State v. The Indiana & Illinois Southern Railroad Company
| Decision Date | 13 December 1892 |
| Docket Number | 15,226 |
| Citation | 32 N.E. 817,133 Ind. 69 |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | The State v. The Indiana & Illinois Southern Railroad Company |
From the Greene Circuit Court.
Judgment reversed with costs, with instructions to overrule the demurrer to the complaint.
J. T Dye, S. Stansifer, J. T. Hays and H. J. Hays, for appellee.
W. C Hultz and O. B. Harris, for appellant.
This suit was brought by the prosecuting attorney of Greene county, Indiana, to recover penalties under an act of the legislature requiring persons and corporations operating railroads to place blackboards in conspicuous places at their stations, and write upon them the fact as to whether or not the trains stopping at such stations are on time, and if late, how much.
The complaint consists of numerous paragraphs. A demurrer was addressed to the complaint for want of facts, and sustained exceptions were reserved, and this appeal was prosecuted, and such ruling assigned as error. The error assigned presents the question as to the validity of the statute upon which such action is based. Section 1 of the statute, approved March 9, 1889, reads as follows: "That every corporation, company or person operating a railroad within this State shall, immediately after taking effect of this act, cause to be placed in a conspicuous place in each passenger depot of such company erected at any station in this State, at which there is a telegraph office, a blackboard at least three feet long and two feet wide, upon which such company or person shall cause to be written, at least twenty minutes before the schedule time for the arrival of each passenger train stopping upon such route at such station, the fact whether such train is on schedule time or not, and if late, how much." Section 2 provides "That for such violation of the provision of this act, in failing to report or in making a false report, such corporation, company or person so neglecting or refusing to comply with the provisions of this act shall forfeit and pay the sum of twenty-five dollars, to be recovered in a civil action to be prosecuted by the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the neglect or refusal occurs, in the name of the State of Indiana, one-half of which shall go to said prosecuting attorney and the remainder shall be paid over to the county in which such proceedings are had, and shall be a part of the common school fund."
Numerous objections are urged to the validity of this statute.
Some criticism is made in regard to the wording of the statute, in that it is indefinite and inoperative, for the reason that it provides that a "corporation, company or person" operating a railroad shall place in the passenger depot of such "company" a blackboard upon which such "company or person" shall cause to be written, etc. It is contended that as it is a penal statute it must receive a strict construction, and that nothing can be supplied as intended by the Legislature to determine its meaning, and, therefore, the statute does not apply to corporations for the reason that the word corporation is omitted, the statute providing that blackboards shall be placed in the company's office, and that the company or person shall cause to be written upon the board. The further objection is made that the statute provides that the blackboard shall be placed in each passenger depot located at any station at which there is a telegraph office, and that a passenger depot is commonly understood to be a house for the accommodation of passengers, while a station is a place such as a city, town and intermediate way stations where trains stop, so that if there is a telegraph office in the city or town where the railroad company has a passenger depot, no difference to whom the telegraph line belongs, or by whom operated, or whether it has any connection with the operation of the railroad or not, yet at each passenger depot within such city or town there must be placed a blackboard, upon which shall be written the fact whether the trains are on time, and if late, how much. It is true that penal statutes, as a rule, are to receive a strict construction, but this rule is not violated by adopting the sense of the words which best harmonize with the object and intent of the Legislature, and the whole context of the statute must be construed together. Courts are to take a common-sense view of the statute as a whole, and if by so doing and giving to the words used a reasonable construction, the object of the Legislature can be definitely ascertained and carried out, the statute must be upheld, if not it must fall. See State v. Hirsch, 125 Ind. 207, 24 N.E. 1062.
The draftsman was careless in the use of language in constructing this statute. It might have been framed so as to have avoided the criticism urged, but we think the intent and object of the Legislature is clear and certain, notwithstanding it is awkwardly expressed.
It is manifest and certain that it was intended to require all persons, whether natural or artificial, who were engaged in operating a railroad in this State to put up in a conspicuous place at each passenger depot provided for the use of passengers traveling upon such railroad, in connection with which depot there was a telegraph office, a blackboard, and to enter upon such blackboard at least twenty minutes before the schedule time for the arrival of each train the fact whether such train is on time or not, and if late, how much. By "passenger depot" was not meant merely the station-house built for the accommodation of passengers, but the grounds prepared and used as depot grounds for the benefit of persons traveling upon the particular railroad, and used by the company, at such point, in operating it as a common carrier of passengers.
It is evident that it was intended that a board should be put up at every station where the train was stopped, if there was a telegraph office at such point, at which office was received information as to the time of the arrival of trains at such stopping place, and it is equally certain that it was not intended to require such notices written if there was not a telegraph office at such place, which received information as to the time of the arrival of trains. It is not essential that such telegraph office should be in the house built for passengers, but if there is an office at such stopping place operated in connection with the railroad, receiving and giving information as to the time of arrival and departure of trains on such road, there would be a liability for failure to write the notice required by the statute. The word station, as used in the statute, is synonymous with the word passenger-depot, meaning the place--the grounds and the buildings--prepared for and used by the traveling public at such point in waiting for, taking and leaving the trains, and by the company in operating the road at that point. As to just what constitutes a passenger depot or a station at a particular place is a question of fact.
It is next contended that section 2 only provides a penalty for failing to report, or in making a false report as to whether a train is on time, or if late, how much, and that no penalty can be incurred until a blackboard is put up on which to note the fact as to whether the trains are on time or late, and if late, how much. We can not concur in this interpretation of the statute. The plain and evident intention of the statute is that the object sought is to require the noting of the fact as to whether trains are on time or not, and if late, how much, and the putting up of blackboards is a mere incident. Section 2178, R. S. 1881, provides a penalty for failing to sound the engine whistle upon approaching a road crossing, at a distance of not more than one hundred nor less than eighty rods from such crossing; and section 4020 makes it the duty of railroad companies to have attached to such engine a whistle and bell. We do not think that the penalty in section 2178 could be avoided by a failure to comply with section 4020 in providing a whistle and bell for each engine, and yet, if the contention of counsel for the appellees be correct, railroad companies might, with impunity, run engines without any whistle or bell attached, and the persons in charge of the engines would not be liable to the penalty prescribed for failure to sound them.
Section 4020, as originally passed, Acts of 1879, p. 173, made it the duty of railroad companies to have attached to each and every locomotive engine a whistle, and made it the duty of the engineer, or other person in charge of an engine, on approaching a road crossing, to sound the whistle at a distance of not more than one hundred nor less than eighty rods, and to continue to sound it until the engine passed the crossing. Section 2 of the act provided a penalty of not less than $ 10 nor more than $ 50 for a violation of the provisions of section 1, and this act was held to be constitutional in the case of Pittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co. v. Brown, 67 Ind. 45.
Indeed to hold the law under consideration void, on the grounds contended for by counsel, would be to hold that a party can avoid the penalty prescribed by the statute by a failure or refusal to comply with a duty imposed upon him by the same statute. In other words, the law makes it the duty of persons operating a railroad to put up blackboards at such stations where there is a telegraph office, and to write on the same the fact as to whether or not each train is on time, and if late, how much, and prescribes a penalty for failure to note on the board the fact as to whether or not each train is on time, etc. The contention is that the penalty can be avoided by a refusal or neglect to perform the duty of putting up the blackboard, for the...
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