State v. Thompson, No. 94,254.
Citation | 138 P.3d 398 |
Decision Date | 21 July 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 94,254. |
Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Dennis W. THOMPSON, Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Kansas |
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, of Topeka, for appellant.
Ty Kaufman, county attorney, and Phill Kline, attorney general, for appellee.
Before HILL, P.J., GREENE and ELLIOTT, JJ.
Dennis W. Thompson appeals his multiple drug-related convictions, arguing (i) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine, (ii) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, and (iii) a sentencing error, and other errors that we need not discuss in light of our conclusions. We conclude that although there was sufficient evidence to support Thompson's convictions, the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, requiring reversal and remand.
Thompson was stopped within the city limits of McPherson after an officer observed that his vehicle had a faulty headlight. The officer asked for Thompson's license and insurance documentation and determined that there were no wants or warrants for Thompson. Notwithstanding this determination, and consistent with policy, the officer called for a back-up officer to come to the location and told him that he intended to ask Thompson for consent to search the vehicle. The back-up officer was then stationed immediately behind Thompson's vehicle and in front of the first officer's vehicle, which had its emergency lights activated.
The officer then returned the identification documentation to Thompson, issued a verbal warning, and told Thompson to have a good day. Although the officer testified that he then started to walk away but returned within a second or two, the district judge found that there was no disengagement before the officer asked Thompson if he could ask additional questions:
The additional questioning resulted in Thompson's consent to search his vehicle, and when that search found assorted drug paraphernalia and finished methamphetamine in powder form, Thompson was asked for and he granted authorities written permission to search his garage, where a host of additional manufacturing paraphernalia was found.
Thompson was charged with manufacture of methamphetamine in violation of K.S.A. 65-4159, a severity level 1 felony, possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine as a precursor in violation of K.S.A. 65-7006(a), a severity level 1 felony, possession of lithium metal as a precursor in violation of K.S.A. 65-7006(a), a severity level 1 felony, possession of methamphetamine in violation of K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 65-4160, a severity level 4 felony, possession of drug manufacture paraphernalia in violation of K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3), a severity level 4 felony, possession of marijuana in violation of K.S.A. 65-4162(a)(3), a class A misdemeanor, and possession of drug use paraphernalia in violation of K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(2), a class A misdemeanor.
Prior to trial, Thompson moved to suppress the evidence recovered from the search of his vehicle and garage, arguing that his consent was not voluntary. After hearing testimony, the district judge concluded that the motion should be denied, citing state and federal authorities and stating in material part:
The jury found Thompson guilty on all counts. Using the severity level 1 felony, the trial court sentenced him to a controlling term of 158 months' incarceration on the primary offense of methamphetamine manufacture, and the remaining sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
Thompson appeals.
Thompson argues his conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine is not supported by sufficient evidence. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Calvin, 279 Kan. 193, 198, 105 P.3d 710 (2005).
In order to prove the crime of manufacture of methamphetamine, the State must show that the defendant (1) intentionally (2) completed the manufacture of methamphetamine or (3) could have successfully manufactured methamphetamine. State v. Martens, 274 Kan. 459, 465-66, 54 P.3d 960 (2002). "[T]he focus of the crime described in 65-4159 is the successful manufacture or potentially successful manufacture of a controlled substance." 274 Kan. at 466, 54 P.3d 960.
Despite the numerous methamphetamine manufacture ingredients and items found in his car and garage, Thompson argues the evidence does not show that he either had successfully manufactured methamphetamine or that he was engaged in any process of manufacture that had a degree of likely success. He contends the lack of any methamphetamine residue on the items in his garage, insufficient anhydrous ammonia to manufacture methamphetamine, unopened cold pills, and unaltered lithium batteries show he had neither manufactured nor could have successfully manufactured methamphetamine.
The State cites the following as evidence of guilt: (1) Thompson testified that he knew how to manufacture methamphetamine using the Nazi method and had manufactured methamphetamine on at least three separate occasions before the time of his arrest; (2) finished methamphetamine was found in his car in powder form and dissolved in liquid; (3) lab results showed the liquid solution contained a byproduct of the Nazi manufacture method; and (4) all of the ingredients and utensils necessary to manufacture methamphetamine using the Nazi method were found in Thompson's car and garage except anhydrous ammonia.
Additionally, officers discovered an Aquafina bottle containing a white sludge in Thompson's garage. The sludge was found to consist of sulfuric acid and sodium chloride consistent with a hydrogen chloride gassing generator. Thompson testified that when he had manufactured methamphetamine in the past, he had always used gassing generators with sulfuric acid and sodium chloride. The presence of the sludge indicated the bottle had previously been used to produce methamphetamine during a stage of the manufacture process. The record indicated gassing generators of this type have no purpose other than a piece of equipment used in the Nazi method of methamphetamine manufacture. Thus, a reasonable inference was that the gassing generator must have been used in either a successful or potentially successful manufacture of methamphetamine.
Thompson is correct in stating there is some evidence to the contrary, such as the complete absence of any methamphetamine residue on the equipment in his garage. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, however, we conclude that the evidence as a whole is such that a rational factfinder could have found Thompson guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt. Thompson's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is rejected.
When reviewing the district court's denial of a defendant's suppression motion, we review the factual underpinnings using a substantial competent evidence standard. The ultimate legal conclusion drawn from such facts, however, is a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 71, 73, 106 P.3d 1 (2005). If the facts are undisputed, the question of whether evidence should have been suppressed is a question of law, and we have unlimited review. State v. Ramirez, 278 Kan. 402, 404, 100 P.3d 94 (2004). The prosecution has the burden of proving that a search and seizure was lawful. K.S.A. 22-3216(2).
The stopping of a moving vehicle by law enforcement is always considered a seizure. City of Norton v. Stewart, 31 Kan. App.2d 645, 647, 70 P.3d 707 (2003). To lawfully stop a moving vehicle under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and K.S.A. 22-2402(1), a law enforcement officer must ...
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State v. Thompson, No. 94,254.
...of this court and the Court of Appeals, we will not extensively narrate the underlying facts and circumstances. See State v. Thompson, 36 Kan.App.2d 252, 138 P.3d 398 (2006), rev'd and remanded 284 Kan. 763, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007) (Thompson I). Some discussion of the procedural background of ......
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State v. Thompson
...search of his vehicle and, therefore, his "Fourth Amendment rights do not come into play." On direct appeal in State v. Thompson, 36 Kan.App.2d 252, 260-61, 138 P.3d 398 (2006), the Court of Appeals panel reversed, holding in part "that Thompson submitted to a claim of lawful authority rath......
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State v. Thompson, No. 94,254 (Kan. 10/17/2007)
...much the same as those applied to determine if an encounter is consensual. Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 36 Kan. App. 2d 252, 138 P.3d 398 (2006). Appeal from McPherson district court; CARL B. ANDERSON, JR., judge. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district ......
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State v. Thompson
...of this court and the Court of Appeals, we will not extensively narrate the underlying facts and circumstances. See State v. Thompson, 36 Kan.App.2d 252, 138 P.3d 398 (2006), rev'd and remanded 284 Kan. 763, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007) (Thompson I). Some discussion of the procedural background of ......