State v. Taylor, 070318 NCCA, COA17-730

JudgeJudges BRYANT and TYSON concur.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals
Docket NumberCOA17-730
PartiesSTATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. AARON ROSS TAYLOR, Defendant.
Date03 July 2018

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

AARON ROSS TAYLOR, Defendant.

No. COA17-730

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

July 3, 2018

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 March 2018.

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 5 October 2016 by Judge Paul L. Jones in New Hanover County No. 13 CRS 009336 Superior Court.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Kathryne E. Hathcock, for the State.

Appellate Defender G. Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Hannah H. Love, for the Defendant.

DILLON, Judge.

Aaron Ross Taylor ("Defendant") appeals from the trial court's judgment entering a jury verdict finding him guilty of driving while impaired ("DWI"). Defendant contends the trial court erred by (1) dismissing his motion to suppress where his blood was drawn unlawfully and (2) giving jury instructions unsupported by the evidence at trial. After careful review, we find no error.

I. Background

On 9 December 2013, police responded to an emergency involving a truck stopped in a travel lane of a busy intersection in Wilmington. One officer parked his vehicle to the right of the truck, while another parked in front of the truck. The officers discovered Defendant unconscious and unresponsive in the driver's seat of the truck with his foot on the brake pedal. The truck's engine was running.

As the officers attempted to awaken Defendant, Defendant's foot slipped off the brake pedal. The truck moved suddenly, striking one of the officers and crashing into the patrol car parked in front of it. Defendant slid out of the truck as it moved and sustained injuries to his head and shoulder as he struck the ground. He was transported to a hospital.

An officer visited Defendant at the hospital. There, Defendant consented to and blew positive on a breathalyzer test. Based on the positive breathalyzer result and reports that Defendant had been unconscious at the scene, the officer charged Defendant with DWI. Defendant signed an implied consent rights form and allowed a nurse to draw his blood. Police tested Defendant's blood and discovered a .11 blood alcohol concentration ("BAC").

At trial, Defendant moved to suppress any evidence of his BAC, contending that it was obtained without a warrant, consent, or probable cause. The trial court denied the motion. The first trial ended in a mistrial. On the day of the second trial, Defendant filed a new motion to suppress on the same grounds. Again, the trial court denied the motion. During the charge conference, the parties agreed only to jury instructions stating that Defendant could be convicted if his BAC was .08 or more, but the trial court also instructed the jury that it could convict Defendant if it found that he was "appreciably impaired." The jury found Defendant guilty of DWI. Defendant appeals.

II. Analysis

Defendant claims the trial court erred in essentially two respects. First, he contends that the trial court erred in summarily denying his amended motion to suppress because he presented new information that warranted reconsideration, and because his blood was drawn without a warrant, his consent, or probable cause. Second, Defendant argues that the trial court gave jury instructions that were not supported by the evidence in the case. We address each argument in turn.

A. Motion to Suppress

Defendant first challenges the trial court's denial of his amended motion to suppress evidence of his blood draw. Defendant asserts that the judge abused his discretion when he summarily denied the amended motion to suppress. Further, Defendant alleges that consideration of the merits of his amended motion to suppress would have shown that the judge in his first trial improperly denied the first motion to suppress.

"A trial court's ruling on a request to renew a pretrial motion to suppress is subject to appellate review under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Wade, 198 N.C.App. 257, 264-65, 679 S.E.2d 484, 488 (2009).

Defendant filed his amended motion to suppress on the day of trial, before jury selection. The judge immediately denied the motion, stating "you don't file motions on the day of trial." Then, at the end of the trial day, the judge explained that he was unable to reconsider Defendant's motion: [T]he reason the [trial court] didn't give more consideration to your motion [is] because this case was previously tried and mistrialed, and everything had been considered. So one superior court judge cannot overrule another one. For that reason, can't even be reconsidered. So for that fact, they were summarily denied.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its reasoning for denying his motion. Specifically, Defendant states that, since his new motion was based on a change in circumstances, the trial court did have the authority to consider its merits. State v. Woolridge, 357 N.C. 544, 549-50, 592 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2003) (holding that a second superior court judge can only reconsider a prior judge's ruling on a motion upon a showing of a "substantial change in circumstances . . . warrant[ing] a different or new disposition of the matter.").

Assuming, for the sake of Defendant's argument, that the trial court erred, we conclude that any such error at retrial was harmless. A substantial change in circumstances exists where new facts that "bear upon the propriety" of a prior decision have emerged, causing a "material change in conditions." Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 505, 189 S.E.2d 484, 490 (1972). Defendant moved to suppress evidence of his BAC acquired from a blood draw, arguing that it was done without consent. The amended motion to suppress alleged that, between the hearing in the first trial and the beginning of the second trial, Defendant learned new information about beer cans found in...

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