State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 22 December 2020
• Docket Number: Nos. 2018-1243,2018-1315,s. 2018-1243
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. TAYLOR, Appellee.

163 Ohio St.3d 508

171 N.E.3d 290

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,

v.TAYLOR, Appellee.

Nos. 2018-1243

2018-1315

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted July 7, 2020

Decided December 22, 2020

Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sarah E. Hutnik and Andrew T. French, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.

Marshall G. Lachman, Springboro, for appellee.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Office of the Ohio Public Defender.

Fischer, J.{¶ 1} In this certified-conflict case from the Second District Court of Appeals, we address whether a trial court, pursuant to R.C. 2941.51(D), may order a criminal defendant to pay a portion of his or her court-appointed-counsel fees without first articulating explicit findings about the defendant's ability to pay.

{¶ 2} We answer the certified-conflict question in the negative and hold that under R.C. 2941.51(D), a trial court in a criminal case may assess court-appointed-counsel fees against a defendant without making specific findings on the record to justify the fee assessment. We recognize, however, that the best practice is for the trial court to articulate its findings on the record for the benefit of the parties and to allow for more meaningful appellate review. We also hold that an order for payment of court-appointed-counsel fees cannot be included as a part of the defendant's sentence for a criminal conviction. Although those fees may be ordered at the time of sentencing and may be listed separately in the sentencing entry as a civil matter, the best practice is to include such fees in a separate entry.

{¶ 3} Because the Second District based its decision on its determination that there is a statutory explicit-findings requirement and thus did not properly review the trial court's assessment of court-appointed-counsel fees, we reverse its judgment. And because the trial court erred in imposing court-appointed-counsel fees upon Taylor in his sentence, we also vacate the portion of the sentencing entry imposing those fees.

BACKGROUND

The trial court orders Taylor to pay court-appointed-counsel fees

{¶ 4} After appellee, Robert Taylor, was indicted, the trial court determined that Taylor was indigent and appointed counsel to represent him. Taylor pleaded guilty to amended charges of kidnapping and gross sexual imposition against a person under the age of 13. See R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) and 2907.05(A)(4). Appellant, the state of Ohio, joined Taylor in recommending that the court impose five years of community-control sanctions.

{¶ 5} After ordering and reviewing Taylor's presentence-investigation report ("PSI"), the trial court opted to impose the agreed-upon term of community control. The trial court also ordered Taylor to pay a $250 supervision fee, court costs as determined by the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts, and $130 to the assigned-counsel-budget fund. The court then stated, "I'm also going to enter judgment against [Taylor] for the * * * costs of the prosecution as I just went over." (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 6} The $130 court-appointed-counsel fee was listed in the "Financial Obligations" section of Taylor's sentencing entry, along with the supervision fee and court costs. The court-appointed-counsel fee was also included on the second page of the entry in the "Reimbursements Payable" section. The entry also provided, "If applicable in this case, defendant is ordered to pay any restitution, all costs of prosecution, stipulated fines, and any fees permitted pursuant to R.C. 2929.18(A)(4) and 2951.021." After the sentencing entry was journalized, Taylor filed a notice of appeal in the Second District Court of Appeals.

The appellate court reverses the judgment of the trial court

{¶ 7} On appeal, Taylor asserted that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $130 toward appointed-counsel fees and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the imposition of those fees. Taylor argued that his PSI did not conclusively establish that he had the ability to pay, since it showed that he was receiving Social Security disability benefits with a limited monthly stipend and had no other source of income. Taylor also asserted that the trial court made no finding about his ability to pay. Taylor also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue before or during sentencing.

{¶ 8} The Second District held that the trial court could not order Taylor to pay the court-appointed-counsel fees without first considering his financial ability to do so. The court determined that because " R.C. 2941.51(D) specifically provides that court-appointed counsel fees shall be paid by the county," "there is a statutory presumption that the county will pay appointed counsel's fees and expenses." 2018-Ohio-2858, 117 N.E.3d 887, ¶ 21. It reasoned that "[g]iven this presumption, * * * the trial court must make an explicit finding that a defendant has or reasonably may be expected to have the means to pay some or all of the cost of his or her legal representation" before assessing those fees against him. Id. Further, the court explained that someone other than the defendant would bear the burden of proving that the exception should apply. Id. at ¶ 13. The Second District concluded that the duty to pay remains fully with the county unless the record reflects a determination by the trial court regarding the defendant's ability to pay, as well as evidence supporting the court's determination. Id. at ¶ 13, 15.

{¶ 9} The Second District noted that although several other courts have similarly concluded that a trial court must determine a defendant's ability to pay prior to imposing any appointed-counsel fees, they have disagreed on exactly how that determination must be reflected in the record. The court observed that the Third and Sixth District Courts of Appeals have held that a trial court must support its determination with specific findings articulated on the record. Id. at ¶ 19, citing State v. Ramsey , 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-10-55, 2012-Ohio-134, 2012 WL 134827, ¶ 22, and State v. Talley , 2016-Ohio-8010, 74 N.E.3d 868, ¶ 44 (6th Dist.). But the Twelfth District has held that in order to comply with R.C. 2941.51(D), the record merely needs to indicate that the trial court has considered a PSI containing information about the defendant's finances and employment. Id. at ¶ 18, citing State v. Christman , 12th Dist. Preble Nos. CA2009-03-007 and CA2009-03-008, 2009-Ohio-6555, 2009 WL 4810318, ¶ 39.

{¶ 10} The Second District agreed with the Third and Sixth Districts, holding that in order to overcome the statutory presumption that the county must pay for appointed counsel, a trial court must make "an explicit finding" on the record regarding the defendant's ability to pay and also specify the amount the defendant can reasonably be expected to pay. Id. at ¶ 21. The court determined that Taylor's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the issue of court-appointed-counsel fees was moot. Id. at ¶ 27.

{¶ 11} The Second District certified that its judgment was in conflict with the Twelfth District's judgment in Christman .

We recognized that a conflict exists, accepted the corresponding discretionary appeal, and ordered supplemental briefing

{¶ 12} We determined that a conflict exists and ordered the parties to brief the following question:

Prior to ordering a defendant to pay court-appointed counsel fees pursuant to R.C. 2941.51(D), must the trial court make an explicit finding that the defendant has or reasonably may be expected to have the means to pay some or all of the cost of his or her legal representation?

154 Ohio St.3d 1421, 2018-Ohio-4495, 111 N.E.3d 19.

{¶ 13} We also accepted the state's discretionary appeal, in which it asserted a proposition of law that requires us to address the same issue as the conflict question. See 154 Ohio St.3d 1421, 2018-Ohio-4495, 111 N.E.3d 20. We sua sponte consolidated the two matters. Id.

{¶ 14} After oral argument, we sua sponte ordered supplemental briefing on the following issues:

(1) whether R.C. 2941.51(D) authorizes a court in a criminal case to order a defendant to pay a portion of the cost of appointed counsel; (2) if so, whether that court's order of appointed-counsel fees may be included in a judgment of conviction; and (3) the extent to which the assessment of appointed-counsel fees is restricted, if at all, by R.C. 120.03(B)(6), Ohio Adm.Code 120-1-05(C), and any other relevant statutes, administrative provisions, or agency-promulgated rules governing marginal indigency.

158 Ohio St.3d 1525, 2020-Ohio-3069, 145 N.E.3d 318.

ANALYSIS

{¶ 15} Our review is de novo. See State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, 871 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 8 (questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed de novo). And here, it necessarily begins with R.C. 2941.51, which is one of several statutes, see, e.g., R.C. Chapter 120, that governs the process for the appointment of counsel for criminal defendants.

{¶ 16} The General Assembly has provided, in R.C. 2941.51(A), that "[c]ounsel appointed to a case * * * shall be paid for their services by the county the compensation and expenses that the trial court approves." Those fees and expenses that are approved by the court "shall not be taxed as a part of the costs and shall be paid by the county." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2941.51(D). "However, if the person represented has, or reasonably may be expected to have, the means to meet some part of the cost of the services rendered to the person, the person shall pay the county an amount that the person reasonably can be expected to pay."Id.

{¶ 17} Thus, under the plain language of the statute, the person represented by court-appointed counsel may be required to pay some or all of the expenses of that representation. We next must determine who may impose those fees, how those fees may be imposed, and when those fees may be imposed.

The trial court has authority to...