State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 05 April 1983
• Docket Number: No. 17674,17674
• Citation: 664 P.2d 439
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Randy TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 439

664 P.2d 439

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Randy TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 17674.

Supreme Court of Utah.

April 5, 1983.

David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Roger Cutler, Salt Lake County Atty., Paul Maughan, Stanley H. Olsen, Asst. Salt Lake Co. Attys., Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.

John H. Weston, G. Randall Garrou, Brown, Weston & Sarno, Beverly Hills, Cal., Jerome H. Mooney, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

DURHAM, Justice:

I

The appellant, Randy Taylor, seeks review of a judgment of the Third District Court affirming a conviction entered against him in the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court, for a violation of Utah's pornography statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 76-10-1204. His appeal raises a number of constitutional questions, but does not challenge the validity or constitutionality of any statute. Before we may reach any of those constitutional questions, it is necessary to determine whether this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 78-3-5 (Supp.1981) or whether Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution prohibits this appeal.

Section 78-3-5 provides:

Appeals shall lie from the final judgments of justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the district courts, on both questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions as are or may be provided by law; and the decisions of the district courts on these appeals shall be final, except in cases involving a constitutional issue. Appeals shall also lie to the district courts from the final judgments of the circuit courts, and from the final judgments of the juvenile courts, except where a direct appeal to the Supreme Court is expressly provided for. The decisions of the district court on appeals from circuit courts shall be final except in cases involving a constitutional issue.

U.C.A., 1953, § 78-3-5 (Supp.1981) (emphasis added). Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution of Utah, entitled "Appeals from district court--From justices' courts," reads as follows:

From all final judgments of the district courts, there shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be upon the record made in the court below and under such regulations as may be provided by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone. Appeals shall also lie from the final orders and decrees of the Court in the administration of decedent estates, and in cases of guardianship, as shall be provided by law. Appeals shall also lie from the final judgment of justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the District Courts on both questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions as shall be provided by law; and the decision of the District Courts on such appeals shall be final, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute.

Utah Const. art. VIII, § 9 (emphasis added).

The issue before us is whether the emphasized language from Article VIII, Section 9 renders unconstitutional the emphasized language from § 78-3-5. There is no question that the first sentence of § 78-3-5, purporting to expand the right to appeal district court decisions in cases originating in justice of the peace courts to include every "constitutional issue," is unconstitutional. Article VIII, Section 9 expressly provides that the constitutionality or validity of a statute must be challenged, and this Court has consistently and uniformly applied that restriction to justice of the peace cases. See, e.g., State v. Munger, Utah, 642 P.2d 721 (1982). However, the portion of the statute dealing with appeals in circuit court cases is severable, and may be upheld if it does not on its own merits contravene the constitutional restriction.

Only two ways exist in which § 78-3-5, as it affects appeals from circuit courts, may be held unconstitutional: (1) where the sole source of appellate jurisdiction is the Constitution of Utah, and the Legislature has no power to create additional jurisdiction; or (2) where the reference to "final judgment of justices of the peace" in Section 9 of Article VIII includes final judgments from the circuit court. The first result, requiring a holding that the Legislature has no power to create appellate review for the decisions of courts not specifically referred to in the Constitution, is clearly untenable. It flies in the face of the long history of decisions of this Court in which appeals from the city courts (in civil cases where the judgment or amount in controversy, depending on the statutory language, exceeded $100), from the juvenile courts, and from certain administrative tribunals have been permitted, even though the Constitution does not mention any of those courts. Clearly, the Legislature has the power to confer appellate jurisdiction in connection with the decisions of any inferior court where such jurisdiction is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Appellate jurisdiction, as this Court has previously held, may exist by virtue of a constitutional grant or by statute. See, e.g., Town of Ophir v. Jorgensen, 63 Utah 288, 225 P. 342 (1924); Castle Dale City v. Woolley, 61 Utah 291, 212 P. 1111 (1923). In McCashland v. Keogh, 32 Utah 11, 88 P. 680 (1906), a case which had originated in city court, this Court stated:

We think it is quite clear that the constitutional right to an appeal is given only in the following cases: (1) In criminal cases (article 1, sec. 12); (2) from final judgments of the district courts where the cases originate in that court as above outlined, including probate matters; and (3) from justices' courts to district courts. In all other cases, while the appellate jurisdiction--that is, the power generally to hear and determine appeals--exists, the right to an appeal, nevertheless, depends upon legislative action alone, the right itself not having been conferred by the Constitution.

Id. at 19, 88 P. at 682. Although acknowledging that the constitutional grant also constituted a limitation in that case, the McCashland Court articulated the rationale for narrowly construing such limitations:

As the district courts have concurrent jurisdiction in all cases with inferior courts, and all inferior courts are deprived of jurisdiction in all matters where important rights may be affected and in all other cases have jurisdiction only in specified and limited amounts, it is easy to perceive why the framers of the Constitution relegated the right to appeal to the Legislature, except in certain specified cases above referred to. To hold that the right of the Legislature to regulate appeals from inferior courts is prohibited by the Constitution, except as specified in that instrument, is to impose a limitation on that body by implication.

Such limitations are not, and should not be, favored, and ought not be imposed by the courts, except where the implication is both necessary and unavoidable, when considered in the light of the language used in that instrument, and applied to the subject-matter under consideration.

Id.

Thus, the Legislature clearly has the power to create appellate jurisdiction beyond that granted in the Constitution, so long as the statutory grant does not run afoul of any specific constitutional limitation. The crucial issue, then, is whether the constitutional language prohibiting appeals to this Court in justice of the peace cases likewise prohibits such appeals in circuit court cases. This can be so only if the circuit courts established by the Legislature in 1977 can be considered so analogous to the justices of the peace referred to in the Constitution as to require identical treatment.

The circuit court system supplanted an earlier statutory scheme which included city courts and justice of the peace courts. Justice of the peace courts were not eliminated, however, when the circuit courts came into being; only the city courts disappeared. The city courts were established in 1901, with the following language concerning appeals:

From all final judgments of a city court a motion for a new trial may be made, and an appeal may be taken by either party in a civil case, or by the defendant in a criminal case, to the district court of the county in the manner and with like effect as is now, or may be provided by law from appeals from justices' courts in similar cases, and from all final judgments in the district courts rendered upon such appeals, an appeal may be taken to the supreme court in like manner as if said actions were originally commenced in the district court; provided, however, when the judgment in the district court does not exceed one hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, that the same shall be final, and no appeal shall lie therefrom; and provided further, that in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of the statute, there shall be a right of appeal to the supreme court.

1901 Utah Laws, Ch. 109, Sec. 18 (emphasis added and in the original). This statute was later amended to refer to the "amount in controversy" instead of the "judgment in the district court." In Salt Lake City v. Lee, 49 Utah 197, 161 P. 926 (1916), the amended statute was construed as follows:

While somewhat ambiguously expressed, yet we think the statute fairly means that in all cases, both criminal and civil, an appeal lies from the city court to the district court; and from all final judgments in the district court rendered upon such appeals an appeal lies to the Supreme Court, provided, however, the amount in controversy exceeds $100 or the case involves the validity or constitutionality of a statute or an ordinance. The proviso that when the amount in controversy does not exceed $100 the judgment shall be final and nonappealable is a restriction and a limitation upon the language preceding it, and imposes a condition precedent to the right of an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Id. at 198-99, 161 P. at 926....