State v. Thompson
| Decision Date | 22 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-134,93-134 |
| Citation | 263 Mont. 17,865 P.2d 1125 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Edward THOMPSON, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
William F. Hooks, Appellate Defender Office, Helena, for defendant and appellant.
Joseph P. Mazurek, Atty. Gen., Cregg W. Coughlin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, George H. Corn, Ravalli County Atty., Hamilton, for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant James Edward Thompson (Thompson) appeals a jury verdict from the Montana Fourth Judicial District, Ravalli County (now the Twenty-First Judicial District), which convicted him of felony assault. We affirm.
The following issues are presented for our review:
1. Did the District Court err in permitting the jury to consider certain statements made by the defendant at the omnibus hearing?
2. Did the District Court err in permitting a medical doctor to testify as to the victim's identification of the perpetrator?
3. Was defendant denied his right to a speedy trial under the Montana and United States constitutions?
On Monday, March 9, 1992, ten-year-old K.T. was talking to Cindy Duarte (Duarte), a teacher at the Corvallis school which she attended. During their conversation, K.T. coughed and grabbed her side, complaining that her side hurt, and then showed her bruises and scrapes to Ms. Duarte. Duarte asked K.T. what had happened and K.T. responded that her stepfather had repeatedly kicked her. Upon further questioning from Duarte, K.T. revealed another injury on her leg.
Duarte advised the school principal of what she had observed; the principal then contacted Linda Heyes (Heyes), a social worker with the Department of Family Services, who in turn notified the Ravalli County Sheriff's office. Heyes and Officer Pat Richie investigated the matter; they met with K.T. at the school and looked at K.T.'s injuries. They noted that K.T. had bruises on her left arm, on her left torso, on her back, on her legs and on her shin. Heyes described the injuries as "extensive and severe"; Officer Richie described them as "pretty extensive."
Heyes and Richie took K.T. to the emergency room at Marcus Daly Hospital in Hamilton because K.T. complained of pain when she coughed and when she breathed. Dr. Brett Bender, the emergency room physician, examined K.T. and observed numerous bruises over K.T.'s chest, back, right leg and left arm. When Dr. Bender asked her why she was there to see him, she told him that her stepfather had kicked her numerous times. Dr. Bender noted that the bruises were 20-30 hours old and were consistent with injuries sustained from kicking.
When K.T. referred to her "stepfather," she meant the defendant, James Edward Thompson. Thompson testified that he and K.T.'s mother are common law husband and wife. Heyes spoke with Thompson about the incident and he told her that he had grabbed K.T. by the hair and thrown her up onto a dresser, but that he had not kicked her. He further claimed that K.T. had injured herself when she had a tantrum in the garage and threw herself up against a woodpile, against car parts and then against the woodpile again.
Thompson was charged with felony assault on May 6, 1992. Counsel was appointed to defend Thompson, but he expressed dissatisfaction with that representation as well as the public defender system in general. At the omnibus hearing on May 26, Thompson asked to personally address the District Court. Against the advice of his counsel, he then read a prepared statement to the court. Thompson also read the statement although the District Court had admonished him at the urging of the Ravalli County Attorney that anything he stated would be used against him. This statement was subsequently read to the jury at Thompson's trial for felony assault.
Further facts will be provided as necessary in the opinion.
Did the District Court err in permitting the jury to consider certain statements made by the defendant at the omnibus hearing?
Prior to trial, Thompson filed a motion in limine to suppress the admission into evidence of certain statements he had made at the omnibus hearing. The portion of the transcript of the omnibus hearing admitted into evidence, which Thompson sought to suppress, is as follows:
[Thompson]: ... The first remark refers to two parts of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. This amendment has been and is proven thoroughly in several cases by state, federal and supreme courts of these United States.
The charges brought today against me are a direct and contradictory action against the references to religion and religious freedom. Christianity in the New Testament of the Bible refers specifically to the use of force on and in the rearing of children. It is direct in its quotation, "To spare the rod and spoil the child."
Mr. CORN: Your Honor, may I object: The Defendant should be admonished that anything he states can be used against him.
Having not had a formal education in law or mediation, much of my knowledge is firsthand from reading this constitutional entry which directly stipulates that congress or no law-making establishment may or will make any laws regarding religions.
This openly means that if a person--any person--in an attempt to live a life in his personal religious manner may not be made to submit to the atrocities of invasion of privacy, discrimination or to answer for his personal religious views in an open court or to be brought before a charge which he may believe is a Godly action.
Remembering that in Christianity, child sacrifice was also accepted, any form of action less would be a merciful action.
Over the objection of defense counsel, the prosecutor read the above-quoted statement aloud during the State's case-in-chief. Thompson had alleged in his motion in limine that the above statements were prejudicial because they were the result of an "emotional outburst" and were irrelevant to the crime charged.
The District Court denied the motion to suppress the statements from evidence because Thompson had no basis for asserting that the statement was an "emotional outburst." In the Opinion and Order denying Thompson's motion in limine, the District Court stated:
Defendant has filed a Motion in Limine to exclude the use by the State of a statement which Defendant read to the Court at the end of the May 26, 1992 omnibus hearing. Defendant asked the Court if he could read his prepared statement to the Court. At that time the Court again advised him of his rights. Defendant responded that he understood his rights and that he wanted to make the public statement even though it was against the advise (sic) of his own counsel. Defendant's argument that the statement was an emotional outburst is without factual basis. Defendant appeared calm and composed as he read the lengthy, pre-prepared public statement to the Court. Defendant's statement was made voluntarily, with full knowledge of his rights, and is therefore admissible....
On appeal, Thompson makes three arguments relating to his statement. Thompson first contends that the District Court erred by permitting the State to read the statement because it was neither an admission nor a confession. He further contends that the District Court then exacerbated the error by instructing the jury as to how to weigh the statement as an admission or confession when in fact the statement was neither an admission nor a confession. Finally, he claims that the statement was unduly prejudicial and that any probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect.
We first conclude that this is the sort of statement which this Court has characterized as an admission. See, e.g., State v. Stevens (1921), 60 Mont. 390, 199 P. 256. Thompson's statement indicates that he believed that the First Amendment allowed him to punish his stepdaughter as he saw fit; this statement is inconsistent with his theory of innocence which was that he did not inflict the injuries upon K.T. by kicking her and that she had injured herself in a tantrum. Statements or declarations of independent facts which are inconsistent with any theory of innocence on the part of a defendant, thus tending to prove the defendant's guilt although on a different set of facts, are competent evidence as admissions against interest. Stevens, 60 Mont. at 401-02, 199 P. at 259.
"An 'admission' is defined as an avowal or acknowledgement of a fact or of circumstances from which, together with other facts, guilt may be inferred." State v. Goltz (1982), 197 Mont. 361, 369, 642 P.2d 1079, 1084, (quoting 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 730(a) (1961)). An admission does not acknowledge guilt; rather, it tends to establish guilt. Goltz, 642 P.2d at 1084. See also People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill.2d 22, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840, cert. denied sub nom. Stewart v. Illinois, 471 U.S. 1131, 105 S.Ct. 2666, 86 L.Ed.2d 283, reh'g denied 473 U.S. 921, 105 S.Ct. 3548, 87 L.Ed.2d 671.
We further conclude that the District Court did not err when it instructed the jury with regard to admissions and confessions by giving the following jury instruction:
Admission or confession.
A statement made by a defendant other than at this trial may be an admission or confession.
A confession, as applied in criminal law, is a statement by a person made after the offense was committed that he...
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