State v. Tate
| Decision Date | 17 March 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 1572-E,1572-E |
| Parties | STATE v. Howard W. TATE. x. &c. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Howard W. Tate was tried and convicted by a jury in the Superior Court on a charge of rape. He is here pressing his exceptions to the trial justice's refusal to pass the case and to grant his motion for a new trial.
A mere outline of the evidence will suffice for our purposes. On the evening of September 5, 1969, the prosecutrix, then a girl of about 17 years, and some others went to a beach along the upper reaches of Narragansett Bay where they had a cookout. During the evening the prosecutrix, together with an acquaintance, Raymond Pariseau, left the group and walked along the beach. Some time thereafter Pariseau left her and then, according to prosecutrix, she was literally attracked by what she described as 'a whole bunch of boys.' They threw her to the ground, disrobed her, and held her arms and legs while several of the assailants raped her. She positively identified defendant as one of those who had carnal knowledge of her by force and without her consent.
Pariseau later returned to the beach, and offered her a ride which she accepted. He dropped her off at her home in the early morning hours. She did not immediately awaken her parents, but retired and waited until she arose at about 11:00 a.m. to tell them what had happened. Her father called the police and then took his daughter to the police station.
After relating the events of the previous night to the police, the prosecutrix was taken to a hospital where she was examined by a physician specializing in gynecology and obstetrics. He found her arms and legs bruised, and that she had 'some form of trauma' to the vulva and vagina. Those symptoms, as well as others observed on subsequent examinations, were in his opinion consistent with her statement that she had been raped. Indeed, he went so far as to say some of her injuries would not have resulted from consensual intercourse on several occasions with several individuals on the same day.
The defendant offered no testimony that in any way directly negated the state's evidence. Pariseau, however, testified on defendant's behalf that at no time during the ride home from the beach did the prosecutrix complain that she had been assaulted or raped. He further testified that en route they stopped, got out of the automobile, and went behind some bushes where they had intercourse two or three times.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence the jury returned a guilty verdict. Thereafter, the trial justice, in denying defendant's motion for a new trial, observed that the case was not very complicated, that it 'rested essentially on the credibility of the witnesses as presented by the prosecution' and that 'the jury was justified in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' The defendant attacks that decision on the ground that it neither makes a reasonable reference to the evidence nor indicates the reasons underlying the trial justice's determination, and he argues that a decision deficient in these particulars should not receive the persuasive force which might otherwise be its just entitlement.
It is true that the trial justice's bench decision is sketchy and brief, that it fails to analyze the evidence extensively, and that it does not specifically indentify which witnesses he believed and which he disbelieved. But we give a trial justice wide latitude with respect to the form of his decision, and we have never insisted that it be lengthy or that it contain an exhaustive analysis of the evidence, or that it literally tag the testimony of each witness as 'credible' or 'incredible.' Notarantonio v. Damiano Bros. Welding Co., 101 R.I. 173, 177, 221 A.2d 473, 475 (1966); Turgeon v. Rocks, 96 R.I. 353, 356, 191 A.2d 606, 607 (1963); Chase v. Goyette, 85 R.I. 469, 473, 133 A.2d 123, 125 (1957). We require, however, that in the exercise of his independant judgment he weigh the evidence and pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and that he give the reasons for his conclusions. Handy v. Geary, 105 R.I. 419, 435, 252 A.2d 435, 443 (1969); McVeigh v. McCullough, 96 R.I. 412, 428, 192 A.2d 437, 446-447 (1963).
When we look to the record in this case in order to test the trial justice's decision against these standards, we find that here, as in so many rape cases, there was no direct testimony from an impartial eyewitness. Instead, for the state there is the prosecutrix's statement that she had been ravished plus whatever corroboration it receives from the examining physician; and for the defense, there are only the inferences that might have been drawn either from Pariseau's testiomy of what happened during the drive home or from the prosecutrix's failure to awaken her parents as soon as she returned home in order to tell them what had happened.
Given the evidentiary context of this case, we do not believe that defendant would, or could, have faulted the trial justice's performance of his obligations in...
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State v. Anil, 79-162-C
... ... Consistently with our rule in Lerner, we therefore affirm the trial justice's ruling denying the request for disclosure ... The defendant next argues that in considering his motion for a new trial, the trial justice did not comply with the requirements of State v. Tate, 109 R.I. 586, 288 A.2d 494 (1972). In Tate, this court held that on a motion for a new trial, the trial justice must exercise his independent judgment, must weigh the evidence must pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and must give reasons for his conclusions. Id. at 589, 288 A.2d at 496 ... ...
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