State v. Terrazas

Decision Date14 August 1997
Docket NumberNo. CR-96-0467-PR,CR-96-0467-PR
Citation944 P.2d 1194,189 Ariz. 580
Parties, 250 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 3 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Mario Amado TERRAZAS, Appellant.
CourtArizona Supreme Court
OPINION

MOELLER, Justice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 20, 1994, Timothy Sterns' truck was stolen from his place of employment. Six days later, a police detective told defendant, Mario Amado Terrazas, that he thought there were stolen vehicles on defendant's property. When defendant gave the detective permission to look around, the detective found the frame and glove box of Sterns' truck, both of which contained the truck's vehicle identification number. On a later date, Sterns identified more parts of his truck among items that had been found on defendant's property. When the detective asked defendant about the pieces to Sterns' truck, defendant claimed that he had been gone for four days and, while he was away, the vehicle parts had been left on his property by an unknown individual.

Defendant waived his right to a jury trial. The state sought to introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, and defendant sought to exclude such evidence. The trial court stated that it would receive the evidence subject to a later ruling on admissibility.

The state proceeded to offer evidence of three earlier incidents which it alleged showed defendant had committed earlier criminal acts with which he had never been charged. The first involved a 1985 Chevrolet Blazer S-10 owned by Tommy Medina that was stolen in March 1993. At that time, a friend of Medina's saw someone driving Medina's truck onto defendant's property. The next day, Medina and the friend went with police onto defendant's property and located parts belonging to Medina's vehicle.

The second item involved Jennifer Vasquez' 1991 Chevrolet S-10 truck that had been stolen in 1992, two years before the truck involved in this case was stolen. When the Vasquez truck was stolen, there were several items in it, including a maroon backpack containing library books. While searching defendant's property in connection with the present case, a detective found a maroon backpack and three library books. He seized the books but not the backpack. The books proved to be the library books that had been in Vasquez' truck when it was stolen. No other connection between Vasquez' truck and defendant was shown.

The third item of alleged bad act evidence involved Richard Estrada's stolen truck. A police detective showed Estrada pictures of items found on defendant's property to determine whether they were parts of Estrada's truck. Estrada, however, could not make any positive identification.

At the end of the trial, the court relied on the other act evidence regarding Medina's Blazer and the books from Vasquez' truck, but disregarded evidence regarding Estrada's truck because of the lack of evidence connecting it to defendant.

The trial court found defendant guilty of class four felony theft, suspended his sentence, and placed defendant on probation. The court of appeals affirmed. We granted review and have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Constitution article VI, section 5(3) and Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 31.19.

ISSUE

In Arizona, what level of proof is required to show prior bad acts in a criminal case, assuming such evidence is otherwise admissible?

DISCUSSION

We granted review in this case to consider the level of proof trial judges should apply in determining whether to admit evidence of prior bad acts in a criminal case. We emphasize that this is a criminal case and is not intended to apply to civil cases, which present different considerations. This opinion assumes that all of the prerequisites for admission of the prior bad acts have been met and the only question remaining is with regard to the proper level of proof required for admission of those acts. At the trial court level, the defense argued for an admissibility standard similar to the standard set forth in State v. Hughes, 102 Ariz. 118, 426 P.2d 386 (1967). The defense stated that "there needs to be enough evidence of the prior bad act or wrong to survive a directed verdict." The trial judge, on the other hand, applied a standard closer to the preponderance standard enunciated in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). The trial judge stated that the only amount of evidence necessary was "enough to link the defendant to what's going on." He did not require "substantial evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt," or enough evidence to "get past a directed verdict."

On appeal, the court of appeals noted that although this court had never affirmatively adopted the Huddleston preponderance standard we had referred to theHuddleston case in some of our opinions. State v. Terrazas, 187 Ariz. 387, 390, 930 P.2d 464, 467 (App.1996). The court of appeals then appliedHuddleston, holding that evidence of prior acts may be admitted "if the profferer produces sufficient proof to permit a fact-finder to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prior act occurred and that the party against whom the evidence is offered committed the act." Id. Upon consideration, we do not agree with the preponderance standard set forth inHuddleston, but hold that the standard to be applied to prior bad acts evidence is that set forth in Hughes, requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence.

Evidence of prior bad acts committed by a defendant is usually inadmissible at trial. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b); see Hughes, 102 Ariz. at 122, 426 P.2d at 390; State v. Garcia, 96 Ariz. 203, 205, 393 P.2d 668, 670 (1964). However, evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible to establish "motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, identity and common scheme or plan." Hughes, 102 Ariz. at 122, 426 P.2d at 390; Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). 1 The issue presented in this case is by what standard these prior bad acts must be proved to be admissible against the defendant in a criminal case.

The first case to set forth the standard in Arizona was State v. Hughes. 102 Ariz. at 122-23, 426 P.2d at 390-91. In Hughes, this court noted that the overwhelming majority of other states required the proof to be "clear," or "clear and convincing," or that there must be "substantial proof" that the other crime was committed by the defendant. Id. The court stated that, whether the standard is given by any of these phrases, "the test appears to be that the proof both as to the commission of another crime and its commission by the defendant, must be by 'substantial evidence sufficient to take the case to a jury.' " Id. at 123, 426 P.2d at 391 (quoting State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200, 136 S.W. 316, 331 (1911)). This court has subsequently cited and followed Hughes. See, e.g., State v. Valles, 162 Ariz. 1, 5, 780 P.2d 1049, 1053 (1989); State v. McGann, 132 Ariz. 296, 298, 645 P.2d 811, 813 (1982).

In 1977, Arizona adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. Even so, "we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court's non-constitutional construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence when we construe the Arizona Rules of Evidence." State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 580, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (1993). The United States Supreme Court interpreted the standard of proof required to allow evidence of prior bad acts under Federal Rules of Evidence 104(b) 2 in Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689-91, 108 S.Ct. at 1501-02. The standard adopted by the Supreme Court differs from the standard set forth in Hughes. Huddleston only requires a jury to be able to find the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Hughes requires the judge to find the conditional fact by "substantial evidence sufficient to take the case to a jury." 102 Ariz. at 123, 426 P.2d at 391 (quoting Hyde, 136 S.W. at 331). Because both Huddleston and Hughes have been cited by this court, a question has arisen as to which standard should now be used in Arizona. We clarify that we did not adopt the preponderance standard set forth in Huddleston. Rather, we adhere to Hughes and clarify that, for prior bad acts to be admissible in a criminal case, the profferer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prior bad acts were committed and that the defendant committed the acts.

Although we have cited to Huddleston, we have not previously adopted the preponderance standard of Huddleston. When we last identified the issue, we declined to decide it. See State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 51-52, 859 P.2d 156, 161-62 (1993). In a few cases where we cited toHuddleston, we cited it merely to highlight the four factors thatHuddleston identifies as safety precautions embedded within the Federal Rules of Evidence. See State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 60, 906 P.2d 579, 593 (1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2558, 135 L.Ed.2d 1076 (1996); State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 638, 832 P.2d 593, 655 (1992). The protective provisions found in the rules of evidence are:

(1) rule 404(b)'s requirement that the evidence be admitted for a proper purpose; (2) the relevancy requirement of rule 402; (3) the trial court's assessment that the probative value of the similar acts evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, see rule 403; and (4) rule 105's provision for an appropriate limiting instruction, if the party requests one.

Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 638, 832 P.2d at 655. We continue to agree with these four protective provisions. They are, in essence, merely a restatement of part of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See State v. Roscoe, 184 Ariz. 484, 493, 910 P.2d 635, 644 (stating that the four factors are ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
140 cases
  • State Of Ariz. v. Garcia, CR-07-0438-AP.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arizona
    • March 18, 2010
    ...convincing evidence that the prior ... act[ ] [was] committed and that the defendant committed the act [ ].” State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 582, 944 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1997). The trial court must also find that the prior act evidence is relevant and that its probative value is not substant......
  • State v. Allen
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arizona
    • July 26, 2022
    ...that the defendant committed the act." State v. Anthony, 218 Ariz. 439, 444 ¶ 33, 189 P.3d 366, 371 (2008) (quoting State v. Terrazas , 189 Ariz. 580, 582, 944 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1997) ). Here, the trial court deemed Kassandrea's testimony credible and noted that Sammantha herself acknowledge......
  • Rugemer v. Rhea
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Oregon
    • April 15, 1998
    ...decision, which has met with widespread rejection and criticism. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence at 141; see also State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 944 P.2d 1194 (1997) (declining to apply the Huddleston standard to Arizona Rules of Evidence); Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154, 160 (Tex.Cr.App.......
  • State v. Norlin, 63691-5
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • April 22, 1998
    ...107 Wash.2d 97, 727 P.2d 239 (1986); see also United States v. Houser, 929 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir.1990); State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 944 P.2d 1194, 1197-98 (1997) (citing cases from 20 jurisdictions which hold that the defendant must be connected to the prior acts by at least a prep......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • § 11.05 ACCUSED'S PARTICIPATION IN OTHER ACT: FRE 104(B)
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (CAP) Title Chapter 11 Other-acts Evidence: Fre 404(B)
    • Invalid date
    ...testimony based on a lack of corroboration and questions about credibility, the Court usurped the jury's role.").[58] State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Ariz. 1997). Accord Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) ("clear and convincing evidence"); Bigpond v. State, 270 P.3d 1244, 1250 (Nev. 2012) ("the ......
  • § 11.05 Accused's Participation in Other Act: FRE 104(b)
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (2018) Title Chapter 11 Other-Acts Evidence: FRE 404(b)
    • Invalid date
    ...testimony based on a lack of corroboration and questions about credibility, the Court usurped the jury's role.").[58] State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1198 (Ariz. 1997). Accord Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) ("clear and convincing evidence"); Bigpond v. State, 270 P.3d 1244, 1250 (Nev. 2012) ("the ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT