State v. T.M.
| Decision Date | 03 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 20111113–CA.,20111113–CA. |
| Citation | 744 Utah Adv. Rep. 12,327 P.3d 1203 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, IN the INTEREST OF K.J., A Person Under Eighteen Years of Age. A.J., Appellant, v. T.M. and L.M., Appellees. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gary W. Barr, for Appellant.
Steven C. Russell, for Appellees.
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem.
¶ 1 A.J. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights with respect to her daughter, K.J. Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred in determining that the Juvenile Court Act's (the Act) reunification timelines precluded additional reunification efforts and that the juvenile court's termination of Mother's parental rights was against the clear weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶ 2 K.J. was born in April 2010 to Mother.2 In July 2010, Mother moved with her brother, sister-in-law, and K.J. to Ogden, Utah. N.B. (Father) is K.J.'s natural father. At the time of trial, Father had seen K.J. only one time, had never made visitation arrangements, had not financially supported K.J., and had never attempted to assert his parental rights.3
¶ 3 On July 29, 2010, K.J. was taken by ambulance to an emergency room due to difficulty breathing and lethargy. X-rays revealed four broken ribs, a broken collarbone, and both old and new indications of chronic bilateral subdural hematomas and retinal hemorrhaging. K.J. was taken by helicopter to Primary Children's Medical Center (PCMC) where additional tests indicated chronic subdural fluid collection, a more recent subdural hemorrhage, and healing rib and collarbone fractures. The examining doctor at PCMC reported that the fractures were approximately two to three weeks old and that the likely cause of K.J.'s injuries was inflicted trauma.
¶ 4 On August 2, the juvenile court signed a warrant ordering K.J. to be placed in the custody of the Division of Child and Family Services (the Division). On August 12, the juvenile court held a pretrial hearing on the State's verified petition to adjudicate K.J. as abused, neglected, or dependent. Mother declined to admit or deny the factual allegations in the petition and the juvenile court therefore deemed the allegations in the petition to be true.4 Based on these facts, the juvenile court adjudicated K.J. as abused and neglected and ordered that her custody with the Division be continued.
¶ 5 In its September 1, 2010 order adjudicating K.J. as abused and neglected, the juvenile court ordered Mother to contact the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) to arrange for and pay child support and to complete a child and family plan (the Plan) that required, among other conditions, that Mother maintain stable and suitable housing and stable employment. The juvenile court established reunification with Mother as the primary permanency goal, with adoption as a concurrent permanency goal in the event that Mother “fail[ed] to meet the goals of a treatment plan or follow [court] orders.” The court ordered the Division to provide reunification services to Mother until the time set for the permanency hearing. K.J. was thereafter placed in foster care with appellees T.M. and L.M. (Foster Parents). A permanency hearing was set for January 20, 2011, which was subsequently rescheduled for March 21, 2011. During this time, Mother completed most of the goals outlined in the Plan, but she was unable to obtain stable employment or suitable housing. Mother also failed to comply with the juvenile court's order to contact ORS to arrange for and pay child support.
¶ 6 At the March 21, 2011 hearing, the State submitted a verified petition to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights with respect to K.J. The State's request to terminate Mother's rights was based principally on Mother's inability or failure to provide for K.J.'s needs, including Mother's failure to comply with the employment and housing requirements of the Plan and her failure to comply with the juvenile court's order to contact ORS and arrange for child support. The parties then investigated placing K.J. with her maternal grandmother in Mexico but they were ultimately unsuccessful in making the necessary arrangements. On May 26, 2011, Foster Parents filed a third-party petition for termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights with respect to K.J. In August 2011, the State withdrew its termination petition and trial on Foster Parents' petition was set for November 2011.
¶ 7 Following the termination trial on November 3, 2011, the juvenile court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered Mother's and Father's parental rights with respect to K.J. terminated. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights.
¶ 8 Mother first claims that the juvenile court erred in determining that the timelines established by the Act precluded additional time for reunification of K.J. with Mother. We review the juvenile court's interpretation of the Act for correctness. In re S.F., 2012 UT App 10, ¶ 24, 268 P.3d 831.
¶ 9 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court's termination of her parental rights is against the clear weight of the evidence. We review a juvenile court's determinations that grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the child “for clear error, reversing only if the result is ‘against the clear weight of the evidence or leave[s] the appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ” In re A.K., 2012 UT App 232, ¶ 14, 285 P.3d 772 (alteration in original) (quoting In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435). “When a foundation for the [juvenile] court's decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435.
¶ 10 First, Mother argues that the Act's timelines governing the time for decision on a termination petition and limiting the duration of reunification services are applicable only when termination proceedings are initiated by the Division and not when a third party files a termination petition. She thus claims that the juvenile court erred by applying the timelines set forth in the Act, specifically Utah Code sections 78A–6–312 and –314, to the proceedings before it. Next, Mother argues that even if the timelines are applicable to a proceeding involving a private termination petition, a termination petition need not be adjudicated until eighteen months after the child was removed from the home, in accordance with subsection –314(13)(c), and the juvenile court therefore erred in its conclusion that no time for reunification remained.
¶ 11 Mother argues that because Utah Code section 78A–6–510 identifies specific considerations the juvenile court must make when the Division has instituted proceedings to facilitate the adoption of a child by foster parents, the Act's termination and reunification timelines are not applicable in a termination proceeding initiated by a third party. We disagree.
¶ 12 “When interpreting a statute ... [w]e employ plain language analysis to carry out the legislative purpose of the statute as expressed through the enacted text.” See Richards v. Brown, 2012 UT 14, ¶ 23, 274 P.3d 911. “Where a statute's language is unambiguous and provides a workable result, we need not resort to other interpretive tools, and our analysis ends.” Id.
¶ 13 First, the plain language of the Act does not restrict the timeline for decision on a termination petition only to petitions filed by the Division. The Act provides, “Any interested party, including a foster parent, may file a petition for termination of the parent-child relationship with regard to a child.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A–6–504 (LexisNexis 2012).5 “A decision on a petition for termination of parental rights shall be made within 18 months from the day on which the minor is removed from the minor's home.” Id.§ 78A–6–314(13)(c). Subsection –314(13)(c) makes no distinction between petitions brought by the Division and those brought by a third party; it unambiguously applies to both. Mother argues that a reference to Division-instituted proceedings in a different section of the Act, unrelated to these timelines, compels the result that the given timelines are applicable only to Division-filed termination petitions. This interpretation is neither “obvious,” as Mother asserts, nor consistent with the plain language of the statute.
¶ 14 Second, the shorter timelines imposed by the Act on the underlying reunification proceedings are applicable when a private termination petition has been filed because the reunification timelines operate independently of the termination proceeding.6 “The time period for reunification services may not exceed 12 months from the date that the minor was initially removed from the minor's home, unless the time period is extended under Subsection 78A–6–314(8).” Id.§ 78A–6–312(13)(a) (Supp.2013). “If reunification services are ordered, a permanency hearing shall be conducted by the court ... at the expiration of the time period for reunification services.” Id.§ 78A–6–312(16)(a). With respect to a child who is thirty-six months old or younger when removed from the home, the permanency hearing shall be conducted within eight months from the date of removal. Id.§ 78A–6–312(17) (2012). 7 These timelines are applicable in all proceedings where a child is removed from the home on the basis of a finding of abuse, neglect, or dependency. See id. §§ 78A–6–304, –306, –307(17), –311, –312(2), –312(13)(a), –312(16)(a) (2012 & Supp.2013). The plain language of the Act does not...
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