State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 13 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 13827,13827
• Citation: 657 A.2d 659,37 Conn.App. 464
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Jason TAYLOR.

Page 659

657 A.2d 659

37 Conn.App. 464

STATE of Connecticut v. Jason TAYLOR.

No. 13827.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 5, 1995.

Decided April 11, 1995.

Certification Denied June 13, 1995.

Louis S. Avitabile, Sp. Public Defender, with whom was Meryl Anne Spat, Waterbury, for appellant (defendant).

Nancy L. Gillespie, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, State's Atty., and Edward T. Ricciardi, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, LANDAU and HEIMAN, JJ.

HEIMAN, Judge.

The defendant appeals ¹ from the judgment of conviction, ² rendered after a jury trial, of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-92(a)(2)(A) ³ and 53a-8(a), ⁴ assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-59(a)(1) ⁵ and 53a-8(a). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) charged the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt, (2) admitted testimony despite the defendant's claims of irrelevance and prejudice, and (3) failed to suppress evidence when (a) the witness' identification of that evidence was tainted by an unnecessarily suggestive prior identification and (b) the state failed to establish a proper chain of custody. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On the evening of August 1, 1992, the victim, Norman Reynolds, was walking on Berkley Street in Waterbury. A vehicle operated by the victim's brother-in-law, Duane Gooch, drove up near the victim. The defendant was seated in the front passenger seat of the car and Jamel Hurtle was seated in the back seat, holding a nine millimeter weapon. When the vehicle came to a stop, Gooch asked the victim to get into the car.

The victim, who had stolen money and narcotics from Gooch, refused to enter the car fearing that Gooch was angry with him. When the victim refused to enter the car, the three men exited the vehicle and forced the victim inside. In doing so, the defendant struck the victim in the face. After the victim was forced into the car, Hurtle placed the gun in the area of the victim's ribs. Gooch threatened to tie the victim's hands and legs together, break his hands, and shoot his fingers off. The defendant threatened to "kick [the victim's] ass really bad...."

Gooch drove around in Waterbury while Hurtle kept the gun trained on the victim. Gooch finally stopped the car on Eastern Avenue and told the victim that they had arrived at the victim's "death spot." He ordered the victim out of the car and the three men forced the victim to accompany them down a hill. Hurtle pointed the gun to the victim's head and the defendant pushed the victim with his hands to keep the victim moving.

While the men were walking down the hill, Hurtle, who had the gun, slipped and fell. The victim jumped on Hurtle and tried to take the gun from him. The defendant grabbed the victim while Gooch picked up a rock and struck the victim on the head, rendering the victim unconscious. The victim was unconscious when he was shot in the chest by one of the three men.

The victim was found at about 9 p.m. that evening by uniformed officers of the Waterbury housing authority who had been alerted by a group of youths that three men were beating a man behind one of the buildings. As the officers approached the rear of the building, they heard a shot and observed three black men getting into a blue four door foreign car that was parked at the top of an embankment. The victim was transported by ambulance to a hospital where he underwent surgery.

On August 2, 1992, Detective James Clary of the Waterbury police department visited the victim in the intensive care unit of the hospital. Although unable to speak, the victim indicated in writing that he had been shot by Gooch. Clary left the hospital, located Gooch and took him into custody. Gooch implicated the defendant in the actions directed against the victim.

I

The defendant first asserts that the trial court improperly charged the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt. The defendant asserts (1) that the charge as given contained an improper articulation requirement, and (2) that the trial court incorrectly declined to charge the jury in accordance with his request to charge. ⁶ We are unpersuaded.

At the completion of the trial court's instructions to the jury, ⁷ the defendant excepted to the charge concerning reasonable doubt. In his exception, the defendant mounted a two-pronged attack. ⁸ He argued first that the instruction as given constituted an improper requirement of articulation on the part of the jurors. In addition, the defendant argued that his request to charge concerning the fact that a juror need not be able either to give or to articulate a reason for the reasonable doubt "that the juror may feel" is a correct statement of the law and that he was thus entitled to that charge.

A

The defendant first claims that the charge that was given on the issue of reasonable doubt improperly required articulation by a juror of his or her reason for entertaining a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. We disagree.

"The principle function of a jury charge is to assist the jury in applying the law correctly to the facts which they might find to be established.... When reviewing the court's instruction, our role is to determine whether, taken as a whole, [the charge] fairly and adequately present[s] the case to a jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Beliveau, 36 Conn.App. 228, 246, 650 A.2d 591 (1994), cert. granted on other grounds, 232 Conn. 910, 654 A.2d 354 (1995); see also State v. Campbell, 225 Conn. 650, 661, 626 A.2d 287 (1993).

In reviewing the charge as a whole, we conclude that the charge as given fairly presented the issue of reasonable doubt to the jury. We do not, in fact, agree with the defendant that the charge as given contained any improper articulation requirement.

The defendant points specifically to that portion of the charge that defined reasonable doubt as "a doubt for which you, in your own minds, can give a reason based upon the evidence or lack of evidence." Our Supreme Court, has held that such a definition does not require articulation, but rather makes clear that reasonable doubt should be based on reason rather than speculation. State v. Derrico, 181 Conn. 151, 170-71, 434 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1064, 101 S.Ct. 789, 66 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980).

Our Supreme Court has reviewed various jury charges that have required reason to be the basis of a finding of reasonable doubt. In Derrico, the court concluded that a charge that defined reasonable doubt as a doubt "for which you can, in your own mind, conscientiously give a reason"; id., at 171 n. 4, 434 A.2d 356; did not, when taken as a whole, dilute the state's burden of proof or shift that burden to the defendant. Id., at 170-71, 434 A.2d 356. The court read that language instead as defining the term reasonable doubt as one founded on reason as opposed to speculation. Id., at 171, 434 A.2d 356. Similarly, in State v. Findlay, 198 Conn. 328, 345-46, 502 A.2d 921, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986), our Supreme Court concluded that a definition of reasonable doubt as a "doubt for which a valid reason can be assigned" merely provided a method by which jurors could test the reasonableness of a doubt. The court viewed the charge given as a whole and determined that the jury was sufficiently guided. Id., at 346, 502 A.2d 921.

More recent challenges to language similar in content to that found in Derrico and Findlay have also been rejected by our Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, supra, 225 Conn. at 661, 626 A.2d 287 (reasonable doubt is doubt for which valid reason can be assigned); State v. Gomez, 225 Conn. 347, 353 n. 8, 622 A.2d 1014 (1993) (reasonable doubt is "a doubt for which a reasonable man or woman can give a valid reason"); State v. Adams, 225 Conn. 270, 291, 623 A.2d 42 (1993) (reasonable doubt is doubt for which valid reason can be assigned); State v. Thomas, 214 Conn. 118, 119 n. 1, 570 A.2d 1123 (1990) (reasonable doubt is doubt for which valid reason can be assigned); State v. Lytell, 206 Conn. 657, 664-65, 539 A.2d 133 (1988) ("a reasonable doubt means this: It is a doubt for which a reasonable person can give a valid reason"). Likewise, the charge here did not improperly require the jurors to articulate a reason in order to find the defendant not guilty, but merely defined reasonable doubt as a doubt based on reason.

We note also that even if the charge were construed to be an articulation charge, the defendant would still not prevail on his claim. While our Supreme Court has disapproved of reasonable doubt charges that set forth a definition of reasonable doubt as " 'a doubt for which if necessary you can give an explanation ... to your fellow jurors in the jury deliberation room' "; State v. Jeffrey, 220 Conn. 698, 719, 601 A.2d 993 (1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 3041, 120 L.Ed.2d 909 (1992); it nonetheless has held that such a charge does not constitute reversible error in an otherwise adequate charge. See also State v. Ireland, 218 Conn. 447, 457, 590 A.2d 106 (1991).

Here, the charge as to reasonable doubt constituted a more than adequate charge on that important issue. The trial court correctly charged the jury on the concept of reasonable doubt in such a manner as to make clear to the jury the heavy burden borne by the state in a criminal prosecution. The trial court included in its instructions to the jury, in substance, those requests that were accurate statements of legal principles and omitted only those portions that were not legally correct. The charge by the trial court correctly defined for the jury the concept of...