State v. Taylor, 84-KA-1324
| Citation | 463 So.2d 1274 |
| Decision Date | 25 February 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-KA-1324,84-KA-1324 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Walter J. TAYLOR. 463 So.2d 1274 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Louisiana |
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., William R. Campbell, Nancy Sharp, Rockne Moseley, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellant-plaintiff.
Samuel S. Dalton, Jefferson, for appellee-defendant.
Vehicular homicide is defined as the killing of a human being caused by a person's operation of an automobile when the operator's blood alcohol concentration is 0.10 percent or more 1. La.R.S. 14:32.1. The trial court declared the statute unconstitutional, and the state appealed. La. Const. art. V, Sec. 5. This appeal draws into question the trial court's construction of the statutory crime definition as requiring no causal link between a vehicle operator's blood alcohol concentration and the killing of a human being. We reverse. A genuine construction of the statute indicates a legislative aim to punish a person whose unlawful blood alcohol concentration in combination with his vehicle operation causes the death of a human being.
Defendant, Walter J. Taylor, was charged with the commission of vehicular homicide, La.R.S. 14:32.1, arising out of a fatal accident on February 10, 1984. Defendant moved to quash the bill of information. The trial court construed the statute as establishing that a traffic fatality caused by a vehicle operator having blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 percent or more is presumed to have resulted from his negligent operation and his unlawful blood alcohol concentration. Concluding that the statute sets up unconstitutional presumptions relieving the state of its burden of proof, the trial court struck the statute and quashed the bill.
We do not view the statute as creating any presumptions. Giving the provisions of La.R.S. 14:32.1 a genuine construction, according to their context and with reference to their purpose, La.R.S. 14:3, we conclude that under the vehicular homicide statute, the state, in order to convict, must prove that an offender's unlawful blood alcohol concentration combined with his operation of a vehicle to cause the death of a human being. In our opinion, the statute does not establish any presumption of causation or negligence in aid of the prosecution; indeed, except for the offender's unlawful blood alcohol concentration during his operation of a vehicle, the state is not required to prove any negligence on his part as an essential element of the crime.
The evident purpose of the vehicular homicide statute is to curb traffic fatalities caused by the consumption of alcohol. It is not aimed at persons involved in vehicular fatalities whose alcohol consumption does not cause but merely coincides with such an accident. A vehicle operator with unlawful blood alcohol concentration could be involved in many conceivable types of fatal accidents not caused in any way by his blood alcohol concentration. The punishment of persons who without fault and by coincidence fall in this latter class with the severe penalties intended for offenders whose alcohol consumption actually causes highway deaths is unnecessary to the legitimate purpose of the legislation and would constitute unwarranted statutory overkill.
The criminal code expressly states that a crime is conduct defined as criminal, La.R.S. 14:7, and that criminal conduct consists of an act, a failure to act, or criminal negligence that "produces" criminal consequences. La.R.S. 14:8. Therefore, unless the legislature expressly stipulates otherwise, the conduct described in a crime definition "must result in" criminal consequences, id. Reporter's Comment. In other words, the conduct must be causally related to a prescribed criminal consequence. See La.R.S. 14:8, 9. Accordingly, the vehicular homicide statute should be construed to require proof of a causal relationship between an operator's unlawful blood alcohol concentration and the death of a victim in order to convict.
Accordingly, under the statutory scheme of the criminal code the vehicular homicide statute complements the purposes served by negligent homicide and drunk driving laws. The DWI law makes it a crime to operate a vehicle when the operator's blood alcohol concentration is 0.10 percent, punishable on first conviction by a fine of no more than $500 and imprisonment of up to six months. La.R.S. 14:98. The negligent homicide statute makes it a crime to kill a human being by criminal negligence, punishable by imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both. La.R.S. 14:32. The vehicular homicide statute imposes criminal sanctions similar to those imposed by the negligent homicide law, but requires a minimum prison sentence and a minimum fine, whenever a person's operation of a vehicle and his blood...
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