State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 24 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 3837.,3837.
• Citation: State v. Taylor, 360 S.C. 18, 598 S.E.2d 735 (S.C. App. 2004)
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Carla TAYLOR, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

360 S.C. 18

598 S.E.2d 735

The STATE, Respondent, v.Carla TAYLOR, Appellant.

No. 3837.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard April 21, 2004.

Decided June 24, 2004.

J. Falkner Wilkes, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Attorney GeneralHenry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney GeneralJohn W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney GeneralCharles H. Richardson, Senior Assistant Attorney GeneralNorman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Robert M. Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.

HOWARD, J.:

Carla Taylor was convicted of trafficking in twenty-eight grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of S.C.Code Ann. section 44-53-375(C)(2) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime in violation of S.C.Code Ann. section 16-23-490.On appeal, Taylor argues the trial court erred in admitting into evidence crack cocaine seized at the time of her arrest because the State failed to call the police evidence custodian as a witness to establish a complete chain of custody.¹We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following a traffic stop on I-85 in Greenville County, Highway Patrol Trooper Shannon Webber arrested Taylor for trafficking in crack cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime when a consent search of the car she was driving yielded 36.16 grams of crack cocaine and a handgun.Taylor was subsequently indicted and tried for both offenses.At trial, the State offered the following evidence to establish the chain of custody of the crack cocaine seized in the arrest.²Trooper Webber testified he took possession of a substance believed to be crack cocaine at the scene of the arrest, placing it in a "best evidence bag" along with a form detailing all pertinent information.³He then sealed the bag and turned the evidence over to his superior officer, Sergeant Long.According to Webber, once sealed, the bag could not be opened without tearing it.

Sergeant Long testified that he transported the best evidence bag containing the substance to the Department of Public Safety's central evidence locker in Columbia.He then turned it in to the evidence custodian, Dale Blackmon.⁴

At the time of trial, Dale Blackmon was no longer employed by the Department of Public Safety, and did not testify.In lieu of Blackmon's testimony, the State called the successor custodian, Corporal Price.Price explained that only the evidence custodian had access to the evidence locker, with the exception of the supervisor and administrative assistant, who could receive evidence when the custodian was not on duty.He further testified regarding protocol and procedure for the handling and storage of evidence by the custodian, explaining each officer was assigned his or her own storage locker inside of a safe within the locker room.According to Price, a dangerous drug such as cocaine is not retained by the custodian in the evidence locker, but is immediately taken by the custodian to SLED.Once analyzed, it is placed back in the original evidence bag by the SLED chemist and is heat-sealed in another bag.The SLED chemist then returns the drug to the Department's evidence locker room where it is placed in the individual locker designated solely for the arresting officer.In this case, it remained in Trooper Webber's locker until retrieved by Price for trial.

Chemist Ford testified that he retrieved the evidence from the lockbox at SLED; immediately inspected it to assure there were no holes, punctures, or tears in the best evidence bag; and ensured the original seal by Webber had not been broken.After determining there were no signs of tampering, Ford broke the bag open, tested it, and determined it contained 36.16 grams of crack cocaine.He then placed the crack cocaine and the original best evidence bag into another evidence bag, heat-sealed it, labeled it, and placed it back in the vault.

Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court admitted the crack cocaine into evidence, ruling the State had provided sufficient evidence of the chain of custody without the testimony of the missing evidence custodian.Thereafter, Taylor was convicted by a jury of trafficking in crack cocaine in an amount exceeding thirty grams and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.Taylor was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment on the trafficking offense and five years on the weapon offense.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Taylor argues the testimony of everyone who handled the evidence, including that of the former evidence custodian, Dale Blackmon, was necessary to establish the chain of custody.Without Blackmon's testimony, Taylor argues, the evidence was inadmissible under the authority of State v. Chisolm,355 S.C. 175, 584 S.E.2d 401(Ct.App.2003), cert. denied(April 8, 2004) and State v. Joseph,328 S.C. 352, 491 S.E.2d 275(Ct.App.1997).We reject Taylor's broad reading of these cases as requiring the testimony of all persons handling the evidence as a condition of admissibility.

A party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a chain of custody as far as practicable.See, e.g., Benton v. Pellum,232 S.C. 26, 33, 100 S.E.2d 534, 537(1957);State v. Cribb,310 S.C. 518, 522, 426 S.E.2d 306, 309(1992);State v. Joseph,328 S.C. 352, 364, 491 S.E.2d 275, 281(Ct.App.1997);State v. Johnson,318 S.C. 194, 196, 456 S.E.2d 442, 443(Ct.App.1995).Where the analyzed substance has passed through several hands, the evidence must not leave it to conjecture as to who had it and what was done with it between the taking and the analysis.While the proof of chain of custody need not negate all possibility of tampering, it must establish a complete chain of evidence as far as practicable.State v. Williams,297 S.C. 290, 293, 376 S.E.2d 773, 774(1989);Johnson,318 S.C. at 196,456 S.E.2d at 443.

The admission of evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.Williams,297 S.C. at 293, 376 S.E.2d at 774;Raino v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,309 S.C. 255, 258, 422 S.E.2d 98, 100(1992);Johnson,318 S.C. at 196, 456 S.E.2d at 443.On appeal, the question presented is whether the trial court's decision is controlled by an error of law or is without evidentiary support.State v. Irick,344 S.C. 460, 463, 545 S.E.2d 282, 284(2001);State v. Hughey,339 S.C. 439, 453, 529 S.E.2d 721, 728-729(2000);see alsoState v. Brazell,325 S.C. 65, 78, 480 S.E.2d 64, 72(1997).If there is any evidence to support the trial judge's decision, the appellate courts will affirm it.State v. Wilson,345 S.C. 1, 7, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829(2001).

Where the identity of persons handling the evidence is unknown, our courts have consistently held the evidence is inadmissible.In Benton v. Pellum,232 S.C. 26, 100 S.E.2d 534(1957), our supreme court upheld the trial judge's exclusion of the results of blood alcohol tests where blood was drawn from the defendant driver following an automobile accident and transported over the Christmas holiday to the Medical College in Charleston for testing.Although there was testimony of the hospital's customary practice regarding the mailing of the blood, there was no evidence that the technologist who drew the blood had sealed the vials or had otherwise taken any precautions against tampering.The record did not disclose who had possession of the package containing the vials of blood for several days, and it left the identity of those who handled the vials and the manner of transportation to conjecture.The unidentifiable handlers were missing links in the chain of custody, rendering the evidence inadmissible.Subsequently, in State v. Williams,301 S.C. 369, 392 S.E.2d 181(1990), andState v. Cribb,310 S.C. 518, 426 S.E.2d 306(1992), our supreme court reiterated the holding in Benton v. Pellum, noting that it is an abuse of discretion to admit the results of a blood alcohol test where the identity of those who sealed, labeled, and transported the blood sample is not established.Cribb,310 S.C. at 522,426 S.E.2d at 309.See alsoRaino,309 S.C. at 258,422 S.E.2d at 100(ruling the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding blood test results where the evidence failed to establish who handled the blood).

In each of these casesthe party offering the results failed to trace the handling of the evidence from the time it was gathered until it was tested.As a result, the identity of the people who had control of the evidence and what was done with it during their possession was left to speculation.

In contrast, where there is evidence to establish the identity of those who have handled the evidence and the manner in which it was handled, a weakness in the chain merely raises a question of credibility, not admissibility.The seminal case establishing this principle in South Carolina is State v. Williams,297 S.C. 290, 376 S.E.2d 773(1989).In Williams, our Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court to admit blood test results even though the nurse who had drawn the blood of the defendant and placed it in the hospital refrigerator did not testify.In that case, Nurse Yorke, who removed the blood sample from the locked hospital refrigerator the morning after the accident and took it to the lab for testing, did testify.According to her, the vial was labeled with appellant's name, patient number, date of birth, and the date the blood was drawn.The hospital's internal chain of custody form was initialed by the nurse who drew the blood, indicating she had obtained the sample from appellant and then locked it in the refrigerator.Under those circumstances, our supreme court ruled that the initialed form complying with hospital protocol and Nurse Yorke's testimony sufficiently established a chain of custody to allow admission.Id. at 293, 376 S.E.2d at 774.

Similarly, where the handling of the evidence is reasonably demonstrated, a weakness in the chain implicates ...