State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 15 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 17112,17112
• Citation: 1988 NMSC 23,107 N.M. 66,752 P.2d 781
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Chris TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 781

752 P.2d 781

107 N.M. 66

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Chris TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17112.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

March 15, 1988.

Rehearing Denied April 18, 1988.

Winston Roberts-Hohl, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.

Hal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Anthony Tupler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

STOWERS, Justice.

On April 19, 1985, defendant-appellant Chris Taylor, two youths and the mother of one of them drove to a particular laundromat in Santa Fe with the intent of "breaking some bones" of one of its employees. Upon entering the laundromat, the three youths discovered that their intended victim was not present. When they came out, the mother, who was the driver of the vehicle, told them to go back inside and rob the laundromat. They put masks over their faces and one of them carried a gun. During the robbery the gun was fired, killing a laundry attendant. The youths immediately ran outside, hopped into the car and drove off. Shortly thereafter, all were apprehended.

One of the three youths agreed to testify for the state in exchange for treatment as a child in children's court. Defendant and the third youth were initially charged in children's court and then, as a result of the granting of a motion to transfer, were both transferred to district court to be tried as adults.

At the conclusion of the jury trial, defendant was convicted on all three counts: count one of first degree murder, contrary to NMSA 1978, Sections 30-2-1, 30-1-13 and 30-16-2 (Repl.Pamp.1984); count two of robbery by use of or threatened use of violence while armed with a deadly weapon, contrary to NMSA 1978, Sections 30-16-2 and 30-1-13 (Repl.Pamp.1984) and Section 31-18-16 (Repl.Pamp.1987); count three of conspiracy for the purpose of committing a felony, contrary to NMSA 1978, Sections 30-28-2 and 30-16-2 (Repl.Pamp.1984). Defendant was sentenced to a life term. It is from this judgment of conviction that defendant now appeals. We affirm.

The issues argued by defendant are:

1. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed against defendant as an adult.

2. The trial court erred in refusing defendant's proffered jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter.

3. The removal of the children's court judge was improper.

4. The sentence imposed was not proper.

5. The prosecutor's offered plea bargain with a fixed minimum sentence was an abuse of discretion.

6. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.

We discuss these issues in the order presented.

1. Lack of Jurisdiction.

Defendant argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed against him on two grounds: the transfer hearing was not timely held, and there was no statutory authorization for the transfer of the robbery and conspiracy offenses along with the murder offense.

On April 22, 1986, the state filed a petition in children's court, which has exclusive jurisdiction of a child under the age of eighteen, alleging that defendant was delinquent, in need of care, supervision and rehabilitation, and that he and two other children had committed murder, robbery and conspiracy. See NMSA 1978, Sec. 32-1-9 (Repl.Pamp.1986). That same day, the state filed a petition for a detention hearing; consequently, defendant remained in continuous custody since April 20, 1986. On the following day, April 23, the state filed a motion for a discretionary transfer under Section 32-1-30, NMSA 1978 (Repl.Pamp.1986), to transfer the matter to district court and to prosecute defendant as an adult.

The transfer hearing started on May 15, 1986, in children's court within the necessary time period. At the beginning of this hearing, the state indicated its readiness to proceed on the probable cause determination but sought a continuance on the issue of defendant's amenability to treatment as a child. The state claimed that this continuance was required to review a recently completed psychological profile on defendant and a codefendant. Defense counsel did not object to the request nor to the bifurcation of the transfer hearing. The probable cause determination proceeded to conclusion on May 15 with the presentment of evidence and arguments by counsel. Pursuant to Section 32-1-30(A)(5), NMSA 1978 (Repl.Pamp.1986), the court found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the child, defendant, committed the alleged delinquent acts. The remainder of the hearing was continued until July 16 and 17, 1986, to resolve the issue of defendant's amenability to treatment as a child. The defendant contends that since a portion of the hearing was delayed for more than thirty days from the date of the filing of the motion to transfer, the resultant transfer order dated July 17, 1986, did not confer jurisdiction on the district court.

Rule 10-223, SCRA 1986 (formerly NMSA 1978, Child Ct.R. 43.1 (Repl.Pamp.1982)), reads:

A. Respondent in detention. If the respondent is in detention, the transfer hearing shall be commenced within thirty (30) days from whichever of the following events occurs latest:

(1) the date the motion for transfer is filed;

(2) if the proceedings have been stayed on a finding of incompetency to participate in the transfer hearing, the date an order is filed finding the defendant competent to participate in a transfer hearing; or

(3) if the respondent fails to appear at any time required by the court, the date the respondent is taken into custody after the failure to appear. [Emphasis added.]

The plain meaning of this rule suggests an interpretation contrary to defendant's claim. Since the state filed its motion to transfer on April 23, 1986, and the transfer hearing was commenced within thirty days thereafter, the requirements of Rule 10-223 were complied with. No words in the rule mandate that the hearing be commenced and completed within thirty days. The requirement is met even if the hearing is not completed within that time period.

Moreover, defendant relies on State v. Doe, 94 N.M. 446, 612 P.2d 238 (Ct.App.1980), but this case is inapplicable. At the time Doe was decided, neither the Rules of Procedure for the Children's Court nor the Children's Code set a time limitation for when a transfer hearing had to be held other than stating it must be prior to an adjudicatory hearing on the petition. The court of appeals held therein that when a child is in detention, the transfer had to be commenced within thirty days from the date the motion to transfer is filed. Id. at 449, 612 P.2d at 241. Nowhere did the court state that the hearing had to be completed within those thirty days.

Since the decision in Doe, Rule 10-223 was adopted to prescribe time limits for holding a transfer hearing. The rule requires that the hearing must be commenced within the thirty-day period. The purpose of the rule is to provide early hearings, but does not preclude continuances when reasonable grounds are shown.

Next, defendant claims that there was no statutory authorization for the transfer of the offenses of robbery and conspiracy since NMSA 1978, Section 32-1-30(A)(1) (Repl.Pamp.1986), provides only for the transfer of the offense of murder when the child, as in this case, was fifteen years of age at the time of the conduct. We held in State v. Garcia, 93 N.M. 51, 53-54, 596 P.2d 264, 266-67 (1979), that if the children's court finds at the hearing that the juvenile should be prosecuted as an adult, then the district court obtains personal jurisdiction over the child and subject matter jurisdiction over the entire case. Thus, in the instant case, the entire matter was properly transferred, not merely the offense of murder, to prevent fragmentation of the criminal proceedings on offenses arising from the same criminal charges. Garcia, 93 N.M. at 54, 596 P.2d at 267.

2. Requested Jury Instructions on Involuntary Manslaughter.

At trial, defendant tendered requested jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder in the commission of a felony. The district court refused to give these instructions and defendant claims reversible error.

"Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse * * * in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony." NMSA 1978, Sec. 30-2-1(A)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1984). "Involuntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection." NMSA 1978, Sec. 30-2-3(B) (Repl.Pamp.1984). Only where the evidence could support a conviction of the lesser offense must the trial court instruct the jury on a lesser included. State v. Omar-Muhammad, 105 N.M. 788, 791, 737 P.2d 1165, 1168 (1987); State v. Gutierrez, 88 N.M. 448, 451, 541 P.2d 628, 631 (Ct.App.1975); see also State v. Fero, 105 N.M. 339, 343, 732 P.2d 866, 870 (1987). The evidence relied on by defendant in support of his tendered instructions is a statement given by an accomplice. In one of his versions, the accomplice stated that another accomplice had the cash drawer in his left hand and a gun in his right hand; that he was unable to balance both; and as a result he dropped the gun, the butt hit the counter and discharged, killing the laundry attendant.

There are three separate courses of conduct that constitute involuntary manslaughter: one, the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony; two, the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner; and three, the commission of a lawful act that might produce death without due caution and circumspection. La Barge v. Stewart, 84 N.M. 222, 224, 501 P.2d 666, 668 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 219, 501 P.2d 663 (1972).

The court's refusal to give the instructions was correct, since none of the conduct which constitutes involuntary manslaughter...