State v. Thibodeaux

• Decision Date: 13 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–723.,15–723.
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Mark Wayne THIBODEAUX.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

190 So.3d 426

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Mark Wayne THIBODEAUX.

No. 15–723.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

April 13, 2016.

190 So.3d 428

Paula C. Marx, Louisiana Appellate Project, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Mark Wayne Thibodeaux.

Mark Wayne Thibodeaux, Angola, LA, pro se.

John F. DeRosier, District Attorney, Karen C. McLellan, Lori Nunn, Carla S. Sigler, Assistant District Attorneys, Lake Charles, LA, for Appellee, State of Louisiana.

Court composed of JIMMIE C. PETERS, BILLY H. EZELL, and JAMES T. GENOVESE, Judges.

PETERS, J.

The defendant, Mark Wayne Thibodeaux, appeals his conviction of two counts of second degree murder, violations of La.R.S. 14:30.1, and one count of attempted second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 14:30.1. For the following reasons, we affirm his convictions in all respects.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

This marks the second time this matter has come before this court on these offenses. We previously remanded this matter to the trial court with specific instructions to consider certain pretrial motions which had not been ruled on before trial. State v. Thibodeaux, 14–1002 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/11/15), 162 So.3d 665. In that remand, we summarized the factual and procedural history of this case and incorporate that history by reference herein. In the remand, this court instructed that the trial court

order the Clerk of Court (as custodian of the records), the defendant, and/or the state to produce the missing motions to quash and motion to suppress, or copies thereof at a hearing which the trial court shall schedule within thirty days of the release of this opinion. If the Clerk of Court, the defendant and/or the state cannot produce the missing motions or copies thereof, the trial court shall make a record of such failure to produce them at the evidentiary hearing and shall give the defendant fifteen days in which to refile the missing motions. If the motions or copies thereof are produced at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court shall conduct another evidentiary hearing within thirty days of the date they are produced and rule on the motions. If the motions are not produced, and if the defendant refiles the motions within the fifteen day period provided, the trial court shall conduct another evidentiary hearing within thirty days after they are filed and rule on the motions.

Id. at 674.

The trial court complied with our instructions, and the matter is now before us on the merits. On remand, the missing motions were not recovered, but the defendant “reconstruct[ed] his motions to the best of his recollection[,]” and on April 16, 2015, filed his reconstructed motion to quash, motion to quash indictment, and motion to suppress. The trial court heard

190 So.3d 429

and rejected the reconstructed motions on July 9, 2015. Thereafter, the defendant perfected the appeal now before us. In his appeal, we have two briefs. One is filed by the defendant's appellate counsel and contains four assignments of error. The other brief is filed pro se and contains eight assignments of error. The assignments of error (emphasis removed) filed by the defendant's appellate counsel read as follows:

I. The evidence is insufficient to support the guilty verdicts of second degree murder in this case.

II. The state failed to establish that Mark Thibodeaux intended to kill Joseph Newman; therefore, the state failed to meet its burden of proving Mark Thibodeaux is guilty of attempted second degree murder.

III. The trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing and rule on the pro-se motions prior to commencement of trial in this case, to the prejudice of Mark Thibodeaux.

IV. The trial court erred in denying the pro-se motion to suppress the identification by Joseph Newman.

The pro se assignments of error (emphasis removed) (citations omitted) read as follows:

1. Denial (insidiously constructive) of the constitutional right to “assistance of counsel”... proceedings of pretrial ... trial, 1–9–12 thru [sic] 2–10–14, and evidentiary hearing ... 4–16–15 thru [sic] 7–9–15. Conflict of interest ...

2. Court erred ... and was an [sic] substantial abuse of discretion ... in denying defendant's pro se motion to suppress ... (1) seizure of irrelevant (non-probative value) items (knife, wig) of undue prejudice and unrelative [sic] (no nexus of probative material value) to case matter, and (2) the purporting of inadmissible hearsay (hooded-sweatshirt, cell phone) never verified nor substantiated identity of owner ... extremely undue prejudice and substantial and injurious effect ... influential upon the determination of jury's verdict ... Brecht standard ... and (3) the court erred in failing to suppress the impermissible suggestive post-indictment identification ... in light of Joseph Newman['s] usage of crack-cocaine and alcohol ... state of delirium ...

3. The court renunciated [sic] and relinguished [sic] its incumbent constitutional duty to comport to fair and impartial procedure ... denying the defendant's constitutional right of “due process”... substantial irreparable injury ... both pretrial and trial, and evidentiary hearing ...

4. Court erred in denying defendant's pro se motion to quash indictment ... inherented [sic] on grounds of insufficiency ... failing to allege with sufficient clarity ... unequivocally .... statement of specific essential elements of material facts of identification constituting the offense charged. And cannot be left to inferences ... essential facts ... no indictment can be valid which does not bear the signature of the foreman of the grand jury ...

5. The evidence was insufficient to the finding of guilty as charge[d], LSA–R.S. 14:30.1, two (2) counts ...

6. The evidence was insufficient to the finding of guilty as charge[d], LSA–R.S. 14:27/30.1, one (1) count ...

7. The court has erred and fail[ed] to comply with federal and state constitutions ... statutory laws ... and rules of court procedure ... being in violation of the “confrontation clause”...

8. The court has erred and fail[ed] to comply with federal and state constitutions ... statutory laws ... and rules of

190 So.3d 430

court procedure ... being in violation of the “Brady rule”...

OPINION

Some of the assignments of error overlap, and we will address those which do overlap together.

Insufficient Evidence to Convict the Defendant

In these assignments of error, the defendant alleges, through counsel and pro se, that there was insufficient evidence at trial to convict him of two counts of second degree murder and one count of attempted second degree murder. The defendant asserts that the convictions on all three counts should be vacated.

Second Degree Murder Convictions

The defendant argues that the state had no direct evidence to support the charges of the second degree murders of Bridget Tillman Pryor and Carla Yvette LeDoux, because no murder weapon was recovered, the defendant's DNA did not match any of the tested DNA, the defendant exhibited no injuries, and Mr. Newman's testimony only placed the defendant in Ms. Pryor's room and then leaving that room with a knife. The defendant argues that this is all circumstantial evidence.

“The rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” La.R.S. 15:438. The defendant argues that a reasonable hypothesis of innocence is that the victims, Ms. Pryor and Ms. LeDoux, “fought, cutting each other in the scuffle, then [the defendant] ran out with a knife, attempting to leave.” The defendant argues that the state failed to prove that he cut either of the victims and also failed to prove the requisite intent that is needed for a second degree murder conviction. The state asserts that the record shows that the defendant's guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The supreme court set forth the standard of review for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal in State v. Macon, 06–481, pp. 7–8 (La.6/1/07), 957 So.2d 1280, 1285–86, where it held:

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La.1988). A determination of the weight of evidence is a question of fact, resting solely with the trier of fact who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witnesses. State v. Silman, 95–0154 (La.11/27/95), 663 So.2d 27, 35. A reviewing court may impinge on the factfinding function of the jury only to the extent necessary to assure the Jackson standard of review. State v. Bordenave, 95–2328 (La.4/26/96), 678 So.2d 19, 20. It is not the function of an appellate court to assess credibility or re-weigh the evidence. Id.

In ...