State v. Taft

• Decision Date: 20 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 18163.,18163.
• Citation: State v. Taft, 306 Conn. 749, 51 A.3d 988 (Conn. 2012)
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Orema TAFT.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

306 Conn. 749

51 A.3d 988

STATE of Connecticut

v.Orema TAFT.

No. 18163.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 16, 2012.

Decided Sept. 20, 2012.^*

Conrad Ost Seifert, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Linda F. Currie–Zeffiro, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state's attorney, and C. Robert Satti, Jr., supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.^**

NORCOTT, J.

The defendant, Orema Taft, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a–54a (a)¹ and conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–48 (a)² and 53a–54a (a). On appeal,³ the defendant claims that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of conspiracy to commit murder; (2) if this court determines that there is insufficient evidence to support his conspiracy conviction, there also is insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction because the jury's guilty verdict on that count was predicated on the Pinkerton⁴ theory of conspiratorial liability; (3) the prosecutor engaged in impropriety by eliciting from a key state witness a statement that she would never lie, and by arguing outside the evidence during his closing argument; and (4) his trial counsel's failure to cross-examine some of the state's witnesses regarding whether they expected to receive a monetary reward for testifying, and another of the state's witnesses about whether he had recanted, under oath, some of his prior statements, amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel and entitles him to a new trial. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history. On September 28, 2001, shortly before 3 a.m., the victim, Zoltan Kiss, was shot and killed in his car in the area of 1185 Pembroke Street in Bridgeport. Just prior to the shooting, the victim parked his car across from 1185 Pembroke Street, exited the vehicle, approached some individuals on the street to seek change for a $100 bill and, thereafter, approached a gate leading to an alley next to 1185 Pembroke Street (gate). Shortly thereafter, a group of people, including the defendant, exited from behind the gate and followed the victim as he returned to his car. When the victim reached his car, at least one of the pursuers, Miguel Zapata, ⁵ began firing a handgun at the victim. Additionally, before the gunfire, one witness heard someone in the group say, “Let's get this mother fucker.”

During the autopsy, the medical examiner determined that Kiss' death was caused by multiple gunshot wounds, and that, of the twenty-five bullet wounds in Kiss' body, seventeen were entry wounds. The examiner from the state police forensic laboratory firearms unit analyzed a total of eighteen shell casings recovered from the ground in the area of the victim's car; nine were nine millimeter casings and nine were .40 caliber casings. He determined that all of the nine millimeter casings were fired from one gun, and all of the .40 caliber casings were fired from another single gun.

After an investigation, the state charged the defendant with murder with a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–54a (a) and 53–202k, conspiracy to commit murder with a firearm in violation of §§ 53a–48, 53a–54a (a) and 53–202k, criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a–217 (a), and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29–35(a). The jury found the defendant guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit murder, but found, in relation to the conspiracy count, that the state had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had used a firearm in the commission of that crime, and further found the defendant not guilty on the criminal possession of a firearm and carrying a pistol without a permit counts. The trial court rendered judgment of conviction in accordance with the jury's verdict, and sentenced the defendant to forty-five years imprisonment on the murder count and twenty years imprisonment on the conspiracy count to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to a sentence that the defendant already was serving on an unrelated conviction. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

We begin with the defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence of conspiracy to commit murder to sustain his conviction under §§ 53a–48 and 53a–54a (a).⁶ Specifically, the defendant claims that all of the evidence presented at trial points to a simultaneous violent reaction by two allegedly armed people with no planning or agreement to do anything with regard to the victim. The state, in response, argues that the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom support the jury's finding that the defendant was among the individuals who agreed to “ ‘get’ ” the victim and, therefore, conspired with them to murder the victim. We agree with the state, and conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.

The following additional facts are relevant to the disposition of the defendant's claim. In the early hours of the morning of September 28, 2001, prior to the shooting, two witnesses, A and B,⁷ testified that they had seen the defendant in the area behind the gate with a number of other individuals.⁸ A and B also testified that they had seen guns behind the gate where the defendant and his companions were located. Both A and B recounted that they had seen the victim park his car across the street from the gate and approach the gate. A testified that she had seen the victim interact with someone behind the gate and then begin to return to his car. Shortly thereafter, A saw the group behind the gate chase after the victim, and A further recounted that she had seen both Zapata and the defendant carrying guns as they pursued the victim to his car. B also testified that she had heard someone say, “Let's get this mother fucker” before gunfire erupted. Both A and B then testified that they had heard shouting and gunfire, and had seen the muzzle flashes as the guns were fired at the victim.

The state then presented the testimony of another witness, C, who, at the time of the shooting lived in a third floor apartment of a nearby building. C stated that, at approximately 2 or 3 a.m., on September 28, 2001, she had heard gunfire coming from the street located in front of her apartment. When she went to investigate the noise, C saw four people—the defendant, Zapata, Luisa Bermudez and A—standing in front of the door of a car on the street. C further recounted that she had seen the muzzle flashes as the guns were fired at the victim, and she had heard the victim screaming. She also stated that, from her perspective, she could only see Zapata holding a gun and that, after the shooting stopped, the group ran from the scene.

The state also presented the testimony of the police officers who had investigated the victim's murder. They testified that, shortly after police arrived at the scene of the shooting, they discovered a jacket containing a driver's license for an individual who they knew had associated with Bermudez. On the basis of that discovery, the police began attempting to locate Bermudez to discuss her potential involvement in the shooting. Their investigation led the police to an attic room of a building a few blocks from where the shooting took place, where they discovered Bermudez with the defendant, Zapata and A.

Finally, the state presented testimony from several individuals who had had contact with the defendant while the charges in the present case were pending. First, D testified that he was incarcerated in the same prison as the defendant, and that the defendant had told him that he and Zapata had shot a “dude” in a Honda seven times with a .45 caliber gun. D then recounted that the defendant had told him that he and Zapata had chased after the victim because they wanted to take the victim's jewelry. Then, the state presented the testimony of E who testified that, during one of his court appearances in connection with a felony charge, he was in the “bullpen lockup” of the courthouse with the defendant and Zapata. E recounted that Zapata had told him that he was in court because he and the defendant had shot a person in his car. E further testified that the defendant had confirmed or “vouched for” Zapata's statements and had nodded in agreement while Zapata was talking to E. E also testified that, in 2001, he lived on Pembroke Street and had sometimes seen handguns in the area behind the gate.

With this testimony in mind, we turn now to the defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim. “In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence.... The trier may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Garner, 270 Conn. 458, 472, 853 A.2d 478 (2004). Furthermore, “[i]t is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.” State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502, 510, 668 A.2d 1288 (1995). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the...