State v. Tafoya
| Decision Date | 17 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 107,684,107,684 |
| Citation | 304 Kan. 663,372 P.3d 1247 |
| Parties | State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Kenneth J. Tafoya, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
304 Kan. 663
372 P.3d 1247
State of Kansas, Appellee,
v.
Kenneth J. Tafoya, Appellant.
No. 107,684
Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 17, 2016
Heather Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by Stegall, J.:
Kenneth. J. Tafoya was convicted by a jury in 2008 of one count of driving under the influence (DUI). Tafoya had three prior DUI convictions, all occurring in the 1990s. When Tafoya was sentenced in 2008, Kansas DUI sentencing statutes provided for a lifetime lookback period for purposes of classifying the current conviction as a second conviction, third conviction, etc. See K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 8–1567(o)(3). Including his three prior convictions from the 1990s, Tafoya's 2008 conviction was properly classified as a fourth DUI, and Tafoya was sentenced accordingly to 180 days in jail, 12 months' postrelease supervision, and a mandatory $2,500 fine.
On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the district court had erred by imposing a mandatory fine without making the necessary factual findings concerning Tafoya's financial condition. State v. Tafoya , No. 100784, 2010 WL 5185473, at *9 (Kan.App.2010) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied
293 Kan. 1113 (2011) (Tafoya I ). Specifically, the panel upheld Tafoya's conviction and sentencing for a fourth DUI but found that the district court erred by failing to consider community service under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 8–1567(j) in lieu of a direct payment of the fine. 2010 WL 5185473, at *9. Announcing its holding on this point, the panel ordered that “Tafoya's fine must be vacated and the case must be remanded for reconsideration of the method of payment of the fine.” 2010 WL 5185473, at *9. However, when summarizing the outcome of the appeal in the final sentence of the opinion, the Court of Appeals wrote: “Affirmed in part; sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.” 2010 WL 5185473, at *10.
After the Court of Appeals decision in Tafoya I, but before the district court held the remand hearing as instructed by the panel, the legislature amended the DUI lookback provisions, effective July 1, 2011, to encompass only convictions occurring “on or after July 1, 2001.” K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8–1567(j)(3). Thus, at the time of the remand hearing in February 2012, Tafoya sought the benefit of the new, more limited lookback period which would have resulted in a resentencing for a first DUI, rather than a fourth DUI. The district court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to resentence Tafoya
because the panel's mandate was limited to “reconsideration of the method of payment of the fine.” The district court simply allowed Tafoya to perform community service in lieu of a direct payment of his mandatory DUI fine.
Tafoya again appealed and argued for a retroactive application of K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8–1567(j)(3) to his 2008 conviction. State v. Tafoya , No. 107684, 2013 WL 1457946 (Kan.App.2013) (unpublished opinion) (Tafoya II ). Another panel of the Court of Appeals had recently decided State v. Reese, ruling that the 2011 lookback period was not applicable to crimes committed prior to its effective date. 48 Kan.App.2d 87, 283 P.3d 233 (2012), rev'd 300 Kan. 650, 333 P.3d 149 (2014). Relying on the Court of Appeals' holding in Reese, the Tafoya II panel ruled that because Tafoya's conviction occurred in 2008, he was not entitled to the 2011 lookback period. 2013 WL 1457946, at *2–3.
Soon after, however, while Tafoya's petition for review of Tafoya II was pending, we considered the decision of the Court of Appeals in Reese and reversed. State v. Reese , 300 Kan. 650, 333 P.3d 149 (2014). There, we held that the question was not properly one of retroactive application. Rather, because the classification of a DUI conviction as a first conviction, second conviction, etc. was to occur “at the time of sentencing,” the 2011 lookback period applied “to all persons who are sentenced for DUI on or after the July 1, 2011, effective date of the amended statute.” 300 Kan. 650, 333 P.3d 149, Syl. In light of our decision in Reese, we granted a number of pending petitions for review affected by the Reese holding—including Tafoya's petition for review of the decision in Tafoya II —and then summarily vacated the decisions of the Court of Appeals and remanding the cases to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Reese.
The question on remand—and the question now before us in Tafoya's third trip to this court—was a simple one: When was Tafoya sentenced? If he was sentenced in 2008, the lifetime lookback provision was properly applied. If he was sentenced following the remand hearing in 2012, however, pursuant to Reese he would be entitled to the benefits of the 2011 lookback period. In Tafoya's case, the sentencing difference is significant. The Court of Appeals again affirmed Tafoya's sentence for a fourth DUI conviction,
finding that Tafoya was actually sentenced in 2008 and that the 2012 remand hearing was limited to the question of the method of payment of the mandatory fine. As such, the panel reasoned that Tafoya was neither sentenced nor resentenced in 2012. State v. Tafoya , No. 107684, 2014 WL 7152142, at *2 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion) (Tafoya III ).
Tafoya appeals and we now affirm, thus ending his long sojourn through our appellate courts.
Analysis
Whether a district court has complied with the mandate of an appellate court is a question of law over which we exercise plenary review. State v. Guder , 293 Kan. 763, 765, 267 P.3d 751 (2012). Generally referred to as
the “mandate rule,” K.S.A 60–2106(c) provides:
“When ... a decision of an appellate court becomes final, such court shall promptly cause to be transmitted to the clerk of the district court its...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. LaPointe
...(affirming LaPointe's convictions and sentences on direct appeal), rev. denied 283 Kan. 932 (2007); see also State v. Tafoya , 304 Kan. 663, 666–67, 372 P.3d 1247 (2016) ("The final judgment in a criminal case is the sentence."). These facts certainly separate LaPointe's situation from ques......
-
In re Adoption T.M.M.H.
...the plurality throws in litigants' paths unjustified. It is form-over-substance law making at its worst. See State v. Tafoya , 304 Kan. 663, 670, 372 P.3d 1247 (2016) (" ‘The law of this state is realistic. Substance prevails over form.’ "); State v. McCormick , 305 Kan. 43, 53, 378 P.3d 54......
-
State v. Marinelli
...from the bench."The court has frequently relied on this language to describe a criminal sentence. See, e.g., State v. Tafoya , 304 Kan. 663, 666-67, 372 P.3d 1247 (2016) ; State v. Phillips , 289 Kan. 28, 39, 210 P.3d 93 (2009). We most recently repeated it in our Simmons decision when hold......
-
State v. Smith, No. 118,042
...2017 was a result of the mandate from our Smith II decision and should not be characterized as a resentencing. See State v. Tafoya , 304 Kan. 663, 669, 372 P.3d 1247 (2016) (remand from appellate court to district court to correct error is not remand for resentencing). I agree with the view......