State v. Taylor, No. 8098

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
• Writing for the Court: Graydon W. Smith, Atty. Gen.; PORTER; TAYLOR, C. J., and BAKER; McQUADE; KEETON
• Citation: 76 Idaho 358,283 P.2d 582
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ralph E. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 8098
• Decision Date: 03 May 1955

Page 582

283 P.2d 582 76 Idaho 358 STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Ralph E. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant. No. 8098. Supreme Court of Idaho. May 3, 1955.

Page 583

Delana & Delana, Boise, for appellant.

[76 Idaho 359] Graydon W. Smith, Atty. Gen., J. R. Smead, T. J. Jones, III, Asst. Attys. Gen., James A. McClure, Pros. Atty., payette, for respondent.

PORTER, Justice.

Appellant was found guilty by a jury in Payette County of the crime of statutory rape. He was sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the term of not to exceed five years. From the judgment of conviction entered against him, he has appealed to this court.

On this appeal, appellant lists only two assignments of error. Appellant, by his first assignment of error, contends the trial court erred in giving that part of Instruction No. 7 reading as follows:

'A 'reasonable doubt' is what the word implies; a doubt founded in [76 Idaho 360] reason; a doubt for which you can give a sensible reason; a doubt growing out of the testimony in the case, or the lack of testimony; a doubt which would cause you to hesitate in the ordinary affairs of life. It is not a flimsy, fanciful, fictitious doubt which you could raise about anything and everything.'

Appellant complains of this instruction 'For the reasons that it is erroneous (a) to instruct the jury that a reasonable doubt is a doubt, that the jury or jurors should be able to give a reason for; (b) To instruct the jury that a reasonable doubt is a doubt for which the jury or jurors can give a sensible reason; (c) To instruct the jury that only such a doubt entitled the defendant to an acquittal.'

Appellant cites the following authorities from other jurisdictions which appear to lend support to his position: Gibbons v. Territory, 21 Okl. 340, 96 P. 466; Abbott v. Territory, 20 Okl. 119, 94 P. 179, 16 L.R.A.,N.S., 260; Childs v. State, 34 Neb. 236, 51 N.W. 837; State v. Cohen, 108 Iowa 208, 78 N.W. 857; Siberry v. State, 133 Ind. 677, 33 N.E. 681; Owens v. United States, 9 Cir., 130 F. 279; State v. Parks, 96 N.J.L. 360, 115 A. 305; Gilcoat v. State, 155 Ark. 455, 244 S.W. 723; Pettine v. Territory of New Mexico, 8 Cir., 201 F. 489.

The following cases from other jurisdictions appear to be contrary to the contention of appellant and to support the questioned instruction: People v. Davis, 171 Mich. 241, 137 N.W. 61; State v. Liberman, 59 N.D. 252, 229 N.W. 363; State v. McCune, 16 Utah 170, 51 P. 818; Emery v. State, 101 Wis. 627, 78 N.W. 145; State v. Roberts, 15 Or. 187, 13 P. 896; Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713; People

Page 584

v. Guidici, 100 N.Y. 503, 3 N.E. 493; State v. Grant, 20 S.D. 164, 105 N.W. 97, 11 Ann.Cas. 1017.

The foregoing lists of cases are not exhaustive but the cases cited are intended to be illustrative.

Our court on many occasions has considered instructions defining and attempting to define the term 'reasonable doubt.' State v. Lyons, 7 Idaho 530, 64 P. 236; State v. Gilbert, 8 Idaho 346, 69 P. 62; State v. Moon, 20 Idaho 202, 117 P. 757; State v. Nolan, 31 Idaho 71, 169 P. 295; State v. Bubis, 39 Idaho 376, 227 P. 384; State v. Cox, 55 Idaho 694, 46 P.2d 1093; State v. Hix, 58 Idaho 730, 78 P.2d 1003; State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 87 P.2d 454; State v. Carner, 60 Idaho 620, 94 P.2d 1081; State v. Dickens, 68 Idaho 173, 191 P.2d 364.

It is in the light of our own decisions that the questioned instruction is to be considered. In State v. Bubis, 39 Idaho 376, at page 382, 227 P. 384, at pages 385-[76 Idaho 361] 386, in considering an instruction on reasonable doubt, this court spoke as follows:

'Appellant also complains of the following language used in one of the instructions:

"A reasonable doubt is an actual doubt, based upon the evidence or lack of evidence and upon reason that you are conscious of after going over in your minds, the entire case giving consideration to all the testimony.'

'The objection is that a juryman might have a doubt for which it might be difficult or impossible to assign any reason. Surely, however, he would be conscious of some reason; that is to say, a verdict should be based upon the operation of mental processes and the exercise of judgment. That this language is not prejudicial error, see State v. Gilbert, supra, [8 Idaho 346, 69 P. 62]; State v. Moon, 20 Idaho 202, 117 P. 757, Ann.Cas.1913A, 724; State v. Nolan, 31 Idaho 71, 169 P. 295.'

In State v. Dickens, supra, this court reviewed at length the Idaho decisions dealing with instructions on reasonable doubt and again approved the instruction given in State v. Bubis, supra.

In the Dickens case the instruction on reasonable doubt given in State v. Bubis, supra, is set out as follows: [68 Idaho 181, 191 P.2d 368]

"A reasonable doubt is an actual doubt based upon the evidence, or lack of evidence, and upon reason that you are conscious of after going over in your minds the entire case, giving consideration to all the testimony. If you then feel uncertain and not fully convinced that the defendant is guilty, or if you feel that you would not be acting reasonably should you find him guilty, and if you believe that a reasonable man in any matter of like importance in his own affairs would hesitate to act because of such a doubt as you are conscious of having, then that is a reasonable doubt and the defendant is entitled to the benefit of it. But, if after considering all the evidence you have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, then you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and should return you verdict accordingly."

The instruction on reasonable doubt contained in Instruction No. 7 in this case is as follows:

'A 'reasonable doubt' is what the word implies; a doubt founded in reason; a doubt for which you can give a sensible reason; a doubt growing out of the testimony in the case, or the lack of testimony; a doubt which would cause you to hesitate in the ordinary affairs of life. It is not a flimsy, fanciful, fictitious doubt which you could raise about anything and everything. It means a reasonable doubt. If, when all is said and done, you have such a doubt about the guilt of the accused, it is your duty to acquit him. [76 Idaho 362] If, however, after considering these instructions and all the...