State v. Thompson

• Citation: 166 Or. App. 370,998 P.2d 762
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Mary Louise THOMPSON, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 05 April 2000
• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon

998 P.2d 762

166 Or. App. 370

STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Mary Louise THOMPSON, Appellant.

(10-95-01455; CA A94497).

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted February 22, 1999.

Decided April 5, 2000.

Stephen J. Williams, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was David E. Groom, Public Defender.

Kaye E. Sunderland, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.

Before LANDAU, Presiding Judge, and HASELTON and WOLLHEIM, Judges.

WOLLHEIM, J.

Defendant appeals the trial court's judgment of conviction for six counts of hindering prosecution, ORS 162.325, one count of aggravated murder, ORS 163.095(2)(a)(E), and one count of burglary in the first degree, ORS 162.225. Defendant assigns four errors to the trial court's judgment. We affirm without discussion defendant's convictions of hindering prosecution and burglary in the first degree and address only her first two assignments of error: (1) whether the trial court erred in overruling defendant's objection and admitting testimony concerning the role of witnesses in juvenile proceedings; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of aggravated murder. Those assignments of error present the same question of statutory interpretation, namely whether the legislature intended for a witness in a juvenile delinquency proceeding to be considered a "witness in a criminal proceeding" as that phrase is used in ORS 163.095(2)(a)(E). We reverse defendant's conviction of aggravated murder and remand.

Relevant to the issue on appeal, defendant was indicted for aggravated murder pursuant to ORS 163.095. ORS 163.095 defines aggravated murder, in part, as murder under the following circumstances:

"(2)(a) The victim was one of the following and the murder was related to the performance of the victim's official duties in the justice system:

"(A) A police officer as defined in ORS 181.610; "(B) A correctional, parole or probation officer or other person charged with the duty of custody, control or supervision of convicted persons;

"(C) A member of the Oregon State Police;

"(D) A judicial officer as defined in ORS 1.210;

"(E) A juror or witness in a criminal proceeding;

"(F) An employee or officer of a court of justice; or

"(G) A member of the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision." (Emphasis added.)

The state offered evidence establishing that defendant conspired to and arranged the murder of the victim because the victim was going to serve as a witness in a juvenile delinquency adjudication proceeding against defendant's son.

Defendant objected to the introduction of testimony concerning the duties of a witness in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, arguing that it was not relevant to the aggravated murder charge, because the aggravated murder statute requires the victim to be a witness in a "criminal proceeding," as distinct from a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Defendant argued that, although ORS 163.095 does not define "criminal proceeding," the definitions contained in the criminal code and the juvenile code establish that the legislature did not intend the aggravated murder statute to apply to witnesses in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The trial court overruled that objection, relying on State v. Maney, 297 Or. 620, 688 P.2d 63 (1984), which interpreted the phrase "witness in a criminal proceeding." At the close of evidence, defendant made a motion for judgment of acquittal on the same legal point. In denying the motion, the trial court again relied, in part, on Maney. Defendant was then convicted of aggravated murder pursuant to ORS 163.095(2)(a)(E) and sentenced to life without the possibility of release or parole as set forth in ORS 163.105(1)(b).

On appeal defendant and the state make essentially the same arguments as made below. Defendant argues simply that she could not have been convicted of aggravated murder because the victim was murdered as a consequence of his official role as a witness in a juvenile delinquency proceeding and not a "criminal proceeding." Although not offering a precise definition, the state contends that "criminal proceeding" should be read broadly as the "criminal justice system," not narrowly as a "criminal prosecution." The state places primary reliance on Maney, which it claims interpreted the phrase "criminal proceeding" as excluding "civil and administrative hearings, while including hearings that are part of the `criminal justice system.'" In the alternative, the state relies on the context and legislative history of the statute, arguing that they establish the legislature's intent to include juvenile delinquency adjudications. In determining whether a juvenile adjudication is a "criminal proceeding" for purposes of ORS 163.095, our role is to ascertain the legislature's intent in using that phrase. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). To accomplish that, we need only examine the text and context of the statute. Id.

The language of the statute is the best evidence of the legislature's intent. Id. ORS 163.095, adopted in 1977,¹ does not define the term "criminal proceeding." The state argues that the plain, natural and ordinary meaning of "criminal proceeding" includes juvenile delinquency proceedings. In some juvenile delinquency proceedings, juveniles are adjudicated for acts that, if committed by adults, would be crimes. See ORS 419C.005. Black's Law Dictionary, 448-49 (4th ed 1951) defines "criminal proceeding" as

"[o]ne instituted and conducted for the purpose either of preventing the commission of crime, or for fixing the guilt of a crime already committed and punishing the offender; as distinguished from a `civil' proceeding, which is for the redress of a private injury. * * * Strictly, a `criminal proceeding' means some step taken before a court against some person or persons charged with some violation of the criminal law."

Thus, the state argues, because juvenile delinquency proceedings "invariably involve the violation of criminal laws, as opposed to civil disputes" and therefore implicate the traditional criminal concern over public injury, the plain, ordinary and natural meaning of "criminal proceedings" includes juvenile delinquency proceedings. We agree that, standing alone, the phrase can plausibly be so defined. However, that definition must remain plausible in light of the text and context of the statute. See State v. Stoneman, 323 Or. 536, 545-46, 920 P.2d 535 (1996)

.

We consider, as if written into the text of the statute, prior Supreme Court interpretations of the statute. Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or. 344, 350 n. 6, 838 P.2d 600 (1992). In Maney, the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "witness in a criminal proceeding" in the context of the statute's requirement that the murder be related to the victim's official duties in the justice system. There, it was undisputed that the proceeding in which the murder victim would have been a witness was a "criminal" one; the victim was expected to testify in a criminal prosecution for theft in the second degree. Thus, the dispositive issue was when a victim becomes a "witness" as that term is used in the statute. The court held that the requirement that the victim be a "witness" did not require the victim already to have been subpoenaed for or testified in a criminal proceeding but merely required that the victim be "someone who knows or is expected to know material facts of a crime and is likely to be summoned to testify about those facts at some stage of a criminal proceeding." Id. at 625-26, 688 P.2d 63.

The state places reliance on two observations made by the court in Maney. First, the court observed that the phrase "witness in a criminal proceeding" "exclude[d] witnesses in civil trials or administrative hearings." Id. at 624, 688 P.2d 63. By that observation, the state would have us conclude that the Supreme Court held that, by using the term "in a criminal proceeding," the legislature intended to divide the world of judicial proceedings into only three parts and that "criminal proceeding" must be interpreted very broadly as the "criminal justice system." The state claims that such an interpretation would include juvenile delinquency proceedings.²

That observation is dictum. The question of what is a "criminal proceeding" was not an issue in Maney, nor was it necessary in deciding when a person becomes a "witness" for purposes of the aggravated murder statute. The rule of prior construction does not apply to statutory construction that is dictum, SAIF v. Allen, 320 Or. 192, 204, 881 P.2d 773 (1994), but we generally will follow dicta that are helpful, see State v. Jones, 165 Or.App. 55, 60, 995 P.2d 571 (2000)

. However, we can, off-hand, think of several proceedings that transcend a strict tripartite division of proceedings. For example, termination of parental rights does not fit into one of the three types of proceedings identified in Maney.³ What is more plausible is that the Supreme Court observed the legislature's intent simply to exclude witnesses in civil and administrative proceedings from subparagraph (2)(a)(E) of the statute. But we believe that is about as far as that observation can be taken on its face.

Second, the state relies on the court's explanation that "paragraph (2)(a) was enacted for the purpose of protecting the criminal justice system by deterring selected categories of murder which were deemed especially heinous." Maney, 297 Or. at 624,688 P.2d 63. The state contends that the court implicitly held that "criminal proceeding" is synonymous with "criminal justice system." However, the court explicitly articulated that in Maney it was not "required to define the outer limits" of the phrase "witness in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 626, 688 P.2d...