State v. Tascarella
| Decision Date | 16 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 75551,75551 |
| Citation | 16 Fla. L. Weekly 379,580 So.2d 154 |
| Parties | 16 Fla. L. Weekly 379 STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Allen TASCARELLA and Barbara Ambs Tascarella, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Richard L. Rosenbaum of the Law Offices of Richard L. Rosenbaum, and Gene Reibman, Fort Lauderdale, for respondents.
We review State v. Tascarella, 559 So.2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), in which the district court certified the following question as being of great public importance:
Is it an abuse of discretion to exclude evidence as a sanction against the state where government agents disregard a court order because they are restricted by law from disclosing information without approval?
We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(4), Fla.Const. We answer the certified question in the negative and approve the district court's decision.
Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents arrested Allen Tascarella and Barbara Ambs Tascarella for cocaine trafficking. In response to the Tascarellas' demand for discovery, the state indicated that eleven DEA agents had information relevant to the offense charged. The agents are justice department employees and are forbidden from disclosing information acquired in their official duties or contained in department files without prior approval. 28 C.F.R. Secs. 16.21--.29 (1990). 1
Upon the agents failure to appear for scheduled depositions, the Tascarellas filed a motion to compel the agents to testify by deposition. The trial court granted the motion, and the depositions were rescheduled. The agents again refused to testify upon the advice of the United States Attorney's Office, despite the trial court's order that they respond to subpoenas.
The trial court, after a hearing, found that the Tascarellas would be prejudiced if forced to confront these witnesses at trial without pretrial discovery. The court recognized that contempt was not an alternative under the circumstances 2 and refused to allow the agents to testify pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(j). 3 The state filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the district court for review of the trial court's order. The district court denied the state's petition and certified the aforementioned question to this Court.
The purpose of Florida's criminal discovery rules is to avail the defense of evidence known to the state so that convictions will not be obtained by the suppression of evidence favorable to a defendant or by surprise tactics in the courtroom. Cooper v. State, 336 So.2d 1133 (Fla.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 2200, 53 L.Ed.2d 239 (1977); State v. Counce, 392 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). In furtherance of this purpose, rule 3.220(h) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Generally. At any time after the filing of the indictment or information the defendant may take the deposition upon oral examination of any person who may have information relevant to the offense charged.
Failure to comply with an applicable discovery rule or order may result in court-ordered sanctions pursuant to rule 3.220(n), which include the exclusion of testimony at trial.
The state argues that the federal regulations preempt the application of state criminal discovery rules, and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by sanctioning the state for refusing to comply with state rules. We disagree.
It has long been held that states have full control over the procedural rules in their courts, in both civil and criminal cases. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 652, 68 S.Ct. 763, 769, 92 L.Ed. 986 (1948). See also Markert v. Johnston, 367 So.2d 1003 (Fla.1978) (). In Bute the Court stated:
They [the states] retained this control from the beginning and, in some states, local control of these matters long antedated the Constitution. The states and the people still are the repositories of the "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,...." The underlying control over the procedure in any state court, dealing with distinctly local offenses ... consequently remains in the state.
333 U.S. at 652, 68 S.Ct. at 769 ).
The case under review originated in state court and involved the prosecution of the Tascarellas for violating state law. In this situation, Bute requires trial courts to follow state rules with respect to procedural matters. The supervision of discovery depositions is a procedural matter and is therefore subject to state control.
The state further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by compelling the agents to appear for deposition, or be forbidden from testifying at trial, without first attempting to reach a compromise that would have satisfied both the state discovery rules and the federal regulations. 4 We disagree. Although we recognize that relevant evidence should not be excluded unless no other remedy suffices, a ruling on whether a discovery violation calls for the exclusion of testimony is discretionary and should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse is clearly shown. Wilkerson v. State, 461 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
The exclusion of testimony is a permissible sanction under rule 3.220(j). Whether a remedy such as exclusion should be imposed depends on the totality of the circumstances. Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771, 775 (Fla.1971). The trial court found the agents' failure to comply with its discovery order intentional and prejudicial to the Tascarellas and that it substantially impeded their ability to defend themselves from the charges against them. In addition the trial court could neither hold the federal agents in contempt nor require them to testify. In light of these circumstances, the state has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the witnesses from testifying at trial as a sanction for the...
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Appellate standards of review.
...left to the discretion of the trial judge and are reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., State v. Tascarella, 580 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1991); Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944 (Fla. Venue Orders. Similarly, orders on motions for change of venue will be upheld, absent a show......