State v. the Honorable Ralph Jaynes

• Decision Date: 04 December 2001
• Docket Number: SC23480
• Citation: 63 S.W.3d 210
• Parties: State ex rel. Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Relator v. The Honorable Ralph Jaynes, Circuit Judge, Randolph County, and, Norma Prange, Circuit Clerk, Randolph County, Respondents. SC83480 Supreme Court of Missouri
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

State ex rel. Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Relator

v.

The Honorable Ralph Jaynes, Circuit Judge, Randolph County, and, Norma Prange, Circuit Clerk, Randolph County, Respondents.

SC83480

Supreme Court of Missouri

12/04/2001

Appeal From: ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN CERTIORARI

Counsel for Appellant: Cassandra K. Dolgin

Counsel for Respondent: Rosemary E. Percival

Opinion Summary:

Roderick Warren was convicted in 1986 of arson, first-degree assault and armed criminal action and was sentenced to life in prison plus 30 years. His direct appeal was dismissed in 1987 for failure to prosecute and, after his court-appointed attorney failed to proceed properly regarding his motion for post-conviction relief, the relief he requested was denied. The court of appeals affirmed his convictions in 1999. Warren, who now is imprisoned at Moberly Correctional Center, subsequently petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that because his 1986 trial counsel had a conflict of interest and abandoned him, post-conviction relief essentially was unavailable to him. The court granted a habeas writ requiring the sentencing court to reopen the post-conviction case.

Court en banc holds: Warren is not eligible for habeas relief. He makes no allegation that he is being confined unlawfully. He fails to plead any facts showing he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to proceed properly with his post-conviction relief motion. He also fails to plead facts demonstrating that he actually is innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted and that manifest injustice resulted. If Warren can prove that his court-appointed attorney had a conflict of interest and thereby forfeited his rights, however, then Warren may wish to reopen his original post-conviction motion in the sentencing court, if his original motion was filed in a timely manner.

Limbaugh, C.J., White, Holstein, Benton and Price, JJ., and Montgomery, Sp.J., concur. Stith, J., not participating.

Michael A. Wolff, Judge

Introductory Summary

Roderick Warren was tried and convicted in Jackson County in 1986 of one count each of arson, first degree assault, and armed criminal action. He was sentenced to life in prison plus 30 years. His direct appeal was dismissed in 1987 for failure to prosecute. The Jackson County Circuit Court appointed trial counsel to represent Warren in a post-conviction proceeding in 1988. Counsel failed, however, to correct a faulty verification of the post-conviction motion, file an amended motion, or seek an evidentiary hearing. The motion court accordingly denied relief in 1988. No appeal was taken.¹

In 1998, Warren filed a motion to recall the 1987 mandate of the court of appeals. The court of appeals granted the motion, heard the appeal, and in 1999 affirmed Warren's convictions in an unpublished opinion noted as State v. Warren, 39 S.W.3d 112 (1999).

Warren, who is confined in the Moberly Correctional Center in Randolph County, petitioned the circuit court there for a writ of habeas corpus against the superintendent of the facility. His petition alleged that his 1986 trial counsel had a conflict of interest and abandoned him in the Rule 29.15 post-conviction proceeding. Warren sought, and the habeas court granted, a writ requiring the Jackson County Circuit Court to reopen the post-conviction case, Warren v. State. The court ordered the director of the Jackson County department of civil records to reopen and send to the sentencing court the post-conviction case "so that the sentencing court may appoint counsel who is free of conflict to represent Petitioner (Warren) in the 29.15 motion and allow Petitioner to file an amended motion for post-conviction relief."

Upon the State's request, this Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the granting of habeas corpus relief by the Randolph County Circuit Court. This Court's review on certiorari is limited to determining whether the writ should be quashed because the circuit court exceeded its authority. State ex rel. Manion v. Dawson, 225 S.W. 97 (Mo. banc 1920), and State ex rel. Stewart v. Blair, 208 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. banc 1948); see discussion of certiorari in habeas cases in State ex. rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, __ S.W.3d __ (No. SC83424, decided November 6, 2001).²

Habeas corpus relief is recognized and available under the Missouri Constitution, article I, section 12, and provided for in sections 532.000 et seq., RSMo, and Rule 91 to challenge the legality of a person's confinement. In the circumstances here, Warren has not pleaded facts sufficient to meet the standards for habeas corpus. Accordingly, and for reasons set forth more fully below, the record of the circuit court granting a writ of habeas corpus is quashed.Discussion

Based on the allegations of the habeas petition, Warren was not well served by counsel representing him in his original appeal in 1987 and his Rule 29.15 motion in 1988. The court of appeals, ten years after dismissal of his original appeal, corrected the procedural default in the direct appeal by recalling its mandate and considering Warren's direct appeal. On this direct appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the conviction without opinion. State v. Warren, supra.

The subject of this proceeding, however, is not the direct appeal, but the default by counsel and consequent denial of Warren's original motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15.

Habeas corpus is not a generic substitute for Rule 29.15. State ex rel. Nixon v. Clark, 926 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Mo. App. 1996). Habeas corpus exists solely to challenge the legality of confinement or custody, not to correct procedural defaults as to post-conviction remedies.

A person convicted after trial has certain important rights under Rule 29.15. This post-conviction remedy allows the convicted felon to claim that the conviction or sentence "violates the constitutional laws of this state or the Constitution of the United States, including claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel," and also encompasses claims that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence or that the sentence imposed was in excess of the maximum authorized by law. Rule 29.15(a). An indigent movant is entitled to appointed counsel. Rule 29.15(e).

Warren asserts that trial counsel appointed to represent Warren in the post-conviction proceeding in 1987 defaulted on his claim or abandoned him and that Warren's right to post-conviction remedy was thereby lost. See Luleff v. State, 807 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. banc 1991). But that does not mean that habeas corpus relief is available.³Review by Habeas Corpus

At common law a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction was immune from challenge by writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Dixon, 52 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Mo. banc 1932). See also, Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830). The writ at common law was directed to the custodian of the prisoner and required the custodian to show the basis for which the prisoner was being held. Ex parte Dixon, 52 S.W.2d at 181. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "[t]he writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause." Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. at 202. Collateral review by habeas corpus is extremely limited, especially where there was a previous opportunity to litigate. State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Mo. banc 1993).

The statutes and Rule 91 governing the writ of habeas corpus under Missouri law establish procedures similar to the traditional common law writ. For example, the writ merely allows a prisoner to inquire into the cause of his confinement. Rule 91.01. A petition for habeas corpus relief under Missouri law is said to be limited to determining the facial validity of confinement, which is based on the record of the proceeding that resulted in the confinement. State ex rel. Haley v. Groose, 873 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Mo. banc 1994), citing State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d at 445.

A writ of habeas corpus can be issued when a person is held in detention in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government. McIntosh v. Haynes, 545 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo. banc 1977). When such claims exist following a conviction, a defendant may pursue post-conviction relief under Rules 29.15 and 24.035. These post-conviction proceedings compel a defendant to raise claims that, before the enactment of these post-conviction rules, might have been raised in a petition for habeas corpus relief. See Wiglesworth v. Wyrick, 531 S.W.2d 713, 715-16 (Mo. 1976).

Post-conviction remedies are designed to provide a "single, unitary, post-conviction remedy, to be used in place of other remedies," including the writ of habeas corpus. Id.

If the defendant fails to raise such claims in post-conviction proceedings, the defendant waives them and cannot raise them in a subsequent petition for habeas corpus. Smith v. State, 887 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. banc 1994). A defendant who fails to raise such claims in post-conviction proceedings is said to have procedurally defaulted on those claims.

Thus, it is unusual for a court to consider a prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus for claims that should have been raised in post-conviction proceedings.

Habeas Relief and Post-Conviction Remedies

Since the inception of Missouri post-conviction proceedings, this Court has taken a narrow view of what a criminal defendant must show to obtain a writ of habeas corpus in order to overcome a previous procedural default. This Court has adhered to supporting post-conviction procedural deadlines, but in very limited circumstances has recognized that a defendant may be impeded from satisfying the deadlines through no fault of his own.

One narrow exception was recognized in State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc 1993), where habeas corpus was said to be...