State v. Taft
Decision Date | 16 October 2001 |
Docket Number | (SC 16305) |
Citation | 781 A.2d 302,258 Conn. 412 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM TAFT, |
McDonald, C. J., and Borden, Katz, Palmer and Sullivan, Js.1 Richard E. Condon, Jr., special deputy assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Robert M. Spector, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Elpedio N. Vitale, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant, William Taft, appeals, following our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5)2 and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a).3 We granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following question: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial?" State v. Taft, 253 Conn. 909, 753 A.2d 942 (2000). The defendant claims that there are two grounds upon which his motion for a mistrial should have been granted: that it was improper for the trial court to admit evidence (1) of the defendant's failure, after his arrest, to contact his cousin; and (2) of the defendant's disclosure that he did not contact his cousin on the advice of his counsel. We reject the defendant's claims and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following facts that the jury reasonably could have found. "On October 19, 1994, Ernest Herold drove to the Dunbar Cafe in New Haven with two friends. Herold parked his car behind the bar and proceeded to the front of the bar, where he began talking with the owner of the bar, Robert Williams. Herold then observed a tan Lincoln being parked in front of the bar. Three men exited the vehicle, walked to the bar entrance and began talking with Williams. The three men were Andre Provite, who is the defendant's cousin, Phil Young and the defendant.
At the trial, Provite testified for the defense that, although he had been at the Dunbar Cafe, he was in his car at the time of the shooting and did not witness it. Provite testified that moments after he heard a shot being fired, he saw the defendant, who was not carrying a gun, approach Provite's car.
Provite's testimony was impeached by a tape-recorded statement that Provite had given to the police the day after the shooting. In that statement, Provite said that the defendant had shot Herold and that he had seen Herold fall to the ground, with the defendant standing over him holding a gun. Provite also stated that he had driven the defendant from the scene because he was afraid that, if he did not, the defendant would shoot him.
The defendant later testified in his own defense that an unidentified person had purchased drugs from Herold and then stood behind Herold and shot him in the head. He also testified that he left the scene with Provite because he had been so disturbed by the shooting.
On cross-examination, the state's attorney attempted to discredit the defendant's testimony by asking the defendant why he did not contact Provite, his cousin, subsequent to his arrest. Both the defendant and Provite had testified that they had not spoken with each other after the defendant's arrest. The defendant offered the following response: In response to a later question about why he did not contact his cousin, the defendant replied: "I wouldn't call them and tell or put no words in his mouth." The defendant later testified, "First of all, I am not going to involve people in something I know I haven't done."
On redirect examination, the defendant testified that he had been instructed by his trial attorney not to talk to Provite or anyone "about the case." The following exchange took place between the defendant and his attorney. Question: "Didn't I tell you I didn't want you talking to [Provite] about this case?" Answer: "Yes." Question: "And I didn't want you to talk to anybody about the case, right?" Answer: "Right." The state's attorney later elicited testimony from the defendant that Connecticut defense counsel did not represent the defendant, and did not so instruct him, until approximately two months after his arrest. See id., 23. The defendant had been arrested in Missouri in July, 1995, and his trial attorney did not enter her appearance until September 27, 1995, at the defendant's arraignment in Connecticut.
Following this testimony, the defendant moved for a mistrial, claiming that the state's questions concerning his postarrest silence were improper. He also moved to strike the testimony. The trial court denied both motions. The trial court reasoned that the state's attorney's line of questioning was proper because it was relevant to the credibility of the defendant and Provite and had nothing to do with the defendant's constitutional right to remain silent. Id., 23-24. The trial court thereafter twice instructed the jury that "whenever anyone does not communicate with someone on the advice of counsel, it is not a negative factor at all," and that, if the jury found that the defendant did not contact Provite on the advice of counsel, the jury should "draw no unfavorable inference" from that circumstance. This appeal followed.
The standard for review of an action upon a motion for a mistrial is well established. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813, 836-37, 661 A.2d 539 (1995). "The decision whether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Correa, 241 Conn. 322, 351, 696 A.2d 944 (1997); State v. Day, supra, 835; see Practice Book § 42-43.5
The defendant claims that the admission of the evidence violated his right to silence as enunciated in State v. Ferrone, 97 Conn. 258, 116 A. 336 (1922). We disagree. In Ferrone, this court held that Id., 266. In Ferrone, the state had offered the defendant's silence in the face of accusatory police questions as an adoptive admission.
Ferrone concerns the doctrine of adoptive admissions under principles of the law of evidence. State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 526, 504 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184, 106 S. Ct. 2922, 91 L. Ed.2d 550 (1986). As we said in Leecan,"[w]hen a statement, accusatory in nature, made in the presence and hearing of an accused, is not denied or explained by him, it may be received into evidence as an admission on his part." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 522. We went on in Leecan to hold that ...
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State v. O'NEIL, (SC 16177)
...In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the jury properly followed those instructions. E.g., State v. Taft, 258 Conn. 412, 421, 781 A.2d 302 (2001). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the ev......
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State v. Higgins, (SC 16403)
...a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taft, 258 Conn. 412, 418, 781 A.2d 302 (2001). Whether the presence of security personnel in a courtroom during trial was so prejudicial to the defendant as to depr......
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State v. Higgins
...a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taft, 258 Conn. 412, 418, 781 A.2d 302 (2001). Whether the presence of security personnel in a courtroom during trial was so prejudicial to the defendant as to depr......
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State v. Coltherst
...(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 316-17, 852 A.2d 703 (2004); State v. Taft, 258 Conn. 412, 418, 781 A.2d 302 (2001). Put another way, "[o]n appeal, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that there was irreparable prejudice to......
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Hearsay
...whether a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant unambiguously adopted another person’s incriminating statement. State v. Taft, 781 A.2d 302 (Ct. 2001). When a statement, accusatory in nature, made in the presence of an accused, is not denied or explained by him, it may be receiv......
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Hearsay
...reasonably conclude that the 6-59 ADMISSIONS §633 defendant unambiguously adopted another person’s incriminating statement. State v. Taft, 781 A.2d 302 (Ct. 2001). When a statement, accusatory in nature, made in the presence of an accused, is not denied or explained by him, it may be receiv......
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Hearsay
...whether a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant unambiguously adopted another person’s incriminating statement. State v. Taft, 781 A.2d 302 (Ct. 2001). When a statement, accusatory in nature, made in the presence of an accused, is not denied or explained by him, it may be receiv......
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Hearsay
...whether a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant unambiguously adopted another person’s incriminating statement. State v. Taft, 781 A.2d 302 (Ct. 2001). When a statement, accusatory in nature, made in the presence of an accused, is not denied or explained by him, it may be receiv......