State v. Taylor

Citation663 S.W.2d 235
Decision Date17 January 1984
Docket NumberNo. 64911,64911
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Stanley TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Henry B. Robertson, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.

John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Theodore A. Bruce, John Morris, Asst. Attys. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.

GUNN, Judge.

Defendant was convicted of forcible rape in violation of § 566.030, RSMo Supp.1982 (effective 1980). During the course of trial, a psychiatrist testifying for the state was permitted to venture an opinion that the prosecutrix bore the marks of a condition known as "rape trauma syndrome" 1 arising out of an attack by the defendant. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District in a per curiam opinion gave thorough treatment to the issue of the admissibility of the rape trauma syndrome evidence and concluded that it should not have been admitted. By reason of general interest and importance, the Eastern District transferred the case to this Court, and we consider it as if an original appeal. Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.

Under the circumstances presented for review, we reverse and remand for a new trial. We also note the excellent research provided by the Eastern District's opinion and draw substantially from it.

The night of the alleged attack was the first for the prosecutrix at working as a solo bartender at Mary's Moonlight Lounge in St. Louis. She had observed the defendant, who was employed as a factotum in the bar, but had little conversation with him during the evening.

The prosecutrix related the following pertaining to the attack upon her.

Between 11:30 p.m. and midnight, all the customers had left, and defendant asked the prosecutrix to step from behind the bar so he could ice the beer and empty the trash. As the victim came around the bar, defendant knocked her to the floor with a single blow of his fist between her eyes. Though the victim resisted, defendant overpowered and raped her. The rape complete, defendant called a cab for the prosecutrix which she took home.

Upon arriving at her home, the prosecutrix called police and through tears and visible upset related the incident. Police escorted the prosecutrix back to the bar where defendant was found sitting alone, seemingly sangfroid while sipping his beer. The victim's personal effects were on the floor.

A hospital examination of the prosecutrix revealed a cut lip, bruises and swelling of her forehead and scratches on her neck. Sperm was in the victim's vagina and seminal fluid was found on her undergarments and those belonging to defendant.

Defendant offered no evidence, but the design of cross-examination of state's witnesses was to implant the element of consent.

The gravamen of defendant's appeal is directed at the admission of opinion testimony of Dr. Ebrahim Amanat, a psychiatrist specializing in the diagnosis and treatment of rape victims. Specifically, defendant contends that there was no proper foundation for the testimony, that his opinion was based on hearsay statements related to him by the victim, that his opinion was a wrongful incursion into jury province and that his opinion was irrelevant and immaterial. Efforts to suppress the expression of Dr. Amanat's opinion through motion and objection were unavailing.

We can accept Dr. Amanat's expert qualification on the subject of his testimony. He has 15 years experience as a psychiatrist and has treated over 300 victims of rape and sexual assault. He has authored an article and contributed to a book dealing with rape trauma syndrome.

According to Dr. Amanat, rape trauma syndrome is generally recognized and accepted in the psychiatric community as a syndrome with identifiable symptoms which develop in nearly 95 percent of all victims of rape and sexual assault. He also stated that other serious traumas, such as exposure to combat, fire, earthquake or other catastrophic experiences produce similar traits.

Dr. Amanat's examination of the prosecutrix took place about three months after the assault upon her. It was from her verbal and nonverbal responses to his questions during the examination that he reached his conclusion that she suffered from rape trauma syndrome brought on by the rape incident she described to him.

During the examination, the victim exhibited symptoms of extreme carefulness, muscle tension, irritability, psychomotor retardation, panic reaction, intense agitation, inability to react, long pauses and blocking of thoughts, problems in communicating her feelings, fear of dying, fear of damage to her body, fear of nervous breakdown, tendency toward emotional withdrawal, feelings of guilt, helplessness, disbelief, physical fatigue, sleep problems, and a reliving of the experience. All of the symptoms, according to Dr. Amanat, are consistent with rape trauma syndrome. In fact, she displayed 40 of the 50 recognized manifestations of the syndrome. He testified that the victim was not fantasizing when she described the rape, that she would not be capable of feigning the symptoms and that he could visualize no reason by which consensual intercourse would cause such symptoms.

According to Dr. Amanat, rape trauma syndrome is one of many specific syndromes included in the general classification of post-traumatic stress disorder caused by serious life traumas. The content of the response to the trauma varies with the type. Thus, the symptoms of a person suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder caused by combat would not be entirely the same as those of a person suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder induced by rape. Rape produces a specific and unique pattern of responses because it is a combination of physical and sexual assault.

Dr. Amanat testified that he approached the victim's disorder as rape trauma syndrome because she told him she had been raped and because her nonverbal responses during the examination verified this information. Further, he testified that he normally considers a patient's psychological makeup and history in arriving at his diagnosis and that, to the best of his knowledge, there was nothing in the victim's history outside the alleged rape that would have caused the intensity of her response. He also stated that the diagnosis of rape trauma syndrome using the techniques he applied is 80 percent reliable.

Literature covering the treatment of the psychiatric consequences of rape supports Dr. Amanat's testimony that rape trauma syndrome is generally accepted as a common reaction to sexual assault. See McCombie, The Rape Crisis Intervention Handbook 724-26 (1980); Kaplan, Freedman and Sadock, Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry §§ 21.1d, 24.15 (3d ed. 1980); C. Warner, Rape and Sexual Assault 145-49 (1980); Burgess and Holmstrom, Rape: Crisis and Recovery 35-47 (1979).

A number of other jurisdictions have dealt with the subject matter of rape trauma syndrome, permitting psychiatrists and others to explain in trial under varying circumstances the symptoms and express the professional opinion that rape could be the cause of a victim's condition. See Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F.Supp. 1111 (E.D.Mich.1979) (civil action); People v. Mathews, 91 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1021, 154 Cal.Rptr. 628 (1979) (defense to criminal charge); Division of Corrections v. Wynn, 438 So.2d 446 (Fla.App.1983); Alphonso v. Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans, 413 So.2d 982 (La.App.1982); Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass.App. 163, 450 N.E.2d 190 (1983) (civil action); State v. Mackie, 622 P.2d 673, 675 (Mont.1981) (defines "rape trauma syndrome"); White v. Violent Crimes Compensation Board, 76 N.J. 368, 388 A.2d 206 (1978) (civil action); State v. Jackson, 97 N.M. 467, 641 P.2d 498 (1982) (results of examination ordered by defendant may be used by prosecution); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983) (allows expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome but specifically rejects allowing expert comment on truthfulness of victim); State v. LeBrun, 37 Or.App. 411, 587 P.2d 1044 (1978) (evidence allowed over objection that expert was not qualified); In the Matter of Pittsburg Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126 (1981).

The ultimate issue facing us here is whether evidence that the victim of an alleged rape suffers from rape trauma syndrome is admissible as evidence that intercourse was not consensual. This presents a new issue for Missouri courts' consideration. In State v. Walker, 639 S.W.2d 854 (Mo.App.1982), evidence of rape trauma syndrome was allowed, but its admissibility was never challenged; hence, that case does not offer perfect guidance.

Minnesota and Kansas have dealt with the precise issue confronting this Court, with each state reaching a different result and, therefore, providing an interesting comparison.

State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn.1982), holds that an expert's opinion that an alleged rape victim suffered from rape trauma syndrome is inadmissible on the issue of consent. In Saldana, a counselor for sexual assault victims testified that she had met the alleged victim 10 days after the alleged rape and had counseled her for a 10-week period. The counselor stated her opinion that the victim suffered from rape trauma syndrome and that the victim had been sexually assaulted and raped. Further, she related that the victim could not have fantasized the rape. Id. at 229-30.

The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the primary criterion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony is whether the testimony helps the jury to reach its decision. If not, it must be excluded. The testimony regarding the existence of rape trauma syndrome was found infirm in two respects: first, that it did not assist the jury in its fact-finding function; and, second, that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger that it unfairly prejudiced, confused or misled the jury.

The usefulness of a psychiatric evaluation as a method of proving rape was rejected by the...

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