State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 19 May 1900
• Parties: STATE v. TAYLOR
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

61 P. 288

7 Idaho 134

STATE v. TAYLOR

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 19, 1900

CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-PREJUDICIAL REMARKS BY COURT-REVERSIBLE ERROR.-Where, on the trial of a defendant, upon a charge of murder, a witness testified that after the shooting, and when the defendant was some distance from the house where the shooting took place, "he [the defendant], took a shot at me" (the witness), in overruling an objection to the evidence, the court remarked that "the object of the admission of that testimony is to show the character disposition and action of the defendant at that time as being evilly disposed toward some one." Held, that both the admission of the testimony and remarks of the court were error. The coroner, being upon the witness stand, was asked by the prosecution if he held an inquest over the deceased and the question being objected to by defendant, the court remarked in sustaining the objection: "I sustain that. There was nothing mysterious about it. People knew who shot him. A coroner's inquest is only to find out how a person came to his death. If known otherwise, they do not have to hold one." Held, reversible error.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court, Shoshone County.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial ordered.

W. W Woods, for Appellant.

In overruling the defendant's motion to strike out the words, "He took a shot at me," the court said: "The object of the admission of that testimony is to show the character, disposition and action of the defendant at that time as being evilly disposed toward some one." This remark was highly prejudicial to the defendant; it was suggestive of his guilt, and indicated prejudice on the part of the judge; it was an invasion of the province of the jury and suggested that the defendant was of bad character, and evilly disposed toward some one, and that it was therefore probable that he was guilty of the offense charged. A judge has no more right to volunteer before the jury his opinion upon a material fact in controversy while deciding a question of law on the trial than he has to charge in respect to such facts. (2 Thompson on Trials, sec. 2297; People v. Buster, 53 Cal. 612; People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142.) The court erred in remarking in the presence of the jury while ruling on a question of law, "There was nothing mysterious about it. People knew who shot him. A coroner's inquest is only to find out how a person came to his death. If known otherwise, they do not have to hold one." (People v. Stanton, 106 Cal. 139, 39 P. 525; People v. Hertz, 105 Cal. 660, 39 P. 32; People v. Gordon, 88 Cal. 422, 26 P. 502; People v. Chew Sing Wing, 88 Cal. 268, 25 P. 1099; State v. Jackson (Kan.), 22 P. 427; State v. Lewis, 56 Kan. 374, 43 P. 265; People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191; State v. Addy, 28 S.C. 16, 4 S.E. 814; State v. Lee, 91 Iowa 505, 60 N.W. 119; State v. Fisher, 23 Mont. 540, 59 P. 919; People v. Strong, 30 Cal. 158; People v. Taylor, 36 Cal. 265; People v. Best, 39 Cal. 690.)

Samuel H. Hays, Attorney General, for the State.

It is contended that the court erred in refusing to strike from the testimony of Mabel Meade, the statement, "He took a shot at me." The killing took place at Mabel Meade's house where the parties were visitors. Defendant "took a shot at" the witness as soon as she came out of the house, which was only a moment after the shooting and while defendant was still but a few feet away. While the affray was in progress. Mabel Meade had hold of Barnhart's coat and attempted to prevent a difficulty. Even under the rule as stated in appellant's brief this was part of the res gestae. (See State v. Ellington, 4 Idaho 529, 43 P. 60; State v. Davis, 6 Idaho 159, 53 P. 678.) In examining Dr. France, the coroner, the following proceedings were had: "Q. Did you hold a coroner's jury over the death of Ed. Lorey? A. I did not. Q. State to the jury why you did not. Mr. Evens: We object. The Court: I sustain t hat. There was nothing mysterious about it. People knew who shot him. A coroner's inquest is only to find out how a person came to his death. If known otherwise, they do not have to hold one." This exception cannot be considered in this form for the reason that it is not one of the matters that can be embodied in a bill of exceptions. (See Rev. Stats., secs. 7940, 7942.. Neither is it a matter authorizing the granting of a new trial. (Rev. Stats., sec. 7952.) Nor is it ground for arrest of judgment. (Rev. Stats., sec. 7960.)

HUSTON, C. J. Sullivan, J., concurs. Quarles, J., was absent at the hearing of this case, on account of sickness.

OPINION

HUSTON, C. J.

The defendant was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals from the judgment of conviction, and also from the order of the court denying the motion for a new trial.

Briefly stated, the facts in the case, as they appear from the record, are about as follows: The defendant, one Barnhart and one Mabel Meade were engaged in some dispute or altercation upon the porch of the house occupied by the said Mabel Meade as a house of prostitution, in the town of Wardner. While this altercation was going on, the deceased came out of the house, onto the porch, and engaged in the controversy. Almost immediately upon the appearance of deceased, he and Barnhart engaged in what is termed by the witness a "scuffle." They clinched, and in their scuffle they passed from the porch into the hall of the house, and from the hall into the front room or parlor; and as they passed into the front room or parlor a shot was fired, and the deceased fell, expiring almost instantly. When deceased and Barnhart passed from the hall into the front room, they were clinched. The woman, Mabel Meade, testified that when the shot was fired she had hold of Barnhart's arm, and that he and deceased were clinched. She did not see the defendant after the scuffle commenced between Barnhart and deceased, "until she saw him going down the alley after the shooting." The only other person in the room at the time of the shooting was the woman Susie Wilson, who testifies that she did not see the defendant at all, and that, had he been in the room, she must have seen him. The physician who examined the body of the deceased immediately or very soon after the shooting testifies as follows: "I could determine the point of entrance, on account of a powder stain or powder mark covering an area of, perhaps, two inches in diameter. The hair was singed right down to the scalp, showing that the gun was in close proximity to the body when the shot was fired. Q. Describe to the jury, in your opinion, how far the gun was from the head of Leroy. A. When he was shot,...