State v. Teter

• Docket Number: SC 99464
• Decision Date: 02 May 2023
• Citation: State v. Teter, 665 S.W.3d 306 (Mo. 2023)
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Randy G. TETER, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

665 S.W.3d 306

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.Randy G. TETER, Appellant.

No. SC 99464

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc.

Opinion issued May 2, 2023

Teter was represented by James Egan of the public defender's office in Columbia, (573) 777-9977.

The state was represented by Daniel N. McPherson of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.

Zel M. Fischer, Judge

Randy Teter appeals the circuit court's judgment convicting him of one count of kidnapping in the first degree, and one count of committing violence against an employee of the Department of Corrections.Teter raises two points on appeal: (1)the circuit court erred in failing to conduct a sufficient Faretta¹ hearing to ensure his waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and (2)the circuit court erred in ordering his sentence to run consecutively to his prior sentence in violation of a plea agreement previously entered into with the State.Finding no plain error, this Court affirms the circuit court's judgment of conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2019, Teter pleaded guilty to offenses unrelated to this case.In the plea agreement, the State agreed, if it obtained probable cause of a crime arising from the incidents in this case, "the State will agree that for any sentences arising from that prosecutionthe State shall recommend: (a) a concurrent sentence with all other terms and sentences of incarceration[.]"

Teter was an inmate at the Jefferson City Correctional Center("JCCC").In July 2018, Teter attacked a JCCC employee, holding her briefly as a hostage.The State charged Teter with one count of kidnapping and one count of committing violence against an employee of the Department of Corrections.The public defender's office initially represented Teter, but Teter filed a motion requesting to represent himself at trial, citing his constitutional right to do so.In his motion, Teter referenced a previous criminal case for prior, unrelated offenses in which he represented himself, stating:

In State v. Teter, 14AC-CR02666 Teter was charged with Murder in the first degree with the State seeking the death penalty.After two Feretta [sic] hearings, the Court granted Teter his motion to represent himself.The above entitled case is nowhere near as complex as the death penalty case mentioned ... above.Teter has multiple in court appearances without any issues from him.

At the Faretta hearing in this case, the circuit court asked Teter if he wished to represent himself and waive his right to counsel.Importantly, Teter was still represented by a public defender at this hearing, and his counsel even interjected during the hearing to clarify the range of punishment for one of the charges.Teter affirmed he wished to represent himself.He signed a written waiver of counsel form mandated by § 600.051.²Teter, with defense counsel present, the State, and the circuit court had the following exchange:

The Court: Mr. Teter, is that your understanding as well, that you still want to represent yourself?

Teter: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: All right.It's my understanding that you've had several times where you've gotten this far with the Court in Cole County and they were gonna -- they had hearings on it.Do you have me having -- Do you have any objection to me taking notice of those other hearings where they went through all those rights with you?

Teter: No, Your Honor.

The Court: All right.I won't be having stand-by counsel for you; do you understand that?

Teter: That is fine, Your Honor.

The Court: Okay.And additionally with your history and what you're in custody for, you will have very limited rights of moving around the courtroom; do you understand that?

Teter: Yes, Your Honor, I understand that.

The Court: All right.I'm gonna go ahead and read these rights to you, and then we'll fax them over there.And if that's what you want to do, you might have to sign it later, but -- All right.

I request that the Court allow my waiver of attorney with full understanding that I'm entitled to an attorney if I so desire and with full knowledge and understanding of the following additional considerations.The offenses charged are escape from confinement --

The State: There's two other charges.

The Court then went through the range of punishment for each offense and covered Teter's constitutional rights and the rights he was relinquishing.

The Court: That you have the right to be represented by an attorney.And if indigent and unable to employ an attorney, I have a right to request the judge to appoint an attorney to assist me in defending against the charge.And the Court will appoint an attorney to assist me if it finds that I'm indigent and not able to employ one.That you have the right to a trial by jury with assistance of an attorney to confront and cross-examine witnesses.And a guilty plea waives any right to a trial.That I have the right to remain silent and not make any statement which may be used in the prosecution of the criminal charges filed against me.I am aware that any recommendation by the prosecutor is not binding on the judge who may accept or reject such recommendation.That if a guilty plea is entered, if I'm found guilty by trial of the charge, the judge is most likely to impose a sentence of confinement in jail or prison.That I've had the right to appeal the Court's decision or the jury's verdict should I exercise my right to trial by jury and be found guilty.The above rights have been read to me by the judge in open court.I understand these rights and request the Court to accept my waiver.Is that what you want to do today, sir?

Teter: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: All right.And, Mr. Teter, it's my understanding that you're familiar with the court system and that you don't have any mental prohibitions against you representing yourself.

Teter: That's correct, Your Honor.

The Court: All right.All right.I'll discharge the public defender.

A Cole County jury found Teter guilty of both charged offenses.Teter did not file a motion for new trial.Because Teter was a prior offender, the circuit court proceeded to sentencing.At the sentencing hearing, Teter referenced the plea agreement in his prior case, stating: "Your Honor, the only thing I have to say on the record is what the plea agreement was which is page 4, line 1 through 6.You have a copy."The State deferred to the prior plea agreement, refraining from making a recommendation on either the length of Teter's sentence or whether the sentence in the present case should run consecutively to or concurrently with his prior sentence.The sentencing court sentenced Teter to 30 years’ imprisonment on Count I and 10 years on Count II to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the other sentences he was serving.

Teter, with the assistance of counsel, appealed.After opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer and has jurisdiction.Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.The judgment is affirmed.

Discussion

I.The circuit court did not plainly err in finding Teter's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary

Teter first argues the circuit court erred in allowing him to proceed to trial without counsel without first conducting a sufficient Faretta hearing on the record to ensure his waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Standard of Review

To preserve a constitutional claim of error, the "claim must be raised at the first opportunity with citation [ ] to specific constitutional sections."State v. Tisius , 362 S.W.3d 398, 405(Mo. banc 2012).Further, "to preserve claims of error for appellate review in cases tried by a jury, claims of error must be raised in post-trial motions."Hootselle v. Mo. Dep't of Corr. , 624 S.W.3d 123, 131(Mo. banc 2021)."A defendant who proceeds pro se is bound by the same rules as a party represented by counsel."Franklin v. State , 24 S.W.3d 686, 692(Mo. banc 2000);see alsoState v. Wise , 879 S.W.2d 494, 514(Mo. banc 1994), overruled on other grounds byJoy v. Morrison,254 S.W.3d 885, 888 n.7(Mo. banc 2008)."Our courts cannot hold pro se defendants to a different standard than those represented by counsel."Franklin , 24 S.W.3d at 692.Typically, unpreserved claims may be reviewed only for plain error.State v. Miller , 372 S.W.3d 455, 473(Mo. banc 2012).

"The threshold issue in plain error review is whether the circuit court's error was facially evident, obvious, and clear.If the appellant establishes a facially evident, obvious, and clear error, then this Court will consider whether the error resulted in a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice.To obtain a new trial on direct appeal based on a claim of plain error, the appellant must show the error was outcome determinative."State v. Wood , 580 S.W.3d 566, 579(Mo. banc 2019)(internal citations and quotations omitted).

In this case, neither Teter nor his attorney objected to the procedure utilized by the circuit court when it conducted the Faretta hearing and ruled on his motion to represent himself.Therefore, this claim is not preserved.Teter argues this Court should, nonetheless, review his claim de novo because he was acting pro se.In this case, Teter was not acting pro se during the Faretta hearing, and his counsel did not object—nor even suggest the hearing was insufficient to ensure the waiver of counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.Not only did Teter's counsel still have the responsibility to represent him until discharged, but Teter's counsel embodied this responsibility by interjecting on Teter's behalf.The cases the concurring opinion relies upon to suggest that this case should be reviewed de novo rather than under plain error review are distinguished because those cases involve situations in which there was no written waiver of counsel or waiver of the right to counsel on the record.³This Court, therefore, applies the plain error standard of review to Teter's first claim.⁴

Analysis

The Sixth Amendment affords...