State v. Thomas

• Citation: 105 Conn. 757,136 A. 475
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 05 March 1927
• Parties: STATE v. THOMAS. STATE v. DENIS.

136 A. 475

105 Conn. 757

STATE v. THOMAS.

STATE v. DENIS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 5, 1927

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Christopher L. Avery Judge.

James Thomas and Milford Denis were convicted of robbery with violence, and they appeal. No error.

Samuel E. Hoyt, Public Defender, of New Haven, for appellants.

Arnon A. Alling, State's Atty., and Benjamin D. Winner, both of New Haven, for the State.

WOLFE J.

The appellants were jointly charged with having committed the crime of robbery with violence. From a verdict of guilty and judgment thereon, each of the accused appealed to this court assigning identical reasons of appeal. The cases were argued together as a single case, and the judgment of this court applies to each accused. All of the errors assigned relate to certain instructions of the court to the jury. These assignments of error are 24 in number. Some of them are without merit and do not require consideration.

1. The first reason of appeal assigned is that the court erred in charging the jury upon the question of proof, in giving to them the following instruction:

" But this requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean that the proof must be beyond a possible doubt, as this is seldom possible, especially with reference to crimes that are committed in secret and with the intent and desire to avoid detection. If that was the rule there would be few convictions in such cases. Where there is conflicting testimony and where guilt must be inferred from other facts and circumstances which may have been proven, a possible doubt may frequently be suggested."

The court had just told the jury that the burden was upon the state to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and that any conclusion from the evidence which was consistent with the innocence of the accused must prevail. The reference by the court to a " possible doubt" was a correct statement of the law, but if it could be said that the jury may have been misled by such instruction, any erroneous impression that they may have received by the court's reference to a " possible doubt" was removed by the clear and explicit statement of what constitutes a reasonable doubt, immediately following:

" A reasonable doubt is what is suggested or implied by the term reasonable; that is, it is a doubt which remains in your minds and which you are conscious of after careful and conscientious consideration of all the facts. And where such a doubt exists the accused must be given the benefit of it by a verdict of not guilty, as in that event you would have a reasonable doubt of his guilt."

2. Reason 3 of the appeal is a criticism of the court's instruction that it was the duty of the jury " to consider all the claims of the counsel, both of the state and of the accused." The particular criticism of the accused is that by virtue of this instruction it is quite possible that " the jury were swayed to bring in a verdict of guilty, more by the eloquent presentation of the claims of the state's attorney than by the evidence before them." There was nothing erroneous in this. It is the duty of the jury to consider the claims made by counsel; to follow the court upon the legal questions involved and not counsel, and to weigh and consider the facts in evidence and the claims made thereon in the light of the evidence, their own common sense and judgment, guided by the instruction of the court. It is presumed that claims of counsel unfairly or prejudicially presented and likely to lead to a wrong conclusion have been placed in their proper light before the jury by the court. Previous to this statement the jury had been told that they must take the law which applies to the case " as it is given to you by the court, and not that which you have heard stated by counsel."

3. The ninth reason of appeal is based upon the failure of the court, after referring to " impeaching" testimony, to define to the jury what was meant by testimony of such character. The rule is well established that:

" Where the effect of ‘ impeaching’ evidence is referred to in the charge, proper and adequate instruction thereon should be given." 16 C.J. 1016.

This instruction as to " impeaching" testimony occurred in connection with the statement of the court that:

" Where the evidence of any witness has been shaken or impaired by cross-examination or by ‘ impeaching’ testimony, the credibility of the several witnesses and the weight which should be given to the testimony of each witness is a matter for the jury to determine."

In the light of other portions of the charge, and assuming, as we may, that the jurors are men of average intelligence and therefore must have had a general idea of what the court meant by its reference to " impeaching" testimony, we cannot find that the failure of the court to give a more adequate instruction on this point was harmful error.

4. In the eleventh and thirteenth reasons of appeal the accused complain of the instruction that:

" If the jury believes the testimony of a single witness, there is no law forbidding them to base a verdict upon it, though the witness stands alone and there is testimony opposing him from all the others. To illustrate: The testimony of a witness may be impaired or totally destroyed by impeaching testimony. It may be affected by cross-examination; his appearance upon the witness stand; his evident bias; his acquaintance with the facts which he testifies--all these matters are to be considered by the jury in weighing the testimony in any given case."

And the further statement, referring to interested witnesses:

" If for any reason the jury does not believe him, his testimony, like all the testimony the jury does not believe, is to be rejected or given such weight as the jury believes it is entitled to."

The special criticism is that the jury were thus told that they might consider the testimony of a witness, although its weight had been actually destroyed. While a strict construction of the language of the court might seem to bear out the contention of the accused, it is evident, that what the court meant and what the jury must have understood them to mean was that it was within their province to wholly reject the testimony of a witness or give to it such weight as they believed it entitled to. This instruction is in complete accord with our rule as laid down in Shupack v. Gordon, 79 Conn. 299, 302, 64 A. 740.

5. The twelfth reason of appeal is based upon the claimed failure of the court, after it had told the jury to test the testimony of the...