State v. Thomas

• Citation: 2014 Ohio 319
• Decision Date: 29 January 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 13 CAC 05 0039
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
• Parties: STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. RYAN J. THOMAS Defendant-Appellant

2014 Ohio 319

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. RYAN J. THOMAS Defendant-Appellant

Case No. 13 CAC 05 0039

COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 29, 2014

JUDGES:

Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.

Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.

Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.

OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:

Criminal appeal from the Delaware

Municipal Court, Case No. 13 TRD 02895

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee

ELIZABETH A. MATUNE

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney

Delaware City Prosecutor

For Defendant-Appellant

J. MICHAEL REIDENBACH

WILLIAM THOMAS

Gwin, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant Ryan J. Thomas ["Thomas"] appeals his conviction and sentence for one count of operation without maintain reasonable control in violation of R.C. 4511.02 after a bench trial in the Delaware County Municipal Court.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On March 6, 2013, Thomas was driving his pickup truck with a front snowplow northbound on State Route 257, a two-lane road, at approximately 3:00 am. It was snowing and there was heavy snow on the roads. Thomas was working as part of his business of snow removal services. Due to the conditions, Thomas was travelling between 25 mph and 30 mph in a speed zone marked 55 mph. Thomas was in control of his truck at this time. While traveling northbound, a southbound dump truck with an oversized plow was "encroaching" Thomas's lane of travel. Thomas moved to the right of his lane of travel with two of the truck's tires going off the road onto the grass. After the other snowplow had passed, Thomas attempted to turn left to reenter his lane of travel; he crossed over the centerline of the roadway, travelled across the lane designated for oncoming traffic, went off the road, down an embankment and collided with a tree.

{¶3} Shortly thereafter, State Highway Patrol Trooper Steven M. Schemine noticed taillights "sticking up out of the ditch." Trooper Schemine approached Thomas's vehicle and proceeded to interview Thomas and investigate the scene. Thomas stated he "overcorrected" and went off the left side of the road. Further, Thomas wrote in his statement he had "over [compensated]." Trooper Schemine issued a citation for violation of R.C. 4511.202.

{¶4} On April 2, 2013, a bench trial was held before the Delaware County Municipal Court. Trooper Schemine and Thomas were the only witnesses. Thomas hand written account of the events as given to Trooper Schemine the night of the incident was admitted into evidence.

{¶5} After hearing testimony from Trooper Schemine and Thomas, the trial court found Thomas guilty. Thomas subsequently filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Crim. R. 33(A)(4) and (5), which was denied.

Assignments of Error

{¶6} Thomas raises three assignments of error,

{¶7} "I. THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A GUILTY VERDICT AS THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

{¶8} "II. THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AS THE ACCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY A SUDDEN EMERGENCY.

{¶9} "III. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL."

Analysis

{¶10} Thomas' first, second and third assignments of error raise common and interrelated issues; therefore, we will address the arguments together. All of Thomas' assignments contend that Thomas was confronted by a sudden emergency not of his making and beyond his control. As such, his conviction is against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

{¶11} Our review of the constitutional sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction is governed by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), which requires a court of appeals to determine whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.; see also McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 130 S.Ct. 665, 673, 175 L.Ed.2d 582(2010) (reaffirming this standard); State v. Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163, 2010-Ohio-1017, 926 N.E.2d 1239-Ohio-1017, ¶ 146; State v. Clay, 187 Ohio App.3d 633, 2010-Ohio-2720, 933 N.E.2d 296 (5th Dist.)-Ohio-2720, ¶ 68.

{¶12} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated by State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, 1997-Ohio-355. Weight of the evidence concerns "the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief." (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) at 1594.

{¶13} When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a "'thirteenth juror'" and disagrees with the fact finder's resolution of the conflictingtestimony. Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). However, an appellate court may not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that "'the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.'" State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720-721(1st Dist. 1983). Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for "'the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.'" Id.

"[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts.

* * *

"If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment."

Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191-192 (1978).

{¶14} R.C. 4511.202, Operation without reasonable control provides,

(A) No person shall operate a motor vehicle, trackless trolley, streetcar, agricultural tractor, or agricultural tractor that is towing, pulling, or otherwise drawing a unit of farm machinery on any street, highway, orproperty open to the public for vehicular traffic without being in reasonable control of the vehicle, trolley, streetcar, agricultural tractor, or unit of farm machinery.

{¶15} The "ordinary standard of negligence" provides "the requisite proof of culpability within * * * [the] ordinance." State v. Lett, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 02COA049, 2002-Ohio-3366, ¶12 (construing analogous city ordinance), citing State v. Jones 10th Dist. Franklin No. 88AP-920, 1989 WL 43286(Apr. 25, 1989). As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District has observed,

Simply put, motor vehicle operators must keep their vehicles under control and on their own side of the roadway. See State v. Lunsford (1987), 118 Ohio App.3d 380, 383, 692 N.E.2d 1078; also see Oechsle v. Hart (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 29, 34, 231 N.E.2d 306. There is no question that Davis failed to meet that obligation. By her own admission, Davis swerved the bus to the right and into a ditch, brought the bus back onto the road, and veered across the road through the other lane of travel into an adjacent field and rolled the bus. This evidence sufficiently establishes that Davis failed to maintain reasonable control of her vehicle.

State v. Davis, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 04CA1, 2004 WL 2390013(Oct. 21, 2004), ¶11.

{¶16} In Oechsle, the defendant's car skidded on an icy or wet spot on the pavement and went left of center, striking another vehicle. The Supreme Court noted that a showing by a motorist that he was a victim of a sudden emergency would excuse his failure to comply with the statute in question. 12 Ohio St.2d at 34, 231 N.E.2d 306. However, the Court noted,

As was stated in paragraph five of the syllabus of Spalding v. Waxler, 2 Ohio St.2d 1, 205 N.E.2d 890:

'An emergency which will relieve a motorist of his duty to comply with a safety statute regulating vehicular traffic must arise as the result of something over which he has no control. A self-created emergency, one arising from the driver's own conduct or from circumstances under his control, cannot serve as an excuse.'

Skidding upon wet or icy roadway pavement is a circumstance within the power of motorists to prevent. Bad road conditions, alone, should not excuse a driver from the mandatory requirements of Sections 4511.25 [Lanes of travel upon roadways] and 4511.26 [Vehicles traveling in opposite directions], Revised Code.

* * *

However, the operator of a motor vehicle is responsible for keeping his vehicle under control and on his side of the road. This is true irrespective of the condition of the road. Violation of Sections 4511.25 and 4511.26, Revised Code, is negligence per se. It follows that defendant must bear the loss, for it is her violation of those statutes that caused the loss. Peters v. B. & F. Transfer Co., 7 Ohio St.2d 143, 219 N.E.2d 27. Cf. Stump v. Phillians, 2 Ohio St.2d 209, 207 N.E.2d 762.

Oechsle, 12 Ohio St.2d at 34, 231 N.E.2d 306. The Oechsle Court concluded,

It was error for the trial court to so charge the jury as the sudden emergency doctrine was not

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