State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 01 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 66,66
• Citation: 347 Md. 363,701 A.2d 389
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. James W. TAYLOR. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 363

347 Md. 363

701 A.2d 389

STATE of Maryland v. James W. TAYLOR.

No. 66, Sept. Term, 1996.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Oct. 14, 1997.

Annabelle L. Lisic, Asst. Atty. General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. General, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Margaret L. Lanier, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, ^* RAKER and WILNER, JJ.

CHASANOW, Judge.

James W. Taylor, the Respondent, was charged in five separate indictments with child abuse in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 35A, and the lesser-included, common-law offenses of assault and of battery. The indictments were consolidated for trial on July 29, 1994, despite Taylor's motion to sever the charges. The State entered a nolle prosequi on the assault charges and, on February 15, 1995, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on two counts of child abuse and the corresponding battery charges. The battery convictions were merged into the child abuse convictions, and Taylor was thereafter sentenced to a term of fifteen years of incarceration on each child abuse count, to run concurrently. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred in denying Taylor's motion to sever. We granted certiorari to decide whether severance was mandated as a matter of law. We conclude that separate trials were not required and shall reverse the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.

I.

The charges lodged against Taylor arose from the physical abuse, in separate incidents, of Taylor's fourteen-year-old stepson, Keith C., during a two and one-half month period in 1994. The first incident occurred between March 1 and March 31, 1994. Keith claimed that Taylor, whom Keith referred to as his "dad," punched him in the jaw with his fist, leaving a bruise that was visible "[f]or maybe a week, maybe two weeks." Keith could not recall the predicate for Taylor's display of anger. The second instance of abuse took place sometime between April 17 and April 31, 1994. Keith testified that, for a reason unknown to the child, Taylor used an electric cord to whip him across the shoulders. This left "two scars on each side of [his] shoulders." The third episode, in which Taylor is alleged to have poked Keith in the chest with the sharpened end of a stick, occurred on May 11, 1994, while the two were laying carpet in the bathroom. Keith could not recall the cause of Taylor's actions. The incident left a scar on Keith's chest. The fourth count of battery and child abuse arose out of events that occurred on May 13, 1994. During dinner that evening, while preparing the family's plates, Keith picked up a piece of chicken with his hand and Taylor "got ... angry and stabbed [him] with a fork on the top of [his] head." According to Keith, the blow caused his head to bleed. The last offense allegedly committed by Taylor took place two days later, on May 15, 1994. Keith stated that while he and Taylor were straightening up a storage closet in the house, Taylor punched him in the mouth with his fist. Apparently, Keith had "made some sort of mistake," although he could not recall the precise nature thereof.

Later that same day, police officers came to the Taylor residence to execute an arrest warrant on Taylor for an unrelated matter. Following Taylor's arrest, Keith and his mother, Mary Taylor, spoke to Corporal David Suggs of the Howard County Police Department and recounted to him the events giving rise to the indictments. Suggs observed that Keith's mouth was swollen. The detective also photographed the scars on Keith's shoulders and a scar from a pointed object on Keith's chest.

The five cases were consolidated for trial on motion of the State after the trial judge determined that even if Taylor were tried separately for each child abuse charge, all of the other alleged acts of child abuse would be admissible in each trial to prove Taylor's intent, malice, and absence of mistake. The charges Taylor was convicted of were the two charges of child abuse and the corresponding two charges of battery for the April 17-April 30 beating with the electrical cord and the May 15 punching. Taylor was acquitted of all other charges.

The State challenges the Court of Special Appeals' reversal of the trial court's decision to consolidate Taylor's indictments. It claims that the evidence as to each of the five acts charged "was not offered to show that Taylor was generally a bad person, but to establish Taylor's intent and the absence of mistake in striking his stepson." In other words, it argues that the evidence as to each of the five acts of child abuse was mutually admissible in separate trials of the other under the malice, intent, and mistake exceptions to the other crimes evidence rule. This being the case, the State asserts that joinder was not prejudicial. It further avers that the prejudice resulting from the admission of the evidence relative to each of the five acts, if any, is outweighed by the interest in judicial economy served by conducting a joint trial on all of the charges.

Taylor complains that the defense was prejudiced by the joinder and, thus, by the admission of the other crimes evidence, "which under the circumstances, showed nothing more than propensity, allowing the jury to conclude that [he] was a ' "bad person" and should therefore be convicted, or deserves punishment for other bad conduct and so may be convicted even though the evidence is lacking.' " (quoting Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 499, 597 A.2d 956, 961 (1991)). He maintains that the record evidence fails to establish that the criteria for mutual admissibility were satisfied and points out, "[i]t has been the law in Maryland since McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977), that to survive a motion to sever, evidence of each of the counts must be mutually admissible in a separate prosecution of all of the others."

THE TEST FOR CONSOLIDATION

This Court recently discussed the test for joinder of offenses in Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 693 A.2d 781 (1997). We used a two part test. First, is the evidence concerning each of the charged offenses mutually admissible; and second, does the interest in judicial economy outweigh the arguments favoring separate trials. The second part of the test should not be in dispute in the instant case. A paramount interest of our criminal justice system should be avoiding unnecessary trials and the accompanying trauma to young victims of multiple acts of child abuse. These children should not have to testify at multiple trials if the evidence would be the same at each trial and all of the acts of alleged abuse would be mutually admissible at each trial.

ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER ASSAULTS OR CHILD

ABUSE BY THE SAME DEFENDANT ON THE SAME VICTIM

The admissibility of other crimes evidence is governed by Maryland Rule 5-404(b) which provides:

"(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.--Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."

Evidence of other crimes or other bad acts committed by the accused is not admissible unless it has special relevance, i.e., it is substantially relevant to some contested issue and is not offered simply to prove criminal character. See Md. Rule 5-404; Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 497, 597 A.2d 956, 960 (1991); Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473, 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978); see also State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634, 552 A.2d 896, 897-98 (1989); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976)(quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed. 1972))("[T]he state may not present evidence of other criminal acts of the accused unless the evidence is 'substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that he committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.' "). As we noted in Cross, 282 Md. at 473, 386 A.2d at 761: "[T]here are few principles of American criminal jurisprudence more universally accepted than the rule that evidence which tends to show that the accused committed another crime independent of that for which he is on trial, even one of the same type, is inadmissible." Such "other crimes" evidence lacks special relevance because it "is generally more prejudicial than probative." McKnight, 280 Md. at 611, 375 A.2d at 555; see Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602, 631 n. 8, 645 A.2d 22, 36 n. 8 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1130, 115 S.Ct. 942, 130 L.Ed.2d 886 (1995). Thus, the evidence must ordinarily tend to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme, or identity embracing the commission of two or more crimes to escape exclusion by the general rule. Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 74-75, 629 A.2d 1233, 1237-38 (1993); Harris, 324 Md. at 501, 597 A.2d at 962; Cross, 282 Md. at 473-74, 386 A.2d at 761; Ross, 276 Md. at 669-70, 350 A.2d at 684; Purviance v. State, 185 Md. 189, 196, 44 A.2d 474, 477 (1945); JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 510(E)(2d ed.1993); LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 404.5 (1987). The evidence may also be admitted if the crimes are so linked together in point of time or circumstances that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other. Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 586, 115 A.2d 502, 511 (1955).

Underlying this rule is the concern that the jury will use the other crimes evidence to convict and punish the defendant for having a criminal disposition or to infer that he is more likely to have committed the crime for which he is on trial. Straughn v. State, 297 Md. 329, 333, 465 A.2d 1166, 1168-69 (1983); see also Terry v....