State v. Taylor, AC

Decision Date15 May 2001
Docket NumberNo. AC,AC
Citation776 A.2d 1154,63 Conn. App. 386
Parties(Conn.App. 2001) STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. THADDEUS TAYLOR 17168
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals

Counsel Lisa J. Steele, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Marjorie Allen Dauster, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Eugene R. Calistro, Jr., assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Lavery, C. J., and Spear and Daly, Js.

Lavery, C. J.

OPINION

The defendant, Thaddeus Taylor, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of three counts of assault of an employee of the department of correction 1 in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) §§ 53a-167c. 2 The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) ordered, without first holding a hearing, that he be restrained with leg shackles throughout the proceedings, (2) accepted his waiver of his right to counsel without performing an adequate canvass, (3) failed to ensure that he had access to a law library prior to and during the proceedings, (4) denied his motion to dismiss the assault charges because the proceedings violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), General Statutes §§ 54-186 et seq., and (5) interpreted General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) §§ 53a-167c (b) as requiring the imposition of a consecutive rather than a concurrent sentence for the assault conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant was arrested on July 24, 1996, for assaults of correction department employees after he was involved in an altercation with several correction officers at the New Haven Correctional Center. At that time, he was a sentenced federal prisoner en route to a federal prison in Otisville, New York. The defendant was temporarily transferred to the custody of Connecticut for the resolution of other outstanding charges against him in Enfield and Bridgeport, 3 and was being housed at the New Haven Correctional Center between court appearances.

In late August, 1996, after being arraigned on the assault charges in New Haven, the defendant was transferred back to federal custody and taken to the prison in Otisville, New York. He was returned to Connecticut on December 3, 1996, for trial on the New Haven assault charges and for the Bridgeport case, which was still pending. The Bridgeport case ended in a mistrial. Thereafter, the New Haven charges were resolved in a jury trial lasting from January 21 to February 7, 1997. The defendant acted pro se throughout the proceedings in both Bridgeport and New Haven. The New Haven jury found him guilty of three counts of assault of a correction officer.

On April 11, 1997, the court sentenced the defendant to twelve years imprisonment, suspended after six years, and five years probation. The court, after considering that it lacked the discretion to order otherwise, held that this sentence was to run consecutively, rather than concurrently, to the term that the defendant already was serving in federal prison. Additional facts will be set forth where pertinent to the claim being addressed.

I.

The defendant first claims that the court abused its discretion in ordering, without holding a hearing, that he wear leg shackles throughout the proceedings. 4 He argues that being shackled infringed on his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial before an impartial jury by unnecessarily suggesting that he was dangerous and implying that he was guilty of the charges against him. He claims further that the shackles interfered with his right to represent himself at trial because they limited his movement and deprived him of the full use of his faculties. We disagree with each of those claims.

The following additional facts are relevant to those claims. The defendant initially was brought to court for pretrial proceedings in both leg shackles and handcuffs. On January 13, 1997, prior to the start of jury selection, the court granted the defendant's request to remove the handcuffs but, due to security considerations, denied his request to remove the leg shackles. The trial was being held in a wing of the courthouse that normally was used for civil trials. There was a domestic relations courtroom nearby and, accordingly, many people were present in the hallways. Further, the courtroom in which the defendant was being tried had several entrances that could not adequately be secured.

Responding to the defendant's concerns that the shackles would leave a negative impression with the jury, the state's attorney constructed skirts around both the defense and prosecution tables, and suggested that both sides remain seated while presenting their cases. Alternatively, the state's attorney suggested that the defendant's standby counsel could present evidence to the jury while the defendant remained seated at the table. The defendant rejected both of those options. The jury panel was summoned, and the parties proceeded to voir dire.

The defendant pointed out his shackles to the first prospective juror, who ultimately was dismissed. The court proceeded to instruct subsequent panel members, before they were questioned, that the fact that the defendant was wearing shackles meant nothing and ought not to weigh in the determination of whether he was guilty of the charges against him. 5 During voir dire, the defendant asked each prospective juror if he or she had any opinion regarding the shackles, and each responded that the shackles would not influence his or her judgment regarding the defendant's guilt. Some said they had not noticed the shackles until they were pointed out or that they thought they were standard procedure. 6 A jury was selected and the trial proceeded to conclusion. In its charge to the jury, the court again instructed it not to consider the shackles as any indication of the defendant's guilt. 7 The jury returned a verdict of guilty on three counts of assault of a correction officer. At his sentencing hearing, the defendant made a motion for a new trial on the basis of, inter alia, the shackling. The court denied his motion and sentenced him as previously discussed.

A.

The defendant claims that being shackled deprived him of his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial before an impartial jury. 8 He also claims that the court improperly failed to hold a hearing on the matter. We disagree.

"As a general proposition, a criminal defendant has the right to appear in court free from physical restraints. . . . Grounded in the common law, this right evolved in order to preserve the presumption favoring a criminal defendant's innocence, while eliminating any detrimental effects to the defendant that could result if he were physically restrained in the courtroom. . . . `The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.' Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, reh. denied, 426 U.S. 954, 96 S. Ct. 3182, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1194 (1976). . . . Nonetheless, a defendant's right to appear before the jury unfettered is not absolute. . . . A trial court may employ a `reasonable means of restraint' upon a defendant if, exercising its broad discretion in such matters, the court finds that restraints are `reasonably necessary' under the circumstances. Practice Book §§ 892 [now §§ 42-46] . . . ." 9 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn 489, 505, 594 A.2d 906 (1991).

"In reviewing a shackling claim, our task is to determine whether the court's decision to employ restraints constituted a clear abuse of discretion. . . . While appellate review is greatly aided when a court develops the record by conducting an evidentiary hearing concerning the necessity for restraints, `such a hearing is not mandatory.' . . . A record in some fashion disclosing the justification for using restraints, however, is essential to meaningful appellate review of a shackling claim. . . . This is particularly so because of the potential for prejudice in the use of shackles. . . . Accordingly, a trial court must ensure that its reasons for ordering the use of restraints are detailed in the record." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 506.

A court may consider a variety of factors when exercising its discretion to order that a defendant be shackled. "In view of the fact that the law enforcement personnel at our courthouses are responsible for and possess superior experience in matters of courtroom security, it is practicable for a court to rely heavily upon the advice of such personnel in determining whether a criminal defendant should be restrained. . . . A court may also consider other information not in evidence, including official records, information supplied by correctional officers and attorneys, and facts generally known within the limits of its jurisdiction. . . . Such information or knowledge, however, should be placed on the record outside the presence of the jury and the defendant given the opportunity to respond to that information." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 506-507.

Many courts rejecting claims of improper restraint of criminal defendants in the courtroom have held that the trial court, in exercising its discretion, properly considered the lack of security at the facilities. See, e.g., Patterson v. Estelle, 494 F.2d 37, 38 (5th Cir.) (defendant being tried in courtroom with several exits that could not adequately be guarded), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 871, 95 S. Ct. 130, 42 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1974); People v. Burnett, 251 Cal. App. 2d 651, 653, 59 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1967) (trial conducted in non-secure, temporary quarters while courthouse undergoing repairs); People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 267, 362 N.E.2d 303 (1977) (nature, physical...

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