State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 03 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-518,94-518
• Citation: State v. Taylor, 677 A.2d 1093, 141 N.H. 89 (N.H. 1996)
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. Tracy S. TAYLOR.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 1093

677 A.2d 1093

141 N.H. 89

The STATE of New Hampshire v.Tracy S. TAYLOR.

No. 94-518.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

June 3, 1996.

Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General(Mark D. Attorri, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief and orally), for the State.

David M. Rothstein, Assistant Appellate Defender, Concord, by brief and orally, for defendant.

THAYER, Justice.

The defendant, Tracy S. Taylor, was convicted of second degree murder following a jury trial in Superior Court(Fauver, J.).SeeRSA 630:1-b (1986).On appeal, he argues that the court erred: (1) in allowing the State to impeach his direct testimony with the details of a prior robbery conviction; (2) in refusing to give jurors a "reasonable efforts" instruction regarding lesser-included offenses; and (3) in refusing to allow him to call a certain witness to corroborate his manslaughter defense.We affirm.

On September 23, 1993, the defendant visited his girlfriend, Carmen Blake, at her apartment.When he arrived, he found the victim, Bill Horan, talking with Blake at her kitchen table.The couple knew Horan because they had been enrolled in a drug rehabilitation program with him in 1993.The group began injecting and smoking cocaine and heroin shortly after the defendant's arrival.

At some point during the evening, Horan made a comment about Blake's anatomy which implied that he had been intimate with her.The defendant was shocked and angered by the comment, but chose not to confront Horan.He believed Horan could purchase crystal methamphetamine at a business located across a field from Blake's apartment and did not want to risk alienating Horan before the drug purchase took place.

Later that evening, the defendant and Horan left Blake's apartment and walked across the field to buy drugs.At the time, the defendant was "pretty messed up" because of the cocaine and heroin he had used at Blake's apartment.During the walk, Horan made additional comments about Blake's anatomy.The defendant again decided not to react to the comments because he did not want to disrupt the drug purchase.

When the pair arrived at the business, the defendant quickly decided that Horan would have more luck with the drug purchase if he operated alone.Accordingly, the defendant left the area and walked back toward Blake's apartment, stopping at the far edge of the field.As he waited for Horan to return, the defendant talked separately to Blake and her son, both of whom had walked into the field to express their outrage at Horan's earlier remarks.Blake told the defendantshe did not want Horan back in her apartment.

When Horan returned from the drug purchase, the defendant met him at the edge of the field and relayed Blake's message.Horan responded by pushing and threatening the defendant.The defendant removed a knife from his pocket and confronted Horan.The two men scuffled and the defendant stabbed Horan four times.The defendant testified that he did not think that the wounds were fatal, in part because Horan was still standing after the altercation and in part because he had not intended to kill anyone.He later learned, however, that Horan died as a result of his wounds.

The defendant was indicted for first degree murder.At trial, he argued that he was only guilty of provocation manslaughter.After three days of deliberations, the jury convicted him of second degree murder.The superior court sentenced him to thirty-five years to life in prison.

I.Prior Convictions

The defendant's first argument on appeal is that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to impeach his direct testimony with details about his prior robbery conviction.

On direct examination, the defendant testified that he had been convicted of robbery and burglary in 1986.He revealed the essential facts of both offenses and testified that he spent more than six years in jail for the crimes.Defense counsel chose to introduce the convictions during direct examination because the State had been granted permission, under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 609(a), to refer to them during cross-examination.SeeN.H.R.Ev. 609(a).

On cross-examination, the State referred to the prior robbery conviction by introducing the defendant's written description of the crime as it appeared in a pardon application.The State argued that the defendant's explanation for his conduct in this case mirrored his explanation of the robbery in the pardon application.Asserting that a defendant who relies on the same explanation more than one time may be lying, the State sought to demonstrate that the defendant's testimony regarding the stabbing was not true.

On appeal, the defendant offers two reasons why the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach him with the description contained in the pardon application.First, he argues that Rule 609(a) does not authorize a party to introduce details about a witness's prior convictions because those details are inherently prejudicial.Instead, the rule only authorizes a party to introduce the fact of a conviction.Second, he argues that the details contained in the pardon application improperly allowed the State to argue that his testimony about the stabbing was untrue.According to the defendant, the State could not argue that his testimony was untrue without first demonstrating that his explanation for the robbery was untrue.The defendant maintains that the court's error was not harmless.

We need not decide whether the trial court properly admitted the information in the pardon application because, even assuming error, we agree with the State that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.SeeState v. Judkins, 128 N.H. 223, 226, 512 A.2d 427, 429(1986)."The burden is on the State to prove harmless error, ... and this burden is met only if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence did not affect the verdict."State v. Silk, 138 N.H. 290, 291, 639 A.2d 243, 244(1994)(citation omitted).In evaluating a claim of harmless error, the question "is not ... whether the evidence, apart from that erroneously admitted, would support a finding of guilt, but whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict."State v. Skidmore, 138 N.H. 201, 203-04, 636 A.2d 64, 66(1993)(quotation omitted).

We address each of the defendant's arguments separately under the harmless error analysis.We initially reject the defendant's suggestion that the details in the pardon application were so prejudicial that they affected the verdict.In his direct testimony about the robbery, the defendant referred to almost all of the facts later elicited using the pardon application.The defendant admitted on direct examination that he attempted to steal $280 from the South Street Market, that he hit the cashier on the head with a glass jar during the crime, and that he was "caught red-handed."

The only additional evidence drawn from the pardon application served to explain or minimize the defendant's conduct.More specifically, the evidence from the pardon application established that the defendant was drunk at the time of the crime, that he did not intend to harm the robbery victim when he threw the glass jar, that he was attacked by the victim as he tried to escape, that he did not act with purpose, and that all the money was recovered.Those details were less damaging than the ones divulged by the defendant on direct examination.As a result, we cannot conclude that cross-examination using the pardon application altered the outcome of the defendant's case.Cf.State v. Ramos, 131 N.H. 276, 283-84, 553 A.2d 275, 280(1988)(no abuse of discretion in allowing State to introduce evidence of prior conviction when defendant gave a lengthy description of the conviction).

Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the trial court took steps to limit the prejudicial impact of the information in the pardon application.The court expressly instructed jurors to consider the information only to evaluate the defendant's credibility.It also barred the State from telling jurors that the information came from a pardon application.

We also reject the defendant's assertion that the verdict was affected by the State's decision to use the pardon application to argue that the defendant's explanation for the stabbing was untrue.As the record demonstrates, the defendant contradicted his own explanation of the stabbing several times during cross-examination.At trial, the defendant explained that he did not intend to kill Horan.He testified that the stabbing was a mere reflex and not an action within his control.He also testified that his drug use affected his ability to understand what was happening.

It is true that the State used the pardon application to show that the defendant had made the same argument when explaining the robbery.But the State elicited other testimony from the defendant that directly contradicted his version of events.Judkins, 128 N.H. at 226, 512 A.2d at 429.Under questioning by the State, the defendant admitted that he was able to make decisions before, during, and after he stabbed Horan.Moreover, the defendant admitted that he was not so high that his motor coordination was impaired.He also testified that he told Blake's son that he was going to kill Horan.Finally, he testified that he was angry about the rude comments Horan had made earlier in the evening.

As compared to the information in the pardon application, this evidence was overwhelming.Accordingly, we find that the decision to admit the information in the pardon application was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

II.Jury Instructions

The trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder, RSA 630:1-a (1986& Supp.1995), and the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder, RSA 630:1-b, and reckless manslaughter, RSA 630:2, I(b)(1986).The court also instructed the jury on...