State v. Thomas
Decision Date | 06 March 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 39374.,39374. |
Citation | 154 Idaho 305,297 P.3d 268 |
Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Kerry S. THOMAS, Defendant–Appellant. |
Greg S. Silvey, Star, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Kerry S. Thomas appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He asserts that he should have been permitted to withdraw his plea because before pleading guilty he was incorrectly advised of the maximum sentence he could receive.
This is Thomas's second appeal from the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The background for this case was set forth in State v. Thomas, Docket No. 36947 (Ct.App. Mar. 3, 2011) (unpublished), as follows:
In Thomas's first appeal, this Court held that while it was clear Thomas had been advised that the sentences for the counts to which he pleaded guilty in 2009 could be imposed consecutively, it was not clear whether he had been advised that these new sentences could be made consecutive to the sentence he was already serving for his 1997 conviction. Id. Therefore, we remanded with instructions to hold a hearing on Thomas's motion to withdraw his plea. Id.
On remand, the State conceded that Thomas had not been warned that the court could order that the sentences on the new counts be served consecutively to the remaining portion of the sentence from his 1997 conviction. However, the State suggested that the error could be remedied by modifying Thomas's sentence. Following a hearing, the district court followed the State's suggestion and modified Thomas's sentences in this case by ordering that they be served consecutively to each other but concurrently with the remaining portion of any sentence he was already serving. The court then denied Thomas's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, reasoning that even if Thomas had been improperly advised as to the maximum potential sentence, any possible prejudice was eliminated by the sentence modification. Thomas appeals.
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) states: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea." The rule distinguishes between pleas made prior to and after sentencing, exacting a less rigorous measure of proof for presentence motions. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 485, 861 P.2d 51, 55 (1993). To withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, the defendant must show a just reason for withdrawing the plea. Id. If he does so, then the State may avoid the granting of the motion by showing that prejudice would result if the plea were withdrawn. Id. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea brought after sentencing will be granted only to correct manifest injustice. State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568, 571, 249 P.3d 367, 370 (2011) ; State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 156 P.3d 1193, 1195 (2007).
If a plea was not taken in compliance with constitutional due process standards, which require that a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, then "manifest injustice" or the lower standard of "just reason" will be established as a matter of law. Heredia, 144 Idaho at 97, 156 P.3d at 1195; State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct.App.2009) ; State v. Shook, 144 Idaho 858, 859, 172 P.3d 1133, 1134 (Ct.App.2007) ; State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 879, 880 (Ct.App.2002). A prima facie showing of compliance with due process requirements is made when the minimum requirements of Idaho Criminal Rule 11 have been met.1 Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 99, 982 P.2d 931, 934 (1999) ; Shook, 144 Idaho at 859, 172 P.3d at 1134. That rule provides that when the trial court accepts a guilty plea, "the record of the entire proceedings, including reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show: ... The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences which may apply." I.C.R. 11(c)(2). The possibility that a sentence will be made consecutive to a prior sentence is a direct consequence of a guilty plea, of which the defendant must be informed in order to ensure that the plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. State v. Flummer, 99 Idaho 567, 568–69, 585 P.2d 1278, 1279–80 (1978) ; Shook, 144 Idaho at 859, 172 P.3d at 1134; Huffman, 137 Idaho at 887–88, 55 P.3d at 880–81.
Our previous cases, however, dealt with defendants who actually received a sentence or other direct consequence of a guilty plea without a warning that such a sentence or consequence could be imposed. The question in this appeal is whether a violation of Rule 11(c) based on the court's understatement of the maximum possible sentence constitutes manifest injustice when the defendant has received no greater sentence than was disclosed by the court.
Not all Rule 11 violations invalidate a guilty plea. The Idaho Criminal Rules provide, "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. We have previously recognized that some technical violations of Rule 11(c) do not rise to the level of manifest injustice. See Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 432, 835 P.2d 661, 667 (Ct.App.1992) ; accord United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784–85, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 2087–88, 60 L.Ed.2d 634, 638–39 (1979).
Other courts that have directly considered the issue have held that when a defendant is misinformed as to the maximum punishment and then receives a sentence no greater than the punishment described, the error is generally harmless, unless the defendant can demonstrate, for example, that the...
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