because it saw no conflict between the sentencing and NGI commitments statutes, the court of appeals declined to determine whether an NGI commitment constitutes legal cause for staying execution of a sentence of imprisonment.
¶18 The defendant argues that Wis. Stat. § 917.17 provides the exclusive mechanism by which an NGI acquittee can be discharged from a chapter 971 commitment and that the circuit court's imposition of his prison sentence and his immediate transfer to a correctional facility were in violation of § 971.17. The defendant maintains that the circuit court's order directing immediate execution of the prison sentence contravenes the purpose of § 971.17, namely providing treatment for an NGI acquittee's mental illness and behavioral disorders. See State v. Randall, 192 Wis.2d 800, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995). According to the defendant's interpretation of the statutes, § 971.17 () has primary importance and § 973.15 () is inapplicable to NGI acquittees.
¶19 The State, disagreeing with both the court of appeals and the defendant, views Wis. Stat. §§ 971.17 and 973.15 as conflicting and therefore in need of harmonization. According to the State, the conflict arises because § 971.17 allows an NGI acquittee to be discharged from a chapter 971 commitment pursuant only to certain statutory procedures that were not followed in this case while § 973.15, although allowing a court to stay execution of a prison sentence under certain circumstances, requires immediate execution of a sentence. 7
¶20 The State urges this court to harmonize Wis. Stat. §§ 971.17 and 973.15(1) by holding (1) that a prior NGI commitment is "legal cause" for which a sentence of imprisonment may be stayed, and (2) that a circuit court has discretion to determine whether an NGI acquittee should remain in the custody of the DHSS or be transferred to the custody of the DOC. 8
¶21 Under the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation statutes should be reasonably construed to avoid conflict. See Law Enforcement Standards Bd. v. Village of Lyndon Station, 101 Wis.2d 472, 489-90, 305 N.W.2d 89 (1981). When two statutes conflict, a court is to harmonize them, see Bingenheimer v. DHSS, 129 Wis.2d 100, 107, 383 N.W.2d 898 (1986), scrutinizing both statutes and construing each in a manner that serves its purpose. See Caldwell v. Percy, 105 Wis.2d 354, 361-362, 314 N.W.2d 135 (Ct.App.1981). The principal objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. See Carlson, 190 Wis.2d at 658, 529 N.W.2d 905. 9
¶22 The purpose of the NGI statute is, as the defendant states, two-fold: to treat the NGI acquittee's mental illness and to protect the acquittee and society...
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