State v. Thelusma
Decision Date | 20 March 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 2013–828,2013–828 |
Citation | 167 N.H. 481,113 A.3d 1165 |
Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Makenzy THELUSMA |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Joseph A. Foster, attorney general (Stephen D. Fuller, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the defendant.
Following a jury trial in Superior Court (Bornstein, J.), the defendant, Makenzy Thelusma, was convicted of possession of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. See RSA 318–B:2, I (Supp. 2014). The defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) an inculpatory statement he made to the police should have been suppressed; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his heroin and cocaine convictions. We affirm.
The following facts are derived from the record. On August 9, 2012, Sergeant Roy, a Berlin police officer, observed the defendant driving the wrong way on a one-way street. Roy stopped the car and the defendant produced a New York state identification card, but not a driver's license. While Roy was in his cruiser unsuccessfully seeking to determine whether the defendant had a valid driver's license, Officer White arrived to assist. White obtained the defendant's consent to search the vehicle. At that point, two individuals, Nika Wedge and "Chance," approached the scene on foot. The individuals spoke to the defendant and approached his car. Roy told them to "back off." The defendant got out of his car and walked over to the two, saying that he was going to give Wedge his wallet. Roy saw that the defendant had more than a wallet in his hand, but could not say what else the defendant had. Roy told the defendant to stop, but the defendant and Wedge "made an exchange." Roy then observed that Wedge had a wallet and a "wad" of cash in her hand and that she appeared to be tucking something into her bra. Roy then took custody of Wedge, and pinned her against the defendant's car near the open driver's side window. At this time, White took custody of the defendant. While Roy and White were making these arrests, Chance approached and began yelling and threatening them. Roy used one hand to point his taser at Chance, holding Wedge by her left arm, leaving her right arm free. White performed a quick search of the defendant and put him in his cruiser, and then unsuccessfully attempted to apprehend Chance.
Officer Santos from the Gorham Police Department then arrived to assist Roy and White. Before transporting the defendant to the Berlin police station, Santos searched him and found marijuana. Before transporting Wedge to the station, Roy searched the area where he had held her against the car to see if she had dropped anything. He found nothing. At the station, a female dispatcher watched Wedge undress and also found nothing. After the defendant and Wedge were brought to the station, White performed an inventory search of the car. On the passenger's seat he discovered a small cloth bag that contained heroin and crack cocaine. The bag had not been there earlier when White had commenced his search of the car before the arrival of Chance and Wedge. Roy could not say whether the bag was one of the items that the defendant handed to Wedge.
At the police station, Roy asked the defendant to review a Miranda rights form. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The defendant read the form and initialed it, indicating that he understood his rights, but did not sign the waiver portion of the form. Hours later, Detective Goulet came to the defendant's holding cell to serve written notice that the police intended to seek forfeiture of the money found on him. Goulet explained that the defendant could forfeit the money voluntarily or contest the forfeiture. Goulet advised that the State seeks forfeiture when money is involved with drugs and that the defendant "had a good chunk of drugs" on him when he was arrested. The defendant said that he had no drugs on him other than marijuana, to which Goulet replied that they had other statements in reference to the drugs. Goulet continued explaining voluntary forfeiture and showed the defendant a form on which he could indicate whether he intended to contest it. Goulet asked the defendant if he understood the form and the defendant asked Goulet if the police were going to take his money. Goulet replied that the police were going to seek forfeiture whether the defendant contested it or not. The defendant then asked Goulet what the police were going to do with him. Goulet responded that the defendant would have a bail hearing. The defendant asked what would happen at the bail hearing, and Goulet explained the process and possible outcomes, including personal recognizance bail. The defendant told Goulet that he had been stopped only because he was not familiar with Berlin and went the wrong way on the street. He further said that the police thought he had given Wedge drugs, but he had only given her a "duffle bag" that he found behind a local restaurant. The defendant stated that he had put the bag in his pocket, and later gave it to Wedge.
The defendant was charged with two felony counts of possession of a controlled drug—heroin and crack cocaine—and one misdemeanor count of possession of marijuana. The defendant moved to suppress statements he made to Roy and Goulet, claiming that they were obtained in violation of Miranda. The trial court granted the motion in part, but allowed the State to admit the defendant's statement to Goulet that he found the bag behind the restaurant and later gave it to Wedge. The trial court ruled that, although the defendant had not waived his Miranda rights, the statement was volunteered and not the product of interrogation. After the State presented its evidence at trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the heroin and cocaine indictments on the grounds that the State had presented insufficient evidence to convict. The court denied the motion, and the jury convicted the defendant. This appeal followed.
The defendant first argues that his statement regarding the bag was the product of interrogation and, therefore, obtained in violation of Miranda. See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Whether a defendant is subject to interrogation is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Spencer, 149 N.H. 622, 625, 826 A.2d 546 (2003). Thus, we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, but we review the ultimate determination of interrogation de novo. Id. As the defendant bases his claim upon both the State and Federal Constitutions, we first address it under the State Constitution and rely upon federal law only to aid in our analysis. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231–33, 471 A.2d 347 (1983).
Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution afford individuals a privilege against self-incrimination. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15 ; U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. To protect this privilege, statements obtained through custodial interrogation cannot be used unless the procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are followed. See State v. McKenna, 166 N.H. 671, 676, 103 A.3d 756 (2014). Here, there is no dispute that the defendant was in custody when he made the statement at issue. The question is whether the statement was the product of interrogation. "Interrogation for Miranda purposes occurs when a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent."
State v. Gribble, 165 N.H. 1, 11, 66 A.3d 1194 (2013). The "functional equivalent" of interrogation means "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Although the "functional equivalent" inquiry "focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police," officers "cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions." Id. at 301–02, 100 S.Ct. 1682. Therefore "the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. The State has the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it did not violate a defendant's rights under Miranda. Gribble, 165 N.H. at 10, 66 A.3d 1194.
Under certain circumstances, statements obtained by police from a subject in custody do not violate Miranda. "Volunteered statements of any kind" are not affected by Miranda. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In addition, courts have recognized that certain types of police conduct do not constitute interrogation for purposes of Miranda. For example, there is no need for police to provide warnings before asking a person under arrest routine booking or administrative questions. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601–02, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) ; South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 n.15, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). Police can inform individuals about charges against them or about evidence. State v. Guajardo, 135 N.H. 401, 403–04, 605 A.2d 217 (1992) ; United States v. Collins, 683 F.3d 697, 703 (6th Cir.2012). Police also may respond to direct questions asked by defendants. Gribble, 165 N.H. at 12, 66 A.3d 1194 ; Spencer, 149 N.H. at 625, 826 A.2d 546 ; United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 740–41 (7th Cir.2001) (collecting cases); United States v. Conley, 156 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir.1998).
The defendant argues that, because Goulet initiated the civil forfeiture conversation, the defendant's statement about the bag was the product of interrogation. The defendant...
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