State v. Thompson

CourtCourt of Appeal of North Carolina (US)
Citation2022 NCCOA 6
Decision Date04 January 2022
Docket NumberCOA20-434
PartiesSTATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTOPHER JASON THOMPSON, Defendant.

2022-NCCOA-6

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.

CHRISTOPHER JASON THOMPSON, Defendant.

No. COA20-434

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

January 4, 2022


Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 March 2021.

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 14 March 2019 by Judge V. Bradford Long in Randolph County Superior Court 15 CRS 052178.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Kimberly D. Potter, for the State.

Mark L. Hayes for defendant-appellant.

MURPHY, JUDGE

¶ 1 A trial court properly denies a defendant's motion to dismiss a charge of felony fleeing to elude arrest when there is sufficient evidence, in the light most favorable to the State, that, inter alia, the arresting officers acted in the lawful performance of their duties. Here, the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss where there was sufficient evidence, in the light most favorable to the State, that the officers were acting in lawful performance of their duties because they had a reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Defendant, had probable cause to arrest

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Defendant, and complied with N.C. G.S. § 15A-401(e)(1) and (2).

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On 21 May 2015, Defendant Christopher Thompson drove his son to Liberty Elementary School. The two arrived shortly after the tardy bell rang and a school counselor, Tracey Whatley, had secured the doors. Whatley instructed Defendant's son to go to the front office to obtain a tardy slip. Defendant instead instructed his son to go to class and stated, "I am your tardy note." After Whatley informed Defendant his son would not be let inside the school without a tardy slip, Defendant went to the front office with his son.

¶ 3 At the front office, Defendant yelled, cursed, and argued with school staff, maintaining that his son should not "get a tardy." Defendant's son was taken to class eventually without a tardy, while Defendant remained in the front office. A few minutes later, the principal, Jordi Roman, arrived at the front office and, because there were students in the area and Defendant was still using profanity in a raised voice, asked Defendant to step outside of the building. Defendant did not leave right away and continued using profanity. Roman asked Defendant to step outside a second time, and he instructed his secretary to call the police and clear the office. After this occurred, Defendant complied with the request to go outside. Outside the building, Defendant continued to argue with Roman. Defendant seemingly decided he wanted to leave with his son and requested his son be brought outside. After

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multiple requests, Defendant's son was brought outside. Several police officers arrived as Defendant got into his truck with his son.

¶ 4 Upon arrival, Liberty Police Chief David Semrad noticed that bystanders were looking towards Defendant's truck and that Roman was standing outside near the truck. In light of the police call for a school disturbance and his observations, Chief Semrad concluded Defendant was the source of the reported disturbance, approached Defendant, and told him he was being detained. Shortly thereafter, Chief Semrad discussed the situation with Roman, and Roman asked Chief Semrad to ban Defendant from the property. Chief Semrad then asked Officer Jason Phillips to obtain Defendant's identification for the ban sheet. Officer Phillips approached Defendant's truck, which was running, and asked Defendant for his identification; however, Defendant stated he was not legally required to provide his identification and provided his full name. Officer Phillips requested Officer Hubert Elder to assist him at Defendant's truck, and Officer Elder told Defendant he could either provide his license or go to jail. Defendant asked "under what North Carolina state law," and Officer Elder raised his voice, responding for "obstructing my investigation."

¶ 5 When Chief Semrad heard Officer Elder raise his voice, he approached Defendant's truck because he felt they had "reached a point where . . . an arrest may be warranted." Chief Semrad ordered Defendant to get out of his truck. Defendant refused to exit his truck, and Chief Semrad attempted to open the locked truck door.

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Officer Elder stated he saw Defendant "grab for the gearshift," so he reached inside Defendant's truck and attempted to obtain the keys from the ignition. Defendant pushed Officer Elder's arm into the truck's dash, and Chief Semrad reached into the truck and grabbed Defendant's head and arm in an attempt to break Defendant's grip from Officer Elder. The vehicle abruptly accelerated forward, and Officer Elder testified that "[Defendant's] left arm momentarily came and pinned [Officer Elder] so that [he] could not retract." Defendant then put the vehicle in reverse and backed up, at which point Officer Elder disengaged from the vehicle. Defendant drove away from the school at a high speed, with the police briefly in pursuit. However, after realizing Defendant's son was in the truck, the police stopped pursuing Defendant. Shortly after the police stopped pursuing Defendant, Defendant crashed his truck and was subsequently arrested.

¶ 6 As a result of this incident, Defendant was indicted for feloniously "operat[ing] a motor vehicle on a highway, . . . while fleeing and attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, Officer H. Elder, in the lawful performance of the officer's duties" in violation of N.C. G.S. § 20-141.5.[1] On 7 March 2018, Defendant filed a pre-trial

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Motion to Suppress all evidence obtained, arguing his attempted arrest was unlawful. The motion was denied on 8 March 2019 based on the trial court's finding that Defendant's detention was lawful. At the close of the State's evidence, Defendant made a motion to dismiss based on the insufficiency of the evidence. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss. At the close of all evidence, Defendant renewed his motion to dismiss, and the trial court again denied his motion. Defendant was convicted of felony fleeing to elude arrest. On 14 March 2019, the trial court sentenced Defendant to a suspended sentence of 6 to 17 months. Defendant timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the State did not present sufficient evidence that the officers were acting in the lawful performance of their duties.[2] Specifically, Defendant argues the officers acted unlawfully because (A) "they had no reasonable suspicion to detain [Defendant]"; (B) "they had no probable cause to arrest [Defendant]"; and (C) "the arrest, even if it was based on probable cause, did not comply with [ N.C. G.S.] § 15A-

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401." We disagree.[3]

¶ 8 "This Court reviews the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss de novo." State v. Smith, 186 N.C.App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007).

Upon [the] defendant's motion for dismissal, the question for [us] is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of [the] defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.

State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 148 L.Ed.2d 150 (2000). "In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences . . . . Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case but are for the jury to resolve." State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 596, 573 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2002) (citations omitted).

¶ 9 Defendant was convicted of felonious fleeing to elude arrest pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 20-141.5. N.C. G.S. § 20-141.5 provides in relevant part:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle on a street, highway, or public vehicular area while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer who is in the lawful performance of his duties. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, violation of this
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section shall be a Class 1 misdemeanor.
(b) If two or more of the following aggravating factors are present at the time the violation occurs, violation of this section shall be a Class H felony.

N.C. G.S. § 20-141.5(a)-(b) (2019) (emphasis added). We address only whether the officers were in the lawful performance of their duties as it is the only element that Defendant challenges on appeal. See N.C. R. App. P. 28 ("Issues not presented and discussed in a party's brief are deemed abandoned.").

A. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion

¶ 10 Defendant first argues the police officers departed from the lawful performance of their duties because they lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to detain him.

¶ 11 "The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. The North Carolina Constitution provides similar protection." State v. Hernandez, 208 N.C.App. 591, 597, 704 S.E.2d 55, 59 (2010) (marks and citations omitted), disc. rev. denied, 365 N.C. 86, 731 S.E.2d 829 (2011). "'[B]rief investigatory detentions such as those involved in the stopping of a vehicle' are subject to Fourth Amendment protections." Mahatha, 267 N.C.App. at 358, 832 S.E.2d at 918 (quoting State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994)). "A police officer may effect a brief investigatory seizure of an individual where the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime may be underway." State v. Barnard, 184 N.C.App. 25, 29, 645 S.E.2d 780, 783 (2007), aff'd, 362 N.C. 244, 658 S.E.2d 643, cert.

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denied, 555 U.S. 914, 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008). "To determine whether this reasonable suspicion exists, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances[.]" State v. Kincaid, 147 N.C.App. 94, 97, 555 S.E.2d 294, 298 (2001) (citations and marks...

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