State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 18 November 2014
• Docket Number: 31,998.
• Citation: 343 P.3d 199
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Larry B. TAYLOR, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

343 P.3d 199

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Larry B. TAYLOR, Defendant–Appellee.

31,998.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Nov. 18, 2014.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

VIGIL, Judge.

{1} This is another Sixth Amendment speedy trial case. The central question presented is whether a defendant permanently waives his constitutional right to a speedy trial because his attorney moves for a trial setting to be vacated due to a scheduling conflict with another trial setting and stipulates that the resulting delay will not be attributable to the State. The district court concluded, “it is not reasonable to say that this ‘waiver’ would allow a one (1) year, three (3) months and six (6) days delay” and dismissed the criminal information with prejudice on grounds that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. We agree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} On January 25, 2010, police responded to a domestic abuse call, which resulted in Defendant's arrest. The following day two separate criminal complaints were filed in the magistrate court. The first charged Defendant with criminal sexual penetration in the third degree, and the second alleged misdemeanor battery with respect to the same victim. After posting bond, Defendant was released on February 2, 2010. Defendant filed a written demand for a speedy trial in the felony case on February 11, 2010, and a written demand for a speedy trial in the misdemeanor case on February 16, 2010. A waiver of preliminary hearing and presentation to the grand jury was filed on February 17, 2010, and the case was bound over to the district court. On March 5, 2010, a criminal information was filed in the district court charging both criminal sexual penetration in the third degree and misdemeanor battery on a household member.

{3} On June 15, 2010, a jury trial was scheduled to commence before Judge Tatum on July 27, 2010. However, on July 6, 2010, Judge Tatum voluntarily recused himself from the case, and it was assigned to Judge Hartley. On July 12, 2010, the State recused Judge Hartley from hearing the case, and on July 26, 2010, Judge Orlik was assigned to the case. On September 17, 2010, trial was set to commence on October 6, 2010 before Judge Orlik. On October 5, 2010, Defendant filed a motion to vacate the trial on grounds that Defendant's attorney had another jury trial set on the same date and time. The State concurred in the motion with Defendant's stipulation that “any delay resulting from a continuance will not count against the State in speedy trial determinations.” However, at no time after this motion was granted, did the State request a new trial setting.

{4} Judge Orlik passed away on May 28, 2011, and Judge Mowrer was appointed to replace him. The case was then erroneously assigned to Judge Quinn on June 6, 2011, and when the mistake was discovered, the case was re-assigned to Judge Mowrer on July 19, 2011. Judge Mowrer voluntarily recused herself from the case on September 5, 2011, because as the prior Deputy District Attorney, she had appeared on behalf of the State in the case at a prior hearing. Ten days later, on September 15, the case was re-assigned to Judge Quinn. On his own motion, Judge Quinn held a pretrial conference on December 13, 2011, and set the case to commence trial on January 11, 2012. At the pretrial conference, defense counsel alerted the court that there were speedy trial problems, and the day before trial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, which Judge Quinn granted on January 12, 2012. The State appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{5} On appeal from an order of dismissal for a violation of a defendant's right to a speedy trial, we give deference to the district court's factual findings but review the speedy trial factors de novo. State v. Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 19, 283 P.3d 272. The speedy trial factors we consider are those set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–32, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) : “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons given for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Collier, 2013–NMSC–015, ¶ 39, 301 P.3d 370 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Each of these factors is weighed either in favor of or against the State or the defendant, and then balanced to determine if a defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated.” Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 17, 283 P.3d 272. No single Barker factor is “either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Thus, in applying the Barker factors, we reject a bright-line analysis and analyze each case on an ad hoc basis in light of its own unique factual circumstances. State v. Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 14, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387.

SPEEDY TRIAL ANALYSIS

{6} The Sixth Amendment directs that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial[.]” Id. ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In a similar vein, Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution guarantees to an accused “a speedy public trial[.]” Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 10 n. 1, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. Thus, in our analysis, we are mindful that “[t]he right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused[,]” id., that is “guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution.” Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 16, 283 P.3d 272. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (stating that “because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused,” the balancing process of the Barker factors “must be carried out with full recognition that the accused's interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution”). The first step in our analysis is to determine whether the length of pretrial delay is “ ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ ” Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 23, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182). Only when the length of delay is “presumptively prejudicial” do we proceed to consideration of all of the Barker factors. See Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 21, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (stating that a “presumptively prejudicial” length of delay is “simply a triggering mechanism, requiring further inquiry into the Barker factors”).

{7} The district court found, and the State does not dispute, that this is a simple case. See State v. Plouse, 2003–NMCA–048, ¶ 42, 133 N.M. 495, 64 P.3d 522 (“We give due deference to the district court's findings as to the level of complexity.”). In Garza, our Supreme Court adopted “one year as a benchmark for determining when a simple case may become presumptively prejudicial.” 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 48, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. Here, Defendant's right to a speedy trial attached upon his arrest. See State v. Laney, 2003–NMCA–144, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 648, 81 P.3d 591 (“The right [to a speedy trial] attaches when the defendant becomes an accused, either at the time of arrest or upon the issuance of an indictment or information.”). Thus, the almost twenty-four-month delay between Defendant's arrest on January 25, 2010, and his January 11, 2012 trial date surpasses the twelve-month threshold for simple cases. We therefore proceed to analyze and weigh the four Barker factors.

A. Length of Delay

{8} “Considering the length of delay as one of the four Barker factors, the greater the delay the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the State.” Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 24, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387; see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (noting that, once a defendant establishes that delay was presumptively prejudicial, “the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim”).

{9} Here, the delay was almost two years, nearly twice as long as the twelve-month threshold for simple cases. We therefore weigh this factor heavily against the State. See State v. Vigil–Giron, 2014–NMCA–069, ¶¶ 19, 65, 327 P.3d 1129 (concluding that the length of delay, which was twice as long as the length of delay considered to be presumptively prejudicial, weighed heavily against the State), cert. denied, 2014–NMCERT–006, 328 P.3d 1188; State v. Marquez, 2001–NMCA–062, ¶ 12, 130 N.M. 651, 29 P.3d 1052 (holding that a nine-month delay that extended beyond the then-nine-month threshold for simple cases weighed heavily against the State).

B. Reasons for Delay

{10} Analysis of this Barker factor requires us to address the central question posed in this case: whether the reasons for the almost two-year delay should be weighed against the State, and to what extent. Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 25, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. “Barker identified three types of delay, indicating that ‘different weights should be assigned to different reasons' for the delay.” Garza, 2009–NMSC–038, ¶ 25, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. At one end of the spectrum, “a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.” Id. ¶ 27 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). At the other end of the spectrum, “ ‘official bad faith in causing delay will be weighed heavily against the government,’ and excessive bad-faith delay may present an overwhelming case for dismissal.” Id. ¶ 25 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686). In the middle lies negligent or administrative delay. Although “negligent,” the delay is nonetheless...