State v. Thaden

• Decision Date: 09 May 1890
• Citation: 45 N.W. 447,43 Minn. 253
• Parties: STATE v THADEN.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

43 Minn. 253

45 N.W. 447

STATEvTHADEN.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 9, 1890.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. To entitle a person called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the court must see, from all the circumstances of the case, and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called on to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend that the evidence may tend to criminate him if he is compelled to answer. The danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable with reference to the ordinary operation of law, in the ordinary course of things, and not imaginary or unsubstantial, or a mere remote and naked possibility.

2. Where two or more persons conspire together to commit any offense or actionable wrong, everything said, done, or written by any one of them, in the execution or furtherance of their common purpose, is to be deemed as so said, done, or written by every one.

3. Where the common purpose of the conspirators embraced, not merely the putting off as true of forged promissory notes, but also the disposition of the fruits of the fraud and the division of the proceeds among themselves, statements by one of them, made after the forged paper was issued, but before the disposition or division of the property obtained for it, with reference to future contemplated acts, for the purpose of concealing the fraud so as to enable the conspirators to consummate the common purpose by disposing of the fruits of the crime and dividing the proceeds, are admissible against the other conspirators, although the statements also referred to a past act committed in execution of the conspiracy.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; BRILL, Judge.

Johns, Michael & Johns, for appellant.

M. E. Clapp, Atty. Gen., and M. D. Munn, Asst. Co. Atty., for the State.

MITCHELL, J.

The defendant was jointly indicted with two others (Partello and Tall) for forgery in the second degree, by putting off as true upon one Christianson a false and forged promissory note purporting to have been executed by one Linstad. He demanded and was granted a separate trial, and the state called, as a witness in its behalf, Linstad, the person whose name was alleged to have been forged. The first error assigned is the ruling of the trial court in compelling this witness to answer certain questions, he having previously declined to do so, claiming that the same might tend to criminate himself. While no principle of the common law is more firmly established that that which affords a witness the privilege of refusing to answer any question which will criminate himself, yet its application is attended with practical difficulties. To hold that the witness himself is the sole and absolute judge whether the answer will criminate him would be to place it in his power to withhold evidence whenever he saw fit. Such a rule could not be tolerated for a moment. On the other hand, to require him to state what answer he would have to give, or to explain fully how his answer would tend to criminate, would deprive him of the very protection which the law designs to afford. Moreover, the reason of the rule forbids that it should be limited to confessions of guilt, or statements which may be proved in subsequent prosecutions as admissions of facts sought to be established therein; but it should be extended to the disclosure of any fact which might constitute an essential link in a chain of evidence by which guilt might be established, although the fact alone would not indicate any crime. Hence the problem is how to administer the rule so as to afford full protection to the witness, and at the same time prevent simulated excuses. All the authorities agree to the general proposition that the statement of the witness that the answer will tend to criminate himself is not necessarily conclusive, but that this is a question which the court will determine from all the circumstances of the particular case, and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called upon to give. But the question on which the cases seem to differ is as to what we may call the “burden of proof;” some holding that the statement of the witness must be accepted as true, unless it affirmatively appears from the circumstances of the particular case that he is mistaken, or acts in bad faith, while other cases hold that, to entitle a witness to the privilege of silence, the court must be able to see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence called for, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness, if he is compelled to answer. The following are a few of the leading cases treating of this subject: 1 Burr's Trial, 255; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 254;Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 123;Kirschner v. State, 9 Wis. 140;Chamberlain v. Willson, 12 Vt. 491;Janvrin v. Scammon, 29 N. H. 280; Fries v. Brugler, 21 Amer. Dec. 52; Temple v. Com., 75 Va. 892;La Fontaine v. Underwriters, 83 N. C. 132; Rev. v. Boyes, 1 Best & S. 311. The difference is theoretical, rather than practical; for it would be difficult to conceive of an instance where the circumstances of the case, and the nature of the evidence called for, would be entirely neutral in their probative force upon the question whether or not there was reasonable ground to apprehend that the answer might tend to criminate the witness. After consideration of the question, and an examination of the authorities, our conclusion is that the best practical rule is that laid down in some of the English cases, and adopted and followed by Chief Justice COCKBURN, in Reg. v. Boyes, supra, “that, to entitle a party called as a witness to the...