State v. Tatum, C9-96-30

Decision Date21 November 1996
Docket NumberNo. C9-96-30,C9-96-30
Citation556 N.W.2d 541
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Dywon C. TATUM, Respondent.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Courts considering a contempt penalty are advised to determine at their earliest convenience whether the purpose of the contempt proceeding is remedial or punitive, and whether the nature of the contemptuous conduct at issue is direct or constructive.

2. Neither section 588.10 nor section 588.20 of the contempts statute applies to direct contempt, summarily sentenced, for punitive purposes.

3. The judiciary retains inherent authority to punish direct contempt whether or not statutory authorization exists.

4. A court may not summarily sentence direct contempt for punitive purposes with a penalty exceeding 6 months; contempt orders are subject to appellate review for arbitrariness, capriciousness, and oppressiveness; and, as a matter of comity and deference, summarily imposed contempt sentences for punitive purposes should ordinarily not exceed 90 days and a $700 fine.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

KEITH, Chief Justice.

In this case we are asked to address the operation of certain penalty provisions in the contempts statute, Minn.Stat. §§ 588.01-.21 (1994). The district court found respondent Dywon C. Tatum in direct criminal contempt of court for refusing to testify and summarily sentenced him to 6 months in the workhouse under section 588.10. The court of appeals issued a writ of prohibition, reducing Tatum's sentence to 90 days pursuant to the misdemeanor penalty limitation in section 588.20. The State petitioned for further review. We reverse the court of appeals and remand to the district court for further consideration of Tatum's sentence.

I.

Tatum was a member of the Rolling 60's Crips gang on March 31, 1995, when Roy Griffin was killed. Tatum was charged with first-degree murder in connection with Griffin's death, but he was acquitted by a jury on November 7, 1995. Before the verdict, Tatum was subpoenaed and ordered to appear before the Hennepin County district court judge who was to preside at the trial of Tatum's co-defendant, Samuel Byers.

After Tatum was acquitted, the State sought to compel Tatum's testimony in Byers' upcoming trial. At the hearing on the State's request, counsel for Tatum argued that Tatum's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination would justify a refusal to testify. Tatum's counsel also argued that if Tatum were compelled to testify he would be placed in personal danger, although no specific threats directed against Tatum were identified. The district court rejected the arguments for privilege because, pursuant to the State's request, Tatum would receive immunity from the use of his testimony. See Minn.Stat. § 609.09. The court also believed that Tatum waived any privilege by previously testifying in his own defense.

Despite the district court's ruling, Tatum indicated at the hearing that he would refuse to testify if called by the State as a witness in the Byers trial. The court deemed Tatum an unavailable witness and concluded that he had no right to refuse to testify in violation of the court's order. The court then found Tatum in contempt for refusing to testify despite receiving use immunity. The court concluded: (1) that Tatum's refusal was a direct contempt under section 588.01; (2) that the refusal was a criminal contempt "under a willful disobedience to the lawful process or other mandate of the court"; 1 and (3) that the penalties in section 588.10 applied, and therefore a 6-month sentence was proper.

In punishing Tatum for direct criminal contempt, the district court made a good-faith effort to follow the contempts statute. The court concluded that Tatum's indication that he would not testify was a direct contempt under section 588.01 because Tatum offered his intentions in the presence of the judge. See id. § 588.01, subd. 2. The court then invoked the summary punishment provision in section 588.03. Although it did not expressly refer to section 588.20 as a basis for the contempt order, the court did use the language of section 588.20(4): "I will further find that it is a criminal contempt. And I find that under a willful disobedience to the lawful process or other mandate of the court." The court also appeared to invoke the language of section 588.20(5): "The resistance [to testify] is willfully offered." However, the court did not explain why the sentence for Tatum's willful disobedience was governed by section 588.10.

The court of appeals granted Tatum's petition for a writ of prohibition, concluding that the judiciary's inherent power to punish a civil contempt is not limited by statute, but that the legislature can and has prescribed the appropriate punishment for criminal offenses. Section 588.20 lists "criminal contempts," including willful disobedience to a lawful court process or other mandate. Id. § 588.20(4). The court reasoned that the legislature provided a misdemeanor penalty for such contempts and therefore the district court exceeded its lawful authority when it imposed a sentence longer than 90 days. See id. § 609.02, subd. 3 (limiting misdemeanor sentences to 90 days). The court stated that the 6-month maximum sentence in section 588.10 would have applied if Tatum's contempt were not included in section 588.20, but here, section 588.20 governed.

II.

We first consider the character of the contempt order and Tatum's conduct.

Traditionally, the law of contempt in Minnesota has been organized around two classifications--one judicially crafted and the other statutorily mandated. First, our contempt case law explains that the purpose of the court's contempt order can be either remedial or punitive. Knajdek v. West, 278 Minn. 282, 285, 153 N.W.2d 846, 848 (1967). The primary purpose of "criminal" contempt orders is punitive--in general, vindicating the court's authority by punishing the contemnor for past behavior. Minnesota State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Assistance Ass'n, Inc., 311 Minn. 276, 285, 248 N.W.2d 733, 741 (1976). The primary purpose of "civil" contempt orders is remedial--in general, vindicating the rights of a party by imposing a sanction that will be removed upon compliance with a court order that has been defied. Id. 2

Second, the contempts statute instructs that the nature of the contemptuous conduct can be either direct or constructive. Direct contempts occur in the immediate view and presence of the court, and arise from:

(1) Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceedings;

(2) A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct, or violent disturbance, tending to interrupt the business of the court.

Minn.Stat. § 588.01, subd. 2. Direct contempts may be punished summarily. Id. § 588.03. In contrast, constructive contempts are those not committed in the presence of the court, of which the court has no personal knowledge, and may arise from a variety of conduct. Id. § 588.01, subd. 3. Constructive contempts may not be punished summarily. 3

To ensure that contempt orders are validly issued, we recommend that courts considering a contempt penalty determine at their earliest convenience whether the purpose of the contempt proceeding is remedial or punitive, and whether the nature of the contemptuous conduct at issue is direct or constructive.

Here, Tatum's contempt was direct because it violated the court's order that he be available to testify and because the defiance took place in the presence of the court. See Minn.Stat. § 588.01, subd. 2(1); State v. Martin, 555 N.W.2d 899, 900 (Minn.1996). The purpose of the district court's summarily imposed 6-month sentence was punitive because Tatum's sentence was fixed and because he had no opportunity to purge the penalty. See Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 311 Minn. at 285, 248 N.W.2d at 741.

III.

We next consider whether the contempts statute limits Tatum's sentence to 6 months or to 90 days. Section 588.10 authorizes imprisonment not exceeding 6 months and a fine not exceeding $250, or both. In contrast, section 588.20 lists several types of criminal contempt for which the legislature has prescribed a misdemeanor penalty. "Every person who shall commit a contempt of court, of any one of the following kinds, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor":

(1) disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior, committed during the sitting of the court, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings, or to impair the respect due to its authority;

* * * * * *

(3) breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of a court, jury, or referee;

(4) willful disobedience to the lawful process or other mandate of a court;

(5) resistance willfully offered to its lawful process or other mandate;

(6) contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness, or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper interrogatory[.]

Minn.Stat. § 588.20. The Criminal Code defines a misdemeanor as a crime with a sentence of not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $700, or both. Id. § 609.02, subd. 3.

Neither penalty provision applies to direct contempt, summarily sentenced, for punitive purposes. We agree with Tatum that section 588.10 does not govern this case. Section 588.10 applies only to constructive contempts and direct contempts that are not summarily punished. Cf. Peterson, 278 Minn. at 279 & n. 5, 153 N.W.2d at 828 & n. 5 (stating that section 588.10 applies to constructive criminal contempts). This...

To continue reading

Request your trial
59 cases
  • State v. M.D.T., A11–1285.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • May 22, 2013
    ...the “judicial power” includes the authority to “punish direct contempt whether or not statutory authorization exists.” State v. Tatum, 556 N.W.2d 541, 547 (Minn.1996). As we have stated, “ ‘[t]he [contempt] power is essential to the effectiveness of all other court powers.’ ” Id. (quoting I......
  • State v. Schloegl, A17-0898
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Minnesota
    • May 7, 2018
    ...contempt for his courtroom outburst. We review contempt orders "for arbitrariness, capriciousness, and oppressiveness." State v. Tatum , 556 N.W.2d 541, 547 (Minn. 1996). Direct criminal contempt, as opposed to constructive criminal contempt, occurs in the court’s presence. Minn. Stat. § 58......
  • State v. Umphress
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Minnesota
    • January 10, 2022
    ...by the [district] court with the prosecutor's exercise of the charging discretion" does not constitute "special circumstances." Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541. Instead, the supreme court held that the district court can use its inherent judicial authority to stay adjudication "sparingly and only f......
  • State v. Jones, A14–1399.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • August 26, 2015
    ...discretion of the judiciary, and the other in section 588.20 that is “prosecutable by the state like any other crime.” State v. Tatum, 556 N.W.2d 541, 546 (Minn.1996). In this case, the probationer was charged with violating the latter—specifically section 588.20, subdivision 2(4), a misdem......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT