State v. Taylor, 39255

Decision Date26 February 1965
Docket NumberNo. 39255,39255
Citation270 Minn. 333,133 N.W.2d 828
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Muller TAYLOR, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

In prosecution for a felony, certain admissions by defendant to police officers during detention were received in evidence without objection. No decision as to whether the admissions were voluntary was made either by the court or the jury. There were no requested instructions on the question of voluntariness and no exception was made to the charge as given. On appeal it is contended that defendant was deprived of a fair trial because the admissions were in the nature of confessions and should not have been received in evidence until it was made to appear (A) that the reported statements were not a byproduct of illegal arrest or detention, and (B) that defendant had made the admissions voluntarily, i.e., (a) with knowledge of his right to counsel; his right to remain silent; and the fact that the admissions might be used against him in the event of trial, and (b) under circumstances where the exercise of his will to disclose was not influenced by threats, promises, or improper inducements. Defendant also urges that when such admissions are received in evidence, the jury should be instructed to disregard them if not voluntary and to consider, in deciding voluntariness or the lack of it, such factors as (1) whether the defendant was informed when apprehended of his right to counsel; his right to remain silent; and the possible use of any statements made against him; (2) whether defendant was afforded or denied opportunity to consult with an attorney; (3) whether the statements were made prior to appearance before a magistrate and, if so, whether the failure to make such appearance possible before securing the admissions was justified; (4) whether threats, promises, or inducements of a nature likely to influence the election to confess were made and, if made, whether of a kind likely to make an admission of guilt by a person with the experience, education, and background of the defendant in the particular case not the product of his free and informed choice.

Upon appeal this court recognizes the pertinence of the considerations advanced by defendant in his attack on the conviction, but in light of record showing no miscarriage of justice, affirms on the basis of the state rules (1) that errors in admission of evidence cannot be assigned for the first time on appeal, and (2) that failure to give cautionary instructions will not support a reversal in the absence of request or exception at trial.

Grant J. Merritt, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, George Scott, County Atty., Minneapolis, Philip J. Bloedel, Asst. County Atty., for respondent.

SHERAN, Justice.

Appeal from a district court judgment of conviction.

Defendant was charged by information filed by the county attorney of Hennepin County with having violated Minn.St. 617.32, which provides in part:

'Subdivision 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly accept or receive, in whole or in part, his or her support or maintenance from the proceeds or earnings of any woman engaged in prostitution.'

During the course of the trial, William J. Brady, a member of the police force of the city of Minneapolis and head of the morals squad, related a conversation which he had at about 4:30 p.m., on February 8, 1963, with the defendant, who had been arrested on February 7, 1963, and was then confined in the city jail at the courthouse in Minneapolis. As of that time, defendant was without counsel and had not been taken before a magistrate. Accompanied by Officer Richard C. Strom, Officer Brady approached the defendant in the jail and served on him a warrant charging him with having received the earnings of a prostitute in violation of the statute. Officer Brady proceeded to relate the conversation which then ensued as follows:

'A. He said, 'It looks like you have got me cold this time,' and I said, 'Yes, it does,' and then he said, 'Can I talk to you alone?' and I said, 'Sure.'

'Q. Did you then move or go to another area?

'A. Yes, we went over to the matron's side where there's some interrogation rooms over there where it's private.

'Q. Okay. Tell us then what was said, please.

'A. He asked, 'I don't suppose it would do me any good to try and make a deal,' and I said, 'No, it wouldn't.' And he said, 'Not even marijuana and some heavy stuff on the north side?' And I said, 'Listen, Mueller. You tried the same thing last time and I told you I can't and won't make any deals. However if you want to tell us about the narcotics, I am willing to listen, but with the idea that no deal and you are telling us of your own volition.'

'Q. Did he make any response to that?

'A. No, he didn't. The only thing he said, 'What's the warrant for?' And at that time he had a copy, and I said, 'It's for receiving the earnings of a prostitute.' And he said, 'I want you to know something. She came to me. I didn't go to her.' And I said, 'Mueller, on this charge it wouldn't make--it wouldn't make a particle of difference who went to who. You received the earnings and that is that.'

'Q. Was there anything further said while the two of you were in this room?

'A. I think this is when Officer Strom came in.

'Q. Then in his presence was there any further conversation?

'A. I asked Mr. Taylor who the bartender was and what his name was that had gone with this girl, and he said, 'I can't tell you that; that is my ace in the hole. He knows--' And he is talking about the bartender here. He says, 'He knows that I didn't make the deal for the girl.' And I told him that 'There's one way to prove it. Tell us where he is and what his name is and we'll pick him up and talk to him right in front of you, and if he corroborates your story, you shouldn't be afraid of it,' and that 'I would be glad to go to the County Attorney and tell him what had transpired in front of you with this witness.' He said he didn't think he should do that, and I said, 'Well, I'll tell you what. I am not going to pressure you, I don't want to force you to do anything that you don't want to do, but' I said 'I would appreciate it if you would think it over and if you change your mind, either give me a call, whether it's night or day, and I'll come up and discuss it with you, or another officer will, or we will discuss it in front of you with this other witness,' and it was at that time that I left and I didn't see him till the next day then.'

Officer Strom was also called as a witness by the state and he repeated so much of the conversation as occurred in his presence.

No objection was made to the receipt of this evidence at the time of trial and there was no motion to strike. Consequently, the trial judge did not have occasion to rule upon its admissibility. No requests were made by defendant's counsel for instructions which would have permitted the jury to disregard the quoted conversation if it found the admissions to constitute involuntary self-incrimination. And, although the trial court did on its own motion instruct the jury as to the considerations involved in testing the credibility of admissions made or alleged to have been made under the circumstances here involved, it did not instruct the jury as to the circumstances under which admissions should be considered involuntary and, therefore, wholly disregarded.

Defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by the quoted testimony and the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury with respect to its duty to disregard incriminating admissions not voluntarily made. In perceptive and scholarly briefs, defendant's court-appointed counsel urges, in substance:

(A) That admissions of the kind here involved are in the nature of confessions and should be so regarded.

(B) That before admissions to police officers are received in evidence in criminal cases it should be made to appear (1) that the reported statements are not a byproduct of illegal arrest or detention, and (2) that the defendant making the admissions does so voluntarily, i.e., (a) with the knowledge of his right to counsel; 1 his right to remain silent; and the fact that the admissions may be used against him in the event of trial, and (b) under circumstances where the exercise of his will to disclose was not influenced by threats, promises, or improper inducements.

( C) That when such admissions are received in evidence, the jury should be instructed to disregard them if not voluntary and to consider, in deciding voluntariness or the lack of it, such factors as (1) whether defendant was informed when apprehended of his right to counsel; his right to remain silent; and the possible use of any statements made against him; (2) whether defendant was afforded or denied opportunity to consult with an attorney; (3) whether the statements were made before defendant was given an opportunity to appear before a magistrate and, if so, whether the failure to make such appearance possible before securing the admissions was justified; (4) whether threats, promises, or inducements of a nature likely to influence the election to confess were made and, if made, whether of a kind to prevent the free admission of guilt by a person with the experience, education, and background of the defendant in the particular case. 2

Defendant urges that standards of 'fundamental fairness,' binding upon the states in the conduct of criminal proceedings by virtue of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, compel a reversal of the conviction.

There is authority for the proposition that under some circumstances admissions may be the equivalent of confessions. 3 And the rationale of decisions holding inadmissible upon Federal constitutional grounds evidence secured as the result of an illegal search would seem to apply with equal validity to...

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28 cases
  • Chapman v. State, 41285
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • 1 November 1968
    ...voluntary, but that failure to give the warning did not in and of itself bar the use of the statement given in evidence. State v. Taylor, 270 Minn. 333, 133 N.W.2d 828. In Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 1781, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, 892 (filed June 20, 1966), the ......
  • State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash
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    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • 10 December 1965
    ...against self-incrimination. The factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is valid are as outlined in State v. Taylor, 270 Minn. 333, 133 N.W.2d 828. (d) If the defendant, having been advised before trial that evidence obtained as the result of search and seizure will be ......
  • State ex rel. Holm v. Tahash, 39717
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • 17 December 1965
    ...32, 34.8 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 et seq.9 Case v. State of Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 85 S.Ct. 1486, 14 L.Ed.2d 422.10 State v. Taylor, 270 Minn. 333, 337, 133 N.W.2d 828, 831. See, also, cases listed in footnote 3.11 Except in cases of imprisonment for life, the Adult Corrections Commission is ves......
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    • United States
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    • 24 June 1966
    ...York cases are listed in Massiah. We quote from the holdings of Courts of other States and territories since Massiah: In State v. Taylor, 270 Minn. 333, 133 N.W.2d 828, the Supreme Court of Minnesota 'A confession obtained from a defendant who has been denied counsel directly (citing Escobe......
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