State v. Taylor, 15AP-1017

• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
• Citation: 2016 Ohio 4773
• Docket Number: No. 15AP-1017,15AP-1017
• Parties: State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Melody D. Taylor, Defendant-Appellee.
• Decision Date: 30 June 2016

2016 Ohio 4773

State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Melody D. Taylor, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15AP-1017

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

June 30, 2016

(C.P.C. No. 15EP-455)

(ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

DECISION

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael P. Walton, for appellant. Argued: Michael P. Walton.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

KLATT, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, State of Ohio, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that granted the application of appellee, Melody D. Taylor, to seal the record of her misdemeanor conviction pursuant to R.C. 2953.32. Because appellee failed to comply with the statutory one-year waiting period following the date of final discharge of her sentence, the trial court erred when it granted her application. Therefore, we reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On July 8, 2014, appellee was convicted for attempted receiving stolen property, a first-degree misdemeanor in case No. 14CR-1084. In addition to restitution in the amount of $834.57, appellee was sentenced to two months in jail. The jail sentence

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was suspended "provided no new offenses for a period of One (1) year." The sentencing entry reflects that appellee paid restitution in full prior to sentencing.

{¶ 3} On June 24, 2015, appellee filed an application to seal the record of her conviction in case No. 14CR-1084 pursuant to R.C. 2953.32. The state filed an objection to appellee's application arguing that she was not yet eligible to apply for the sealing of her criminal record in this case. On October 30, 2015, the trial court held a brief hearing to address appellee's application and the state's objection. Neither appellee nor an attorney acting on her behalf attended the hearing and no evidence was presented. The trial court granted appellee's application.

{¶ 4} The state timely appealed and assigns the following errors for our review:

[1.] THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO GRANT THE APPLICATION TO SEAL THE RECORD OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION, AS DEFENDANT HAD NOT FULFILLED THE MANDATORY ONE-YEAR WAITING PERIOD.

[2.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING AN APPLICATION TO SEAL A FELONY CONVICTION WHERE THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY PARTICULAR NEED.

{¶ 5} In its first assignment of error, the state contends that the trial court erred in determining that appellee fulfilled the mandatory one-year waiting period after final discharge of her sentence for her misdemeanor criminal conviction. We agree.

{¶ 6} "The sealing of a criminal record is an act of grace created by the state, and so is a privilege, not a right." State v. Gainey, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-583, 2015-Ohio-3119, ¶ 9, citing State v. Black, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-338, 2014-Ohio-4827, ¶ 8; State v. Simon, 87 Ohio St.3d 531, 533 (2000), quoting State v. Hamilton, 75 Ohio St.3d 636, 639 (1996). A court may grant expungement only when all statutory requirements for eligibility are met. State v. Brewer, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-464, 2006-Ohio-6991, ¶ 5. An appellate court generally reviews a trial court's disposition of an application to seal a record of conviction under an abuse of discretion standard. Black at ¶ 6. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it requires that the court's decision is "unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." State v. Norfolk, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-614, 2005-Ohio-336, ¶ 4, quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

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Whether an applicant is eligible for purposes of sealing a criminal record is an issue of law. Gainey at ¶ 7. We review questions of law de novo. Black at ¶ 6.

{¶ 7} Because appellee sought to seal the record of her misdemeanor conviction, she could apply for the sealing of the record at the expiration of one year after the final discharge of her sentence in that case. R.C. 2953.32(A)(1). In order to determine when this one-year waiting period expires, it is necessary to determine when appellee received a final discharge. "[T]he final discharge required by R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) does not occur until an offender satisfies all sentencing requirements." State v. Aquirre, 144 Ohio St.3d 179, 2014-Ohio-4603, ¶ 28.

{¶ 8} Here, appellee's sentence in Case No. 14CR-1084 indicates that her two-month jail term was suspended provided she did not receive any new convictions for a period of one year. Appellee was...