State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 11 May 2004
• Docket Number: No. SC 85235.,SC 85235.
• Citation: 134 S.W.3d 21
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Michael TAYLOR, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

134 S.W.3d 21

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v.Michael TAYLOR, Appellant.

No. SC 85235.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

May 11, 2004.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 2004.

Rosemary E. Percival, Office of the State Public Defender, Kansas City, MO, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W.(Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Evan J. Buchheim, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.

RONNIE L. WHITE, Chief Justice.

I.

A jury convicted Appellant, Michael Taylor, of one count of first-degree murder and recommended the death sentence.Judgment was entered consistent with the jury's recommendation.Appellant now appeals raising nine points of error.This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3. Affirmed.

II.

The facts, which this Court reviews in the light most favorable to the verdict,¹ are as follows:

In 1998, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and forcible rape and was sentenced to life in prison without probation or parole.Appellant was incarcerated at Potosi Correctional Center and was required to share a cell with Shackrein Thomas.At approximately 7:30 p.m. on October 3, 1999, Appellant placed Mr. Thomas in a chokehold and strangled him to death.Just prior to the routine ten p.m. inmate "count,"Appellant summoned the guards to his cell where they discovered Mr. Thomas' body.

Mr. Thomas' body was found on the cell floor with a bite mark in the middle of his back.His right eye had been nearly dislodged from the eye socket.There were abrasions present to his abdomen and left cheek, and his left eye was swollen.There was also evidence that the two men had engaged in sexual activity at some time prior to the murder.Appellant stated to a department of corrections investigator that his "father" from the "dark side" had instructed him to "send" Mr. Thomas to him.

At trial, Appellant's defense was that he suffered from a mental disease or defect that excused him from responsibility for killing Mr. Thomas.Consequently, the guilt phase evidence primarily consisted of expert testimony as to Appellant's mental status.The jury rejected his insanity defense, found Appellant guilty of first degree murder, and after the sentencing phase of the trial unanimously recommended a sentence of death.

III.

In Appellant's first point, he contends that the trial court erred when overruling defense counsel's objection to giving the jury InstructionNo. 5, patterned after MAI-CR 3d 306.04.Appellant believes this instruction may have caused the jurors to believe that they could not consider whether he had a mental disease or defect.

Expert testimony concerning Appellant's mental status was adduced from several experts.The conclusions of these experts were based upon the direct examination of Appellant, as well as the review of pertinent records, statements and the conclusions of other individuals.Statements made by the accused and the information reviewed by these experts is generally not admissible on the issue of whether the accused actually committed the act charged; however, this information is admissible on the issue of a defendant's mental condition.²To be sure the jury understands the purpose of this evidence, the trial court is required to give the MAI-CR 3d 306.04 instruction.

The Missouri Approved Instruction CR 3d 306.04 states:

You will recall that certain doctors testified to statements that they said were made to them and information that they said has been received by them during or in connection with their inquiry into the mental condition of the defendant.In that connection, the Court instructs you that under no circumstances should you consider that testimony as evidence that the defendant did or did not commit the acts charged against him.

The failure of a trial court to give a required instruction is error.³The instruction clearly informs the jury that it may only use the evidence identified to determine the defendant's mental state and not his guilt or innocence.It does not instruct the jury to disregard the evidence completely when determining the Appellant's mental condition as he alleges.

On a claim of instructional error, "[a]n appellate court will reverse only if there is error in submitting an instruction and prejudice to the defendant."⁴Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred by not allowing Appellant to waive the instruction, Appellant provides only speculation as to the prejudicial effect of this proper instruction.Having failed to demonstrate prejudice, Appellant's claim is without merit.

IV.

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the prosecutor's cross-examination of Appellant's expert, Dr. John Rabun, concerning the details of Appellant's previous conviction.Appellant contends that the testimony elicited from the prosecutor's questioning was inadmissible evidence of an uncharged crime that was neither logically relevant nor necessary to prove the charge against him.⁵

"Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or crimes is inadmissible unless logically and legally relevant to the present charge."⁶However, Dr. Rabun had testified that he had reviewed the records of Appellant's prior rape and murder when forming his opinion of Appellant's mental state, and an expert witness may be cross-examined about facts not in evidence to test the validity of his opinion."Where a psychological expert's opinion of mental illness is before the court, the validity and weight of the opinion may be tested on cross-examination concerning the expert's knowledge of fact surrounding the defendant's mental status, including the accused's past interactions that bear on the opinion.This necessarily implies wide latitude in cross-examining such experts to test the factual basis for the opinion."⁷Trial courts retain broad discretion in deciding the permissible scope of cross-examination, and an appellate court will not reverse a conviction absent an abuse of that discretion.⁸

Dr. Rabun testified that he believed the Appellant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and that Appellant had committed both the previous and present murders after hearing voices.The prosecutor's cross-examination, which did not exceed the scope of the permitted examination as determined in a pre-trial conference, challenged the expert's opinion in terms of attempting to establish a motive for the killings.The prosecutor's questions concerned the similarities between the murders in that both involved death by asphyxiation and the circumstances in both implied that sex might have been the motivating factor as opposed to a schizophrenic disorder.Moreover, since Appellant had admitted his guilt, this evidence could not have been used inappropriately to prove Appellant's propensity to commit the crime charged.The trial court did not abuse its discretion when permitting the cross-examination.

V.

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred when denying his motion to order two psychiatric care centers to disclose the mental health records of the State's witness, Scott Perschbacher, so they could be entered into evidence or else viewed in camera to determine their relevancy.Appellant suggests that these records were necessary to determine the competency of the State's witness and to deny him access to those records violated his rights to due process, confrontation, cross-examination and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

The abuse of discretion standard applies when reviewing claims of denial of meaningful discovery and concerning the relevancy and admissibility of evidence.⁹"A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration."¹⁰"If reasonable persons can differ as to the propriety of the trial court's action, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion."¹¹

When reviewing a claim that a defendant was denied meaningful discovery, the appellate court will determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in such a way as to result in fundamental unfairness.¹²"Fundamental unfairness occurs when the state's failure to disclose results in defendant's genuine surprise and the surprise prevents meaningful efforts to consider and prepare a strategy for addressing the evidence."¹³However, a "defendant is not entitled to information on the mere possibility that it might be helpful, but must make `some plausible showing' how the information would have been material and favorable."¹⁴

Appellant asserts that the records in dispute might have had a bearing on Mr. Perschbacher's competency to testify, but there is a presumption that a witness is competent to testify unless that witness exhibits some mental infirmity and fails to meet the traditional criteria for witness competence.¹⁵The mere possibility, not supported by fact, that the records from these facilities might contain evidence concerning Mr. Perschbacher's competence is insufficient to have rendered the trial court's decision to deny discovery and admission of these records as being an abuse of discretion.

VI.

In his fourth point, Appellant claims the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to make speaking objections during defense counsel's penalty phase closing argument.Appellant asserts that these objections encouraged the jury to speculate about matters not in the record, that they amounted to the prosecutor giving testimony, and that they implied the defense had hidden facts from the jury.

At issue are three specific objections made by the prosecutor.The first was an objection for a "blatant misstatement of the evidence."The second occurred when defense counsel informed the jury that if the Appellant were excused from guilt by reason of insanity that he would be sent to Fulton State Hospital.The prosecutor objected because this was material that defense cou...