State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 26 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. S-1-SC-37893,S-1-SC-37893
• Citation: 491 P.3d 737
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Sandi TAYLOR and Mary Taylor, Defendants-Petitioners.

491 P.3d 737

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Sandi TAYLOR and Mary Taylor, Defendants-Petitioners.

No. S-1-SC-37893

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: April 26, 2021

Harmon, Barnett & Morris, P.C., Tye C. Harmon, Clovis, NM, Herrmann and Sumrall, P.C., Benjamin E. Herrmann, Clovis, NM, for Petitioners

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent

BACON, Justice.

{1} Defendants Sandi Taylor and Mary Taylor were each convicted of two counts of child abuse after they failed to remove two children from a hot vehicle. Sandi was sentenced to thirty years of imprisonment, and Mary was sentenced to thirty-six years of imprisonment. They have appealed their convictions and seek release under NMSA 1978, Section 31-11-1(C) (1988), while their appeal is pending. The district court denied their motion for release pending appeal, and the Court of Appeals, without analysis, affirmed the district court's decision. This Court issued an order remanding the matter of release pending appeal to the district court and instructing the district court to release Defendants on conditions no greater than those entered pretrial. We issue this opinion to explain our ruling in this matter.

{2} We adopt the analysis provided by the Court of Appeals in State v. House , 1996-NMCA-052, 121 N.M. 784, 918 P.2d 370, for determining whether a defendant's appeal raises a substantial question under Section 31-11-1(C)(2). However, we expressly reject any suggestion from House that release pending appeal under Section 31-11-1(C) is not mandatory where defendants meet all of the requirements described by Section 31-11-1(C). See 1996-NMCA-052, ¶¶ 8, 15, 121 N.M. 784, 918 P.2d 370. Defendants who meet all of the requirements of Section 31-11-1(C) are entitled to release pending appeal.

{3} We conclude that Defendants meet Section 31-11-1(C) ’s requirements and are entitled to release pending the resolution of their appeal on the merits. We hold that the Court of Appeals erred, and we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision.

I. BACKGROUND

{4} Defendants operated a daycare. In July 2017, Defendants drove the daycare children, twelve in total, in two cars, to a park for lunch. Defendants did not have permission from the Children, Youth, and Families Department (CYFD) to drive the daycare children.

{5} When they returned to the daycare center, Sandi tended to one of the children from her vehicle who needed a change of underwear. Some of the children in her vehicle exited on their own and went into the daycare center. Mary drove a separate vehicle, and she and all the children from her vehicle went into the daycare center. Two children, however, remained in Sandi's vehicle. Testimony at trial revealed that each Defendant believed the other had brought the two children into the daycare center. Defendants did not conduct a headcount of the children at any point, and they did not maintain proper caregiver-to-child ratios.

{6} Approximately two hours and forty minutes later, Sandi went to her vehicle and discovered the two children inside. When she found them, she and Mary removed the children from the vehicle, called 911, and attempted to revive the children. The outdoor temperature was ninety-one degrees. One child died, and the other child, whose body temperature was 108.3 degrees when the paramedics arrived, suffered serious neurological injuries

. Defendants were charged with child abuse resulting in great bodily harm by reckless disregard, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1(D), (E) (2009), and child abuse resulting in death by reckless disregard, contrary to Section 30-6-1(D), (F). Following a jury trial, both Defendants were convicted of child abuse for the death of one child and great bodily harm to the other child.

{7} Following conviction, Defendants petitioned the district court pursuant to Rule 12-205(B) NMRA and Section 31-11-1(C), for release pending appeal. The district court denied Defendants’ motion, finding that Defendants failed to "raise[ ] a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial," as required under Section 31-11-1(C)(2). Consistent with Rule 12-205(B), Defendants appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals through a motion to review conditions of release. See Rule 12-205(B). The Court of Appeals concluded, without analysis, that Defendants failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 12-205 and Section 31-11-1(C) and denied Defendants’ motion to review conditions of release. Subsequently, Defendants petitioned this Court for certiorari, pursuant to Rule 12-205(C).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Requirements for Release Pending Appeal Under Section 31-11-1(C)

{8} We determine whether Defendants are entitled to release pending appeal under Section 31-11-1(C), which states,

If a defendant is convicted of a noncapital offense other than a violent offense and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment not suspended in whole, he shall not be entitled to release pending appeal unless the court finds:

(1) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released; and

(2) that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.

{9} Defendants were convicted of noncapital, nonviolent offenses. See § 31-11-1(D) (enumerating the offenses that are considered "violent" for purposes of applying Subsection C). Both parties agree that Defendants, by clear and convincing evidence, are not considered flight risks and do not pose a danger to the community. Additionally, the district court found, and the State does not contest, that Defendants do not bring an appeal for purpose of delay. Thus, we review only whether their appeal raises a "substantial question of law or fact" that if resolved in favor of Defendants would "likely ... result in reversal or an order for a new trial." See § 31-11-1(C)(2).

1. Standard of review

{10} Whether an appeal raises a "substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial" under Section 31-11-1(C)(2) is a question of law. See State v. Sanchez , 2020-NMSC-017, ¶ 12, 476 P.3d 889. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Id.

2. To be entitled to release, Section 31-11-1(C)(2) requires an appeal that raises a substantial question

{11} In New Mexico, there is no constitutional right to release pending appeal. See N.M. Const. art. II, § 13 ; House , 1996-NMCA-052, ¶ 6, 121 N.M. 784, 918 P.2d 370. However, release pending appeal is not out of reach to every convicted defendant. House , 1996-NMCA-052, ¶ 6, 121 N.M. 784, 918 P.2d 370. Instead, "a limited and conditional right" to release pending appeal is available to those defendants who satisfy the requirements of Section 31-11-1(C), thereby ensuring that society is protected and the appeal preserves the "effective and efficient administration of justice." House , 1996-NMCA-052, ¶¶ 6, 9, 121 N.M. 784, 918 P.2d 370 ; State v. Rivera , 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 26, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 ("[D]efendants are given a qualified opportunity for release pending appeal.").

{12} In New Mexico, Section 31-11-1(C) governs this limited right and has previously been interpreted by our Court of Appeals in House , 1996-NMCA-052, 121 N.M. 784, 918 P.2d 370. The House Court adopted the analytical framework described by United States v. Affleck , 765 F.2d 944, 952 (10th Cir. 1985), and originally put forward by United States v. Miller , 753 F.2d 19, 23-24 (3d Cir. 1985), to guide courts considering whether a defendant shall be released pending appeal. See 1996-NMCA-052, ¶¶ 14-15, 121 N.M. 784, 918 P.2d 370. This framework requires a defendant to prove and the court to find

(1) that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released;

(2) that the appeal is not for purpose of delay;

(3) that the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact; and

(4) that if that substantial question is determined favorably to defendant on appeal, that decision is likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial of all counts on which imprisonment has been imposed.

Miller , 753 F.2d at 24.

{13} The House Court also adopted Affleck ’s interpretation of "substantial question." 1996-NMCA-052, ¶ 14, 121 N.M. 784, 918 P.2d 370. Under Affleck ’s interpretation, "[a] substantial question is a close question or one that very well could be decided the other way." Id. (quoting Affleck , 765 F.2d at 952 (internal quotation marks omitted)). A substantial question "is one of more substance than would be necessary to a finding that it was not frivolous." Affleck , 765 F.2d at 952 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A substantial question "is either novel, which has not been decided by controlling precedent, or which is fairly doubtful." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Miller , 753 F.2d at 23 ).¹ "[A] question ‘which has not been decided by controlling precedent’ may not be ‘substantial’ under [the statute]." Id. (quoting United States v. Giancola , 754 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir. 1985) ). There are no "blanket categories for ... [a] substantial question"; whether the appeal raises a substantial question is an inquiry that a court must undertake on a case-by-case basis. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Giancola , 754 F.2d at 901 ).

{14} Thus, a "substantial question" in New Mexico for the purposes of Section 31-11-1(C) is a question "of more substance than would be necessary to a finding that it was not frivolous," "a close question or one that very well could be decided the other way," or a question that is "either novel, ... has not been decided by controlling precedent, or ... fairly doubtful." House , 1996-NMCA-052, ¶¶ 12, 14, 121 N.M. 784, 918 P.2d 370 (internal quotation...