State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 23 February 2022
• Docket Number: Appellate Case No. 2020-001184,Opinion No. 28085
• Citation: 436 S.C. 28,870 S.E.2d 168
• Parties: The STATE, Petitioner, v. Kenneth TAYLOR, Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

436 S.C. 28

870 S.E.2d 168

The STATE, Petitioner,

v.Kenneth TAYLOR, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2020-001184

Opinion No. 28085

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard September 21, 2021

Filed February 23, 2022

Rehearing Denied April 5, 2022

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch Jr., both of Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of Spartanburg, for Petitioner.

Kenneth Taylor, of Inman, pro se.

Jason Scott Luck, of Bennettsville, for Amicus Curiae South Carolina Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

JUSTICE JAMES :

Kenneth Taylor was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). The magistrate court dismissed the charge, finding the State failed to comply with subsection 56-5-2953(A)’s requirement that the DUI incident site video recording "show" the defendant being advised of his Miranda¹ rights. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. State v. Taylor , Op. No. 2020-UP-215, 2020 WL 3989479 (S.C. Ct. App. filed July 15, 2020). We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. In this opinion, we address two issues: (1) the meaning of the word "show" as it is used in subsection 56-5-2953(A) and (2) whether per se dismissal of a DUI charge is the proper remedy for a video's failure to "show" a DUI defendant being advised of his Miranda rights at the incident site.²

Background

At approximately 4:35 a.m. on June 11, 2015, Lance Corporal R.B. Thornton of the South Carolina Highway Patrol received a call from Spartanburg County Sheriff's Deputy Tony Woodward. Deputy Woodward requested assistance for a potentially impaired driver who had pulled his vehicle to the side of the road. Corporal Thornton promptly responded by activating his blue lights, which triggered his patrol car's exterior camera to begin recording.

When he arrived on scene, Corporal Thornton approached Taylor's vehicle. Corporal Thornton detected the smell of alcohol, saw an open container of beer in the vehicle, and noticed Taylor's speech was slurred. Taylor admitted he had been drinking alcohol, so Corporal Thornton asked Taylor to recite the alphabet from E to X. Taylor skipped from R to X—omitting S, T, U, V, and W. When Corporal Thornton asked Taylor about the omitted letters, Taylor stated the letters came after X. Taylor was unable to provide basic personal information and stated he was "shook up." Corporal Thornton arrested Taylor for DUI and placed Taylor in his patrol car.

After a brief conversation with Deputy Woodward, Corporal Thornton sat in the driver's seat of the patrol car and began advising Taylor of his Miranda rights. Corporal Thornton did not activate his in-car camera. As a result, both Corporal Thornton and Taylor can be heard, but neither of them can be seen. When Corporal Thornton asked Taylor if he understood the Miranda warnings, Taylor—still off camera—responded, "Yes, sir." The camera was adjusted to show both men and the car's interior only after Corporal Thornton began driving Taylor to the police station.

The case proceeded to trial before a Spartanburg County magistrate. Citing subsection 56-5-2953(A), Taylor moved to dismiss the DUI charge because the video recording did not "show" him being advised of his Miranda rights. The language from subsection 56-5-2953(A) to which Taylor referred provides that a person who violates a DUI statute "must have his conduct at the incident site ... video recorded." The statute further provides that the video recording "must ... show the person being advised of his Miranda rights." § 56-5-2953(A)(1)(a)(iii) (emphasis added).

The magistrate granted the motion, stating, "simple logic indicates that to ‘show’ something at least always includes a visual element," and "[i]n our society[,] it is clear the word ‘show’ means ‘something visible.’ " The magistrate concluded per se dismissal was proper pursuant to City of Rock Hill v. Suchenski , 374 S.C. 12, 646 S.E.2d 879 (2007), because the recording did not fully comply with subsection (A) and the State did not argue any subsection (B)³ exceptions applied.

The circuit court affirmed the magistrate court, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, and we granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision. As we will explain, the magistrate court correctly interpreted the meaning of the word "show" as used in subsection 56-5-2953(A); however, we hold that from this point forward, failure to show a DUI defendant being advised of his Miranda rights does not mandate per se dismissal.

Discussion

I.

The State argues subsection 56-5-2953(A) does not require a defendant to "be ‘seen’ during the reading of Miranda [because] the statutory interpretation most consistent with the legislative intent would only require the State to ‘make apparent’ or ‘demonstrate’ he was read his Miranda rights." The State therefore contends that even if a defendant is not seen on the video recording while being advised of his Miranda rights, the recording still "shows" the advisement of Miranda if the defendant and arresting officer can be heard. Taylor argues the word "show" in subsection 56-5-2953(A) includes both visual and audible components under State v. Kinard , 427 S.C. 367, 831 S.E.2d 138 (Ct. App. 2019), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted , 429 S.C. 614, 840 S.E.2d 924 (2020), and State v. Sawyer , 409 S.C. 475, 763 S.E.2d 183 (2014). We agree with Taylor.

A question of statutory interpretation is a question of law, which is subject to de novo review and which we are free to decide without deference to the courts below. State v. Alexander , 424 S.C. 270, 274-75, 818 S.E.2d 455, 457 (2018) ; State v. Whitner , 399 S.C. 547, 552, 732 S.E.2d 861, 863 (2012). Where a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed, and the Court has no right to impose another meaning. Gay v. Ariail , 381 S.C. 341, 345, 673 S.E.2d 418, 420 (2009). However, if a statute is ambiguous, the Court must construe its terms. Lester v. S.C. Workers’ Comp. Comm'n , 334 S.C. 557, 561, 514 S.E.2d 751, 752 (1999).

The primary rule of statutory construction is "to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature." State v. Pittman , 373 S.C. 527, 561, 647 S.E.2d 144, 161 (2007). A statute's language must be construed in light of its intended purpose, and "[w]henever possible, legislative intent should be found in the plain language of the statute itself." State v. Gaines , 380 S.C. 23, 33, 667 S.E.2d 728, 733 (2008). "The Court should give words ‘their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation.’ " State v. Sweat , 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010) (quoting Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs , 370 S.C. 452, 469, 636 S.E.2d 598, 607 (2006) ). A statute's language should be "read in a sense which harmonizes with its subject matter and accords with its general purpose." Id. "[A] court should not focus on any single section or provision but should consider the language of the statute as a whole." Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman , 324 S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996). The Court must reject a statutory interpretation if it leads to an absurd result that could not possibly have been intended by the legislature or that defeats plain legislative intent. Sweat , 386 S.C. at 351, 688 S.E.2d at 575.

Subsection 56-5-2953(A)’s introductory language plainly states that a person who violates a DUI statute "must have his conduct at the incident site ... video recorded." Most importantly, this subsection provides that the video recording "must ... show the person being advised of his Miranda rights." § 56-5-2953(A)(1)(a)(iii) (emphasis added). Again, the State argues this language requires the video to simply "demonstrate" or "make apparent" that Miranda warnings are administered to the defendant. We disagree. This interpretation of the word "show" ignores the 2009 amendment to subsection 56-5-2953(A), which changed the relevant language from the video recording "must include the reading of Miranda rights" to the video recording must "show the person being advised of his Miranda rights." (emphases added). The General Assembly could have retained the prior language or used other terms, but it intentionally amended the statute to add a visual requirement. See Davenport v. City of Rock Hill , 315 S.C. 114, 117, 432 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1993) ("It is never to be supposed that a single word was inserted in the law of this state without the intention of thereby conveying some meaning."); Nexsen v. Ward , 96 S.C. 313, 321, 80 S.E. 599, 601 (1914) ("[E]very word, clause, and sentence must be given some meaning, force, and effect, if it can be done by any reasonable construction."). The General Assembly chose to amend the statute as it did, and we cannot engage in forced construction of the words the General Assembly chose to employ.

The State's interpretation also cuts against one of the primary purposes of the DUI video recording statute: seeing the defendant and officer on camera reduces "swearing contests" in DUI trials, captures their interactions, and ensures the use of fair procedures to protect the defendant's rights. State v. Henkel , 413 S.C. 9, 14-15, 774 S.E.2d 458, 461-62 (2015) ; State v. Taylor , 411 S.C. 294, 306, 768 S.E.2d 71, 77 (Ct. App. 2014) ; State v. Elwell , 396 S.C. 330, 336, 721 S.E.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 2011). A video recording that visually confirms what is audible leaves little room for doubt as to the procedures used by, and the defendant's interactions with, the arresting officer. Again, by amending subsection 56-5-2953(A) in 2009, the General Assembly chose to change the word "include" to "show." That we cannot ignore. We hold that in order for a DUI recording to "show" a defendant being advised of his Miranda rights, the defendant and...