State v. Taylor, AC
Decision Date | 15 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. AC,AC |
Citation | 776 A.2d 1154,63 Conn. App. 386 |
Parties | (Conn.App. 2001) STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. THADDEUS TAYLOR 17168 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Counsel Lisa J. Steele, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Eugene R. Calistro, Jr., assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
OPINION
The defendant, Thaddeus Taylor, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of three counts of assault of an employee of the department of correction 1 in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) §§ 53a-167c. 2 The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) ordered, without first holding a hearing, that he be restrained with leg shackles throughout the proceedings, (2) accepted his waiver of his right to counsel without performing an adequate canvass, (3) failed to ensure that he had access to a law library prior to and during the proceedings, (4) denied his motion to dismiss the assault charges because the proceedings violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), General Statutes §§ 54-186 et seq., and (5) interpreted General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) §§ 53a-167c (b) as requiring the imposition of a consecutive rather than a concurrent sentence for the assault conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant was arrested on July 24, 1996, for assaults of correction department employees after he was involved in an altercation with several correction officers at the New Haven Correctional Center. At that time, he was a sentenced federal prisoner en route to a federal prison in Otisville, New York. The defendant was temporarily transferred to the custody of Connecticut for the resolution of other outstanding charges against him in Enfield and Bridgeport, 3 and was being housed at the New Haven Correctional Center between court appearances.
In late August, 1996, after being arraigned on the assault charges in New Haven, the defendant was transferred back to federal custody and taken to the prison in Otisville, New York. He was returned to Connecticut on December 3, 1996, for trial on the New Haven assault charges and for the Bridgeport case, which was still pending. The Bridgeport case ended in a mistrial. Thereafter, the New Haven charges were resolved in a jury trial lasting from January 21 to February 7, 1997. The defendant acted pro se throughout the proceedings in both Bridgeport and New Haven. The New Haven jury found him guilty of three counts of assault of a correction officer.
On April 11, 1997, the court sentenced the defendant to twelve years imprisonment, suspended after six years, and five years probation. The court, after considering that it lacked the discretion to order otherwise, held that this sentence was to run consecutively, rather than concurrently, to the term that the defendant already was serving in federal prison. Additional facts will be set forth where pertinent to the claim being addressed.
The defendant first claims that the court abused its discretion in ordering, without holding a hearing, that he wear leg shackles throughout the proceedings. 4 He argues that being shackled infringed on his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial before an impartial jury by unnecessarily suggesting that he was dangerous and implying that he was guilty of the charges against him. He claims further that the shackles interfered with his right to represent himself at trial because they limited his movement and deprived him of the full use of his faculties. We disagree with each of those claims.
The following additional facts are relevant to those claims. The defendant initially was brought to court for pretrial proceedings in both leg shackles and handcuffs. On January 13, 1997, prior to the start of jury selection, the court granted the defendant's request to remove the handcuffs but, due to security considerations, denied his request to remove the leg shackles. The trial was being held in a wing of the courthouse that normally was used for civil trials. There was a domestic relations courtroom nearby and, accordingly, many people were present in the hallways. Further, the courtroom in which the defendant was being tried had several entrances that could not adequately be secured.
Responding to the defendant's concerns that the shackles would leave a negative impression with the jury, the state's attorney constructed skirts around both the defense and prosecution tables, and suggested that both sides remain seated while presenting their cases. Alternatively, the state's attorney suggested that the defendant's standby counsel could present evidence to the jury while the defendant remained seated at the table. The defendant rejected both of those options. The jury panel was summoned, and the parties proceeded to voir dire.
The defendant pointed out his shackles to the first prospective juror, who ultimately was dismissed. The court proceeded to instruct subsequent panel members, before they were questioned, that the fact that the defendant was wearing shackles meant nothing and ought not to weigh in the determination of whether he was guilty of the charges against him. 5 During voir dire, the defendant asked each prospective juror if he or she had any opinion regarding the shackles, and each responded that the shackles would not influence his or her judgment regarding the defendant's guilt. Some said they had not noticed the shackles until they were pointed out or that they thought they were standard procedure. 6 A jury was selected and the trial proceeded to conclusion. In its charge to the jury, the court again instructed it not to consider the shackles as any indication of the defendant's guilt. 7 The jury returned a verdict of guilty on three counts of assault of a correction officer. At his sentencing hearing, the defendant made a motion for a new trial on the basis of, inter alia, the shackling. The court denied his motion and sentenced him as previously discussed.
The defendant claims that being shackled deprived him of his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial before an impartial jury. 8 He also claims that the court improperly failed to hold a hearing on the matter. We disagree.
9 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn 489, 505, 594 A.2d 906 (1991).
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 506.
A court may consider a variety of factors when exercising its discretion to order that a defendant be shackled. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 506-507.
Many courts rejecting claims of improper restraint of criminal defendants in the courtroom have held that the trial court, in exercising its discretion, properly considered the lack of security at the facilities. See, e.g., Patterson v. Estelle, 494 F.2d 37, 38 (5th Cir.) (, )cert. denied, 419 U.S. 871, 95 S. Ct. 130, 42 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1974); People v. Burnett, 251 Cal. App. 2d 651, 653, 59 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1967) ( ); People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 267, 362 N.E.2d 303 (1977) (...
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