State v. the Honorable Timothy J. Wilson, SC83617

• Decision Date: 08 January 2002
• Docket Number: SC83617
• Citation: State v. the Honorable Timothy J. Wilson, 63 S.W.3d 650 (Mo. 2002)
• Parties: State ex rel., Dean Williams, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Timothy J. Wilson, sitting in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis by Order of the Supreme Court, Respondent. SC83617 Supreme Court of Missouri 0
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

State ex rel., Dean Williams, Petitioner v The Honorable Timothy J. Wilson, sitting in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis by Order of the Supreme Court, Respondent

SC83617

Supreme Court of Missouri

01/08/2002

Appeal From: Original Proceeding in Prohibition

Counsel for Appellant: Michael S. Meyers

Counsel for Respondent: Wade Thomas

Opinion Summary:

In November 1999, Dean Williams was charged with one count of felony drug possession and one count of felony second-degree drug trafficking.The indictment also alleged that Williams, who at the time was serving a prison sentence under the long-term drug treatment program, was a persistent drug offender.After he pleaded guilty to both counts, Williams was convicted and sentenced in March 2001 to concurrent terms of ten years and seven years, respectively, and the court ordered him to serve his sentences in the long-term drug treatment program.The state moved to set aside the plea, arguing it only had waived his prior and persistent drug offender status under the belief that Williams would serve ten years in prison.It then sought to prove Williams was a prior and persistent drug offender, but the court did not permit it to do so.The court denied the state's motion to set aside the plea, but two days later, the court, on its own accord, set aside its judgment and sentence and ordered the case transferred back to the criminal court for further proceedings.Williams sought a writ prohibiting such a transfer.This Court issued its preliminary writ in prohibition on May 30, 2001.

Court en banc holds: Once judgment and sentencing occur in a criminal proceeding, the trial court has exhausted its jurisdiction and can take no further action unless expressly authorized by statute or rule.Despite the state's wishes regarding sentencing, the court below made clear it had made no promises and was not bound by the state's recommendations.The court did not violate Rule 24.02 because it has the discretion to enter a sentence that is harsher or more lenient than what the defendant or the state may want.We cannot find any authority for interpreting Rule 29.07(d) to allow the court or the state to set aside a final judgment and sentence, based on an informed and voluntary guilty plea, that was within the court's jurisdiction to enter.

All concur.

William Ray Price, Jr., Judge

Williams pled guilty to felony counts of drug possession and trafficking in the second degree.On March 6, 2001, the circuit court for the city of St. Louis entered a judgment and sentence against Williams on both counts.After the sentence was announced, the state sought to set aside Williams guilty plea because the sentence of the court was not what the state had recommended.The court refused to set aside the sentence at that time, but then issued an order two days later setting aside the judgment and sentence and reassigning Williams' case for trial.

Williams seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent his case from going to trial, arguing that the trial court lost jurisdiction over his case after it entered the judgment and sentence of March 6, 2001.This Court granted a preliminary writ in prohibition on May 30, 2001.We now make that writ absolute.I. Facts

On November 18, 1999, Williams was charged in the circuit court of the City of St. Louis with one count each of the felony offenses of trafficking in the second degree and possession of a controlled substance.The indictment also alleged that Williams was a persistent drug offender.

At the time of indictment, Williams was already serving a prison sentence under the long-term drug treatment program authorized by section 217.362, RSMo 2000.The sentence Williams was serving prior to the indictment in this case was the result of a probation revocation that was based, at least in part, on the charges that were the subject of this case.

The case was assigned for trial on March 5, 2001.On that day, Williams' attorney and the prosecutor met in the judge's chambers to discuss the case.During the meeting, the judge was informed that Williams was currently participating in long-term drug treatment and that a plea had been worked out between Williams and the state.

On March 6, 2001, Williams pleaded guilty to each count of the indictment.The state recommended to the court that in exchange for Defendant's plea of guilty, it had agreed to waive proving Williams as a prior and persistent drug offender and asked that Williams be sentenced to ten years on Count I and seven years on Count II to be served concurrently.The state also asked that the court not sentence Williams under either section 217.362, RSMo 2000, or section 559.155, RSMo 2000.As part of the deal, Williams did not ask the court for probation.

Prior to accepting Williams' plea, the court discussed the plea agreement with him as follows:

Court: Now you understand, sir, I've made you no promises concerning what sentences I'll impose or probation?

Williams: Yes, ma'am.

Court: And do you also understand I have not given anyone permission to make any promises to you on my behalf?

Williams: Yes, ma'am.

Court: And do you also understand the State's recommendations are merely that?They're recommendations and they're not binding on this [c]ourt?

Williams: Yes, ma'am.

The court accepted the pleas, then inquired if Williams or the state had any objection to a sentence being imposed.Neither did.The court imposed sentences of ten years and seven years to run concurrently on the two counts, but also ordered that the sentences be served "pursuant to the provisions of long-term drug treatment and...concurrently with sentences previously imposed...."

The state immediately moved to set aside Williams' plea on the grounds that it made a material reliance that Williams would be sentenced to ten years straight time in exchange for waiving prior and persistent drug offender status.The court noted that it had the discretion to sentence Williams and that the state's recommendation could not take that away.The state then sought to prove Williams' prior offender status, but was not permitted to do so by the court.After lengthy discussion, the court stated, "I am not setting the plea aside.This matter is over."

On March 8, 2001, the court...