State v. T. T. (In re T. T.), A162399
| Decision Date | 15 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | A162399 |
| Citation | 293 Or.App. 376,428 P.3d 921 |
| Parties | In the Matter of T. T., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. T. T., Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Jason E. Thompson and Ferder Casebeer French & Thompson, LLP, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before DeHoog, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Chief Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge.
Appellant seeks reversal of an order committing her to the custody of the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days. See ORS 426.130. In her only assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in determining that she was a danger to others. See ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A). We conclude that the evidence in the record is legally sufficient to support that determination; accordingly, we affirm.
Appellant asks us to take de novo review of a particular factual finding of the trial court. However, we decline to exercise our discretion to do so. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) . Therefore, on review of the trial court's ruling, "we view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the trial court's disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit that outcome." State v. S. R. J. , 281 Or. App. 741, 743, 386 P.3d 99 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In May 2016, appellant stabbed her husband in the hand with a knife; the police subsequently transported her to the hospital. Upon arrival at the emergency department, appellant was speaking in rhymes and was unable to provide her name or date of birth. She reported that she had stabbed her husband because of a "covenant." She also reported that she was experiencing auditory hallucinations and had thoughts about hurting others. Appellant was covered in bruises on her arms and legs, reportedly the result of her husband "holding her down for several hours." According to appellant, "he said he just wanted to help [her]."
While appellant was in the hospital pending the commitment hearing, the attending psychiatrist, Dr. Miller, made a diagnosis of "Bipolar I Disorder, manic episode (first), severe with psychosis." Miller noted that appellant's thought content included "grandiose delusions," and that she had poor insight, was impulsive, had impaired judgment, "[m]inimized and discounted [the] injury to [her] spouse," and reported hallucinations, though it was unclear if hallucinations were then currently present. Appellant refused to take the medication that was prescribed for her.
At the time of the stabbing, appellant was 24 years old and had been married to her husband for seven years. They had two children, one who was three years old and one who was six months old. Appellant reported that she had been hearing voices since her late teens and that, after the birth of her second child, she had begun to experience increased symptoms of depression and auditory hallucinations.
A certified mental health investigator, Hudkins, conducted an investigation and interviewed appellant twice before the commitment hearing, which took place on June 6, 2016. Hudkins prepared a report, which the court admitted without objection at the hearing. Upon first meeting Hudkins in a safety room at the hospital, appellant acknowledged that she had stabbed her husband in the hand and described the events of that night. She said that she "was dancing [and] spinning around," had broken some dishes, and "went psychotic for a moment." She stated that she was trying to "play a part, to lead him" to get her husband to see her point of view. Appellant also told Hudkins that she and her husband had been involved in a "cult" for many years, and stated that she was "brainwashed for eight years." She further stated that she "felt threatened by a predator in [her] house" and that the predator was her husband. A short time later, appellant told Hudkins that she felt safe with her husband, trusted him with her life, and that he was the love of her life. She acknowledged to Hudkins that she hears voices at times, but declined to say what the voices said to her at any given time.
The second time Hudkins met with appellant—which took place on the basketball court at the psychiatric facility where she was being treated—Hudkins observed appellant as she held the broken end of a brush and sang into it as if it were a microphone, then tossed it to the ground and began to dance around. Appellant refused Hudkins's request to speak with her and instead continued to dance. After Hudkins attempted a second time to engage appellant in conversation, appellant told Hudkins that she did not trust social workers and would not talk to her; she would only talk to her attorney, who was supposed to come in later that day. Appellant continued to dance, taking large animated steps in circles around the basketball court. In her report, Hudkins described appellant from that encounter:
Appellant was "hyper-religious" at times while hospitalized. For example, after her arrival, she reported "hearing the voice of Satan," and on another occasion she was reluctant to use the pillow on her bed because she had heard that demons can be transferred through fabric. She also told Hudkins, without further elaboration, that "the devil should die."
As noted above, appellant refused to take her medication. She told Hudkins that she was "willing to commit [herself] into someone's care, we don't always know what's best for us." During the same conversation, however, appellant said that she wanted counseling, but not with a counselor or psychologist; she stated, "I can talk with my husband or my family."
Appellant testified at the hearing and, according to the certified mental health examiner who was present, displayed psychotic symptoms consistent with Miller's diagnosis. When asked why the police had taken her to the hospital, appellant responded, in part, "I think love bites sometimes, and I think that when you get a part of the wrong association that that can kind of mix things up; complicate them." When asked what she meant by "love bites," she explained that "love bites" were scars on her husband's arms—"they're more battle wounds than anything because he didn't provide for me, but we've been homeless and we got kicked out on the street by a church."
Appellant testified that she remembered stabbing her husband because she "felt like [she] needed to neutralize the threat" and that voices inside her head told her to do it.
Because of her earlier reference at the hospital to a "covenant," appellant was asked to explain what a "covenant" was; she responded, similarly to her earlier statement, "That means that I am obliged to my husband as my beloved for the rest of my life, but at the moment I felt like I needed to neutralize a threat in my own household." While being questioned by the state, appellant connected the stabbing of her husband to a church she claimed to have attended and also to a flashback, as follows:
When asked during the hearing when she first began hearing voices, appellant responded, "When I started attending Gordon Spirit Church about four years ago." Shortly thereafter, in response to a question about her age when the voices began, she stated, "I don't mean to be a mad hatter; I don't mean to be rude, but since the day I was born." The examiner asked appellant about the church she referred to and she explained that she was not sure what kind of church that was, but, when asked if the devil was part of that church, she stated, Appellant testified that the church had told her she could not see her family and also that the church had kicked her out, explaining the reasoning as follows:
Appellant's attorney asked appellant whether she was aware that she had been named as the victim of a physical assault in a criminal case that had been filed against her husband. Appellant acknowledged being aware of that and also agreed that the altercation had taken place at her residence.1
Appel...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. J. G. (In re J. G.)
...type necessary to justify an involuntary civil commitment, rather than an isolated incident.The state relies on State v. T. T. , 293 Or. App. 376, 385, 428 P.3d 921 (2018), to argue that the evidence here was sufficient to establish appellant’s dangerousness to others, where appellant’s sin......
-
State v. S. E. (In re S. E.)
...perhaps a close case, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination, as we must, State v. T. T. , 293 Or. App. 376, 384, 428 P.3d 921, rev. den. , 364 Or. 209, 432 P.3d 1104 (2018), we conclude that the record contains legally sufficient evidence to suppo......
-
State v. S. T. (In re S. T.), A164442
...on the evidence in this record, that appellant would present an even greater danger to others if he were released. See State v. T. T. , 293 Or. App. 376, 385, 428 P.3d 921, rev. den. , 364 Or. 209, 432 P.3d 1104 (2018) (record was sufficient to establish that the appellant’s mental disorder......
-
State v. Z. W. Y. (In re Z. W. Y.), A167562
...to engage in future violence toward others, absent commitment." S. E. R. , 297 Or. App. at 122, 441 P.3d 254 ; see State v. T. T. , 293 Or. App. 376, 385, 428 P.3d 921, rev. den. , 364 Or. 209, 432 P.3d 1104 (2018) (record was sufficient to establish that the appellant’s mental disorder mad......